« Previous |
21 - 30 of 30
|
Next »
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
22. Korea-Mongolia Economic Relations: Current Status and Cooperation Measures
- Author:
- Lee Jae Young
- Publication Date:
- 07-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, Korea and Mongolia have broadened cooperation in various areas such as politics, economy, society, and culture given their geographical proximity and cultural similarities. However, the progress of economic cooperation which has been identified as one of the pillars of Korea-Mongolia cooperation is still weak in comparison with other areas. Thus, it is important to analyze achievements and limitations of economic cooperation with Mongolia, which has emerged as a burgeoning new market of Eurasia, and find new measures to elevate their economic relations to a new high moving forward. In this context, the main objective of this research lies in looking back upon the past 26 years and developing a new strategy on economic cooperation measures. Korea needs to formulate a new strategy that provides a coherent, systematic framework for cooperation with Mongolia and implement it consistently. Holding bilateral summit meetings and Korea-Mongolian forums on a regular basis, strengthening high-level networking, and concluding free trade and visa exemption agreements are necessary.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Mongolia, Asia, South Korea, and Korea
23. From Eastward Pivot to Greater Eurasia
- Author:
- S. Karaganov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- The current stage of russia’s pivot to the east is the product of the second half of the 2000s largely as a belated economic response to the rise of asia, which opened new opportunities for the country’s devel- opment, especially for it eastern part. That rise made it possible to turn the ural region and the russian Far east from a mainly imperial burden – or a logistics base in confrontation with the West, sometimes a front line in rivalry with Japan or china – into a potential territory of develop- ment for the entire country. The expediency of making the pivot was substantiated by the fore- casted imminent economic slowdown of its main traditional partner, europe, and the deterioration of relations with europe and the West as a whole. The need for the diversification of economic ties and outside sources of development was becoming increasingly obvious. These assessments were backed up by a number of pronounced trends in the recent decade. First, these are the disintegration and crisis of the global order that the West has been trying to impose on the world since what it saw as its final victory. second is the process of relative de- globalization and the regionalization of the global economy and politics. and the third is the accelerating trend – related to the previous one – toward the politicization of economic ties, which made interdependence and dependence on one market comparatively less beneficial, if not sim- ply dangerous. Finally, the “asia for asia” trend prevailed over the “asia for the world” trend. Development in asia, especially in china, began to be increasingly oriented toward domestic and regional markets. Meanwhile, the process of spiritual and ideological emancipation of the formerly great asian civilizations, which in the past two centuries had been in colonial or semi-colonial dependence on the West, began to gain momen- tum. asian countries gained access to many achievements of the West, took advantage of the liberal global economic order that it created, became stronger, and began to claim a more appropriate place for them- selves on the world’s ideological and strategic map. The inevitability of the u.s. moving away (at least temporarily) from the role of a global hegemon, which came with a hefty price tag, became evident. Barack Obama set a course for domestic revival. however, old elites and inertia did not allow him to abandon costly and ineffective interventionism. Donald Trump strengthened the “self-isolation” trend. The u.s. has turned into a dangerous amalgam of residual intervention- ism and semi-isolationism. It is becoming increasingly evident that the u.s. seeks to create its own center, casting off some of its disadvanta- geous global commitments. a trend has evolved toward the formation of a hypothetically bipolar world through a multi-polar world with its inevitable chaos. One of its poles is based around the u.s. and the other is in eurasia. china seems to be its economic center, but the eurasian center will only materialize if Beijing does not claim the role of hegemon. however, whatever the case may be, it has turned out that once it has finally made a pivot to the east, russia has discovered many unexpected opportunities for itself.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Hegemony, Empire, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
24. Economic Integration between South Asia and East Asia: A Perception Survey of Asian Opinion Leaders
- Author:
- Pradumna B. Rana and Wai-Mun Chia
- Publication Date:
- 04-2014
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
- Abstract:
- Economic integration, which was deepening among the East Asian countries, is now broadening to cover the South Asian region as well. While we are starting to witness the emergence of Pan-Asian integration, a few distinct and yet related questions arise. What are the benefits and costs of South Asia and East Asia (SA-EA) integration? What are the respective roles of market-led vs. regional cooperation policies? Could the integration of the two be an example of “open” regionalism? What are the policies that South Asian countries should adopt under their “Look East” polices to link themselves to production networks in East Asia? What is the role of infrastructure and connectivity? What are the factors that have led to the revival of land connectivity or old South-western Silk Road in Asia? Should efforts to promote ASEAN-India connectivity be supported? Should the membership of East Asian institutions be expanded to cover South Asian countries at an appropriate level? In particular, should India be invited to join the various ASEAN+3 initiatives? Should South Asian countries (other than India) be invited to join the negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)? Can the integration of the two regions re- invigorate economic integration in South Asia? This paper assesses the views of South Asian and East Asian opinion leaders through a perception survey conducted in 2013. 390 respondents from academia, business, and various government offices participated in the survey. In general, the opinion leaders in both regions generally feel positive about the integration of the two regions and they feel that it could revive economic integration in South Asia. They also feel that South Asian countries should be given a role in various East Asian initiatives.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- South Asia, East Asia, and Asia
25. The Transfer of Power in Central Asia and Threats to Regional Stability Russian Politics in Times of Change: Internal and External Factors of Transformation Russia’s View of Its Relations with Georgia after the 2012 Elections: Implications for Regional Stability The “Color Revolutions” and “Arab Spring” in Russian Official Discourse Russia and the Arab Spring The Ukrainian Crisis and its Effect on the Project to Establish a Eurasian Economic Union
- Author:
- Marina Lapenko
- Publication Date:
- 12-2014
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Connections
- Institution:
- Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
- Abstract:
- A continuing transformation of the post-Soviet space is presently underway as it sheds the last elements of its common Soviet past. New geopolitical and spatial configurations and integration associations are being created, with a new set of players and develop-ment priorities appropriate to today’s international situation and the new challenges. The ideological dogma of “fraternal allied republics” is being replaced by the prag-matism of national interests and a desire to take a rightful place in the system of world economic ties. The topic of integration and choosing an integration vector is a central theme in the foreign policy of each new independent state. The project to establish the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is one of the most im-portant Russian integration initiatives since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The objec-tives and tasks of a new integration group, as well as the makeup of the integration core and potential participants, have now been determined.
- Topic:
- Nationalism, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Asia
26. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China
- Author:
- Dong Ryul Lee
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
27. Lost in Translation? The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of U.S.-China Relations
- Author:
- Yang Gyu Kim
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country’s policies. Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements. Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world’s hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese language sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, UCR Statement Factsheet. The UCR Briefing will analyze the UCR Statement Factsheets and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The UCR Briefing will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This UCR Briefing No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
28. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys on Ratification
- Author:
- Wonchil Chung
- Publication Date:
- 10-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- There was a lot at stake for the Korean Congress in August 2011, and one of them was the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Regarding this bill, the two main parties have been pitted against one another. The Grand National Party (GNP) asserts that the FTA bill has at least to be submitted to the Standing Committee; while the Democratic Party (DP) suggests the 10+2 renegotiation proposal (see Appendix 1) for the KORUS FTA that impose restrictions on the arrangement. If the DP's proposal is agreed upon by the National Congress, ratification becomes impossible, since the proposal will allow the negotiation of the FTA, in progress for more than four years (2006 to February 2011), to be taken back to square one. It is true that the KORUS FTA has a lot to offer when it comes to economic aspects, as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) pointed out in its analysis (see Appendix 2). With that in mind, the GNP risks its political position, as public opinion displays distrust and dissatisfaction over the imbalance between Korea and the United States shown during the progress of the negotiation (see Appendix 3).
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
29. Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China and Its Implications
- Author:
- Dong Ryul Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il embarked on a secretive trip to China on May 3, 2010. The five day visit was his first to China in four years and his fifth so far. Kim’s recent visit to China does not seem to be that much different from previous summit meetings between North Korea and China. Although North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009 did not provoke a longer than normal suspension in bilateral exchanges, in essence, progress has been made since the resumption of bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000. The key agenda of the recent summit has been consistent with the principle in which China provides economic assistance in exchange for North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. This principle has been the backbone of Beijing’s North Korea policy, which has been in place since the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Furthermore, this secretive trip to China looks very similar to Kim Jong-il’s last four visits to China, where he toured the industrial regions that have benefited from China’s economic reform and opening. There has been a lot of controversy and diverse assumptions on the reason for Kim’s visit to China. This is particularly attributable to the complicated and delicate nature of inter-Korean relations even though this China-DPRK summit shares many similarities with those of the past. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the political and security environment of the Korean Peninsula in which Kim Jong-il decided to make such a critical strategic decision to travel to China. The visit and the resulting bilateral summit were a successful conclusion to the longest gap in China-DPRK relations since the revival of bilateral ties at the beginning of 2000. Similarly, this summit carries special meaning considering the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks that has gone on for the past eighteen months. What is more significant is the fact that Kim Jong-il’s trip immediately followed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s official visit to China on April 30, amid the escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations over the North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan. Moreover, North Korea is facing dire domestic circumstances primarily caused by the health problems of Kim Jong-il, the succession issue, instability following the disastrous currency reform of late 2009, and its failing economy struggling under United Nations sanctions. The fact that the China-DPRK summit took place in such a complex environment indicates that a wide range of current issues were involved and it would have a greater impact for stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s actions immediately following the bilateral summit with China should be closely examined as it could help South Korea predict how the Cheonan incident will develop. There were no official reports or any specific details of the conversation available for the public due to the opaque nature of the talk. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize as well as analyze any subtle moves by both countries that might reflect any possible major agreements between the two sides. There are three major questions that need to be answered when evaluating this recent summit in China. First, what is the significance of the summit regarding China-DPRK relations and Beijing’s policy toward North Korea? Second, did North Korea and China agree on the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Chinese support for its regime? If so, what is the prospect for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? Third, what impact will this summit have on ROK-China relations in light of the fact that the summit meeting took place while the South Korean-led international investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking was in progress?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and North Korea
30. Economic Interdependence, Alliance Cooperation, and Sino-U.S. Complex Interdependence
- Author:
- Scott Snyder
- Publication Date:
- 12-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- China’s rising economic strength has highlighted a need to understand in greater detail the impact of complex economic interdependence on prospects for alliance cohesion, especially when an ally comes to depend on a potential adversary as its leading trading partner and engine for economic growth. This is an issue that did not come into play to any significant degree in analyzing alliance dynamics during the cold war era precisely because the development of security and economic relationships during that period were aligned with and served to reinforce each other, and the level of economic ties among potential cold-war adversaries was minimal. Analysis of trade relationships among security allies from that period shows a clear correlation of preferences for trading relationships with security partners versus adversaries, but it is not clear based on that data alone that there was necessarily causality between economic trade patterns and security alliances. In fact, structural differences between market economies (that tended to be allied with each other) and non-market economies were a significant deterrent to the development of economic relations with non-security partners during the cold war. In the post-cold war era, economically interdependent trade and investment relationships have been relatively unconstrained by political and security considerations, resulting in a situation where non-security partners such as China, a potential challenger to U.S. power, have become actively integrated in global supply chains as a leading manufacturer of goods for the global market. In considering this question, Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim have attempted to provide an empirical analysis of the influence of bilateral economic relations as a factor in shaping America’s Asian alliances, concluding that “economic ties do not markedly reinforce the security alliances of East Asia, because they have an asymmetrical structure”(Lee and Kim 2010, 4). But in making the argument that asymmetry matters, Lee and Kim assume that the economic consequences of interdependence are negative for dynamics within the alliance and that these negative consequences may cancel out positive effects of economic interdependence, even though the main argument of that the paper proves is that economic ties do not necessarily reinforce security alliances. The authors’ assertions regarding asymmetrical economic relations as having an impact on alliance dynamics are unproven and not dealt with to any significant degree by the evidence presented in the paper.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
- « Previous
- Next »
- 1
- 2
- 3