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21. The Pandemic and its Impact on the South Korea-Japan Identity Clash

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The global pandemic caused by the onset of the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 has tested governance at both the national and international levels by challenging the capacity of nations to provide effective public health solutions to protect their citizenry. The pandemic has deepened preexisting international rivalries while also creating diplomatic opportunities to promote international cooperation and public diplomacy. Rather than serving as a turning point for a new era in international relations, the pandemic and the global response appear primarily to have accelerated preexisting trends. In Northeast Asia, the pandemic has accelerated deepening rivalry between the United States and China, reinforced political paralysis between Japan and South Korea, primarily by providing a pretext for privileging domestic concerns and constituencies at the expense of international relations, and has generated heightened new foreign policy challenges resulting from deepening identity-based major power rivalries. This chapter reviews the deepening of identity-based challenges facing Japan-South Korea relations prior to 2020, examines the conditions generated by leadership responses in both countries to the pandemic, identifies missed opportunities for pandemic-related cooperation between the two countries, and addresses challenges and opportunities facing the Japan-South Korea relationship in the context of anticipated recovery from the pandemic as well as the shifting geopolitical environment as tensions mount between China and the United States.
Topic:
Culture, Domestic Politics, COVID-19, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

22. The Coronavirus: Fueling Concerns and Contrasts between India and China

Author:
Tanvi Madan
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On February 26, 2020, an Indian plane landed in Wuhan carrying medical supplies for China, which was then the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak. On its return, it evacuated a number of Indian and Bangladeshi nationals, as well as citizens of other countries. On the face of it, this is the kind of cooperative effort that is expected during a global public health crisis, with countries—even competitors—coming together at a time of need. However, the saga of that flight reflected another (prescient) dynamic—that COVID-19 would reinforce and increase rather than alleviate competition between China and India and complicate cooperation, with pandemic response and recovery efforts being seen through a competitive prism. That flight to Wuhan was not smooth; indeed, it was much delayed. Delhi had announced it a week earlier. It was a way to help China, demonstrate India’s capacity, and assist India’s neighbors by evacuating their citizens. But then Indian officials publicly, albeit anonymously, revealed that Beijing was not clearing the flight. The reason was unclear—China, after all, had been requesting international support. There also did not seem to be a bureaucratic snafu. So, was it the visual of Beijing accepting support from India, which Chinese officials and analysts sometimes dismiss as a less capable, even chaotic, neighbor? Was it the desire not to give India a soft power win, including with its neighbors? Was it because the flight involved a military transport aircraft procured from the U.S.? Was it retaliation for the temporary Indian detention of a Chinese ship bound for Pakistan due to a tip-off of dual-use items on board? Or was the reason Chinese unhappiness about Indian travel restrictions to and from China, or Indian export limits on certain medical products? Whatever the reason, China eventually gave the flight clearance, but only a week later and after much Indian negotiation. It was an early sign that the public health arena would not be immune from the competitive atmosphere prevailing between the two countries, and in the region as a whole. Subsequent events only bore that out. There has been considerable discussion about how countries’ perceptions of China would change due to the pandemic—at the beginning because of its mishandling, and then because of its recovery. This chapter argues that, rather than change perceptions, Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 increased the largely skeptical views of China that prevail in India, which had at least 29 million cases and over 385,000 deaths in India by mid-June 2021 (the 2nd and 3rd highest in the world respectively). This trend was further bolstered by the worst boundary crisis between the two countries since they fought a war in 1962. Together, the pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the India-China relationship have been front and center over the last year. They have reinforced and accelerated concerns in India about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain commitment to the rules-based order, as well as its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institutions. And they have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to cooperate and to stabilize their relationship over the last two decades, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spill over into conflict. This chapter examines the impact of first the pandemic and then the boundary crisis on perceptions of China among the Indian government, establishment, and public. It proceeds to outline the consequences of these perceptions on Indian domestic policy, its partnerships with like-minded major and middle powers, and its counter-COVID activism. Finally, it considers China’s response, particularly to Indian policy changes.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

23. The Sino–U.S. National Identity Gap and Bilateral Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The national identity gap between China and the United States has become increasingly apparent. Under Xi Jinping, China has sought to reclaim its historical greatness and proclaimed itself to be a responsible great power that offers a credible alternative to Western values, while also promoting increasingly authoritarian policies at home, complete with extensive repression in Xinjiang and renewed state control of the economy. Assertions of U.S. national identity were somewhat muted under Donald Trump, confused by the battle between those who supported the administration’s “America First” policy, its transactional approach to foreign affairs, and its deemphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy, and those who worried about the global repercussions of an isolationist, nativist policy. For a time, the United States seemed more preoccupied with its trade war with China than with claims that the United States should act as the global protector of human rights and democracy. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated already tense Sino–U.S. relations and called both countries’ national identities into question. While China had, as of spring 2021, succeeded in keeping its COVID-19 outbreak remarkably small, the damage caused by its initial suppression of medical reports, along with successful virus mitigation in a number of non-authoritarian states, called into question its claim to be a responsible world power on the basis of its pandemic performance. Meanwhile, the Trump administration failed to protect U.S. citizens from catastrophic death tolls and prevented the United States from taking a leading role in resolving this global crisis. In January 2021, the Biden administration took office with a focus on swiftly ending the pandemic, while also reasserting the traditional U.S. global leadership role. When combined with its assessment of U.S. power after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and of U.S. domestic social and political instability evident throughout 2020-2021, the pandemic has strengthened China’s perceptions of the United States as a country in decline, and of China as a “risen” great power that should now play a major role in shaping the global order. At the same time, although U.S. policy towards China remains firm despite the presidential transition, the underlying rationale has shifted from the “America First” approach of the Trump administration to the democratic values-infused approach of the Biden administration. As the world struggles to move beyond the pandemic, the national identities of China and the United States are increasingly defined in opposition to each other and seem likely to drive an ever more challenging bilateral relationship in the coming years.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Kishida’s Onerous Task After the General Election: The Promotion of Democracy in Domestic and World Politics

Author:
Jaeun Yun
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On October 31, the general election was held in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured a comfortable majority in the lower house, winning 261 seats. Professor Jaeun Yun states this election shows that the majority of Japanese people tend to approve of the Kishida administration. He also points out that the Kishida administration, albeit securing a comfortable majority, needs to address two issues: to recover democracy in domestic politics and to carry out realistic foreign policy for the promotion of democracy in world politics. In order to promote and contribute to democracy domestically and internationally, he suggests that “reluctant realism” could turn out to be “realistic proactive pacifism.”
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

25. Partisan Biases in U.S.‐Japan Relations

Author:
Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Japan will welcome the Biden administration with relief in the wake of what was perceived as Trump’s bombast, threats, and unpredictability – but it will be mixed with apprehension (fair or not) that Biden’s presidency will follow the Obama administration’s perceived weakness, or even accommodation, toward China. It’s a crude simplification, but Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s relationship with U.S. political parties is roughly that they share preferences but not perceptions with Democrats, and share perceptions but not preferences with Republicans. In practical terms, this means that Japanese decision makers favor alliances and multilateral approaches over unilateralism and brinksmanship, but are more suspicious of China’s intentions and behavior than they believe Democrats to be. Put more indelicately, the LDP prefers working with Republicans rather than Democrats. This is combined with a traditional perception that Democrats undervalue Japan as a partner. Taken as a whole, this means that the incoming administration may have to do more to convince Japan that its priorities are being taken seriously – but will find in Japan an essential partner for advancing U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. The Evolving Cross-Strait Policy of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan

Author:
Jason Po-Nien Chen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
This talk was composed of three main sections. First, Dr. Chen introduced the DPP's evolving cross-Strait policy by breaking it down into three respective phrases:1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Then he explained why the party changed from championing independence versus unification in 1990s; intraparty power struggle between de facto and de jure independence in 2000s; and reach the current position of "opposition to de facto unification under one China" rather than "pursuit of Taiwan de jure independence" in 2010s. Second, he shared his research finding and understanding regarding the DPP's view towards the status quo of cross-Strait relations. Third, he discussed the change and continuity of the DPP's position towards sovereignty and cross-Strait relations. Jason Chen has served in different positions in the Democratic Progressive Party for years mainly covering the party's external relations including cross-Strait relations and national security. His last position with the DPP was advisor (Section of National Security) in New Frontier Foundation, the DPP's think tank.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

27. Domestic Politics and Regional Dynamics in Turkey’s Geopolitical Approach to the Middle East Between 2002-2019

Author:
Billy Agwanda
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
During the last two decades, key reforms in social, economic, and political structures have elevated Turkey into a rising regional power. In the Middle East, the increasing influence of Turkey for a better part of the last two decades has been reinforced by its humanitarian oriented foreign policy. Whereas this transformation is extensively attributed to the reform agenda by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the last decade has proved to be challenging for Turkey’s foreign policy stance. Regional dynamics, such as the Syrian civil war, Qatar crisis, and the Kurdish question, have influenced Turkey to gradually shift from its previous subtle to a more assertive foreign policy. Additionally, the frequent domestic political challenges and economic pressure on the AKP government have only pushed Turkey further towards a more assertive Middle East foreign policy. This article examines how regional and domestic political developments are influencing Turkish foreign policy approach. The analysis will attempt to provide a comprehensive perspective on why Turkish geopolitical engagement and an increasingly assertive foreign policy that is characterised by unilateralism particularly in the pursuit of national and regional security is leading to its isolation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

28. 2021 Report on American Attitudes towards the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy

Author:
Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
KEI’s 2021 Report on American Attitudes on the U.S.-ROK Alliance and North Korea Policy summarizes results from a survey commissioned by KEI and conducted by YouGov on May 6th to May 10th, 2021 in advance of the U.S.-ROK summit on May 21st, 2021. The survey asked Americans their views on the U.S.-South Korea relationship, North Korea policy, and the U.S.’ role in the East Asian region.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

29. Key Issues in the Myanmar November 2020 Elections

Author:
Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Franque Grimard, and Kai Scott
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University (ISID)
Abstract:
On 8 November 2020, Myanmar will hold its second election since the country’s gradual liberalization began. Despite presenting itself as a force for liberal democracy five years ago, the National League for Democracy (NLD) has demonstrated its unwillingness to commit itself to the protection of civil freedoms and the expansion of federal governance. It has fallen short of campaign promises by failing to enact meaningful constitutional change, improve economic performance, and address the protracted peace process. Notably, the government has created a climate that represses dissidents and undermines ethnic pluralism. Yet, the NLD’s support base remains strong, in part as a result of Aung San Suu Kyi’s continued ability to appeal to a Bamar-majority voter base by opposing the military cronyism of past and rooting herself in ethno-nationalist values, as witnessed in her decision to respond to charges of genocide at the International Court of Justice at the Hague. As a result, the NLD’s continued dominance over the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) is expected to continue. In the ethnic states, the situation is different—here, the ethnic political parties are expected to make gains on the NLD, as their recent merging place them well to take advantage of anti-NLD sentiment that has grown within ethnic minorities over the years because of the NLD’s perceived Bamar-centric governance. In addition, a lack of trust in the Union Elections Commission and complications due to covid-19 are significant sources of risk in the running of the 2020 election.
Topic:
Development, Government, Human Rights, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

30. China's Situation after the National People's Congress

Author:
Li Hao
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The National People's Congress (NPC) was held in China from May 22 to 28. The 2020 NPC, originally scheduled to open on March 5 as usual, was postponed due to the novel coronavirus outbreak. No new date was announced at the time of postponement and, despite rumours of a meeting in late March or mid-April, in the end it was not held until late May. The session was shorter than usual, and participants underwent PCR testing. Most delegates attended the opening ceremony wearing masks, but the NPC leadership and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Politburo members seated in the two front rows did not wear masks. Before this year's NPC got underway, the key agenda items were whether to declare victory in the battle against the coronavirus and what economic growth targets to establish. However, other issues not initially anticipated, such as the introduction of the Hong Kong version of the National Security Law, also came to garner attention. This paper briefly reviews and analyses issues that were the focus of deliberations at the NPC.
Topic:
Government, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia