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11. A Decade Under the Millennial Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un

Author:
Jeong Won Na
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jeong Won Na, a researcher at Seoul Pyongyang News depicts Kim Jong-un as a trend-sensitive and adventurous leader and provides an overview of the recent changes in North Korea. He states that the symbolic importance of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il has been visibly reduced as Kimilsungia and Kimjongillia flowers disappeared after 2019 and the virtues of patriotism and nationalism have been brought forward as their substitutes. In addition, Dr. Na views that supreme leader Kim has been aiming to improve the regime durability by actively restoring a party-centered management structure, given that important policies have actually been decided during Party sessions ever since the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea was reconvened in May 2016.
Topic:
Nationalism, Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Kim Jong-un, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

12. Foreign Policy Recharged after Defusing MAGA: Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Byoung Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Byoung Kwon Sohn, Professor at Chung-Ang University, predicts that the Biden administration will likely stick to its stance on foreign policy, with the Senate secure in Democratic hands and the inter-party House seat margin found to be smaller than expected. Encountering the recent escalation in North Korea, he claims that Washington will keep the Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation in place and strengthen its commitment to extended deterrence to its two Asian allies. Professor Sohn also highlights that the United States will continue to pursue its current Indo-Pacific strategy to contain Chinese influence in the region whilst attempting to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Domestic Politics, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

13. China’s 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep?

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping successfully thwarted another “Twitter coup” in late September 2022, making clear he will remain China’s top leader for at least the next five years. But there is much less certainty about who else will make up the new leadership team at the 20th Party Congress that will assist Xi in guiding the country through its most challenging period in decades. There are virtually no hard rules in CCP politicking limiting the range of possible outcomes, and even the “norms” that are often cited as governing the process of choosing a new leadership lineup are, at best, loose conventions rather than predictable practices. Xi’s extreme centralization of power also means that China’s already deeply opaque political system is even more so, and more than two and a half years of COVID isolation for China has made it much more challenging to glean authoritative insights. Nevertheless, one still gets a very clear sense that the personnel arrangements for the party congress are largely in hand, and that Xi Jinping is firmly in command and very comfortable with them. If we accept that as the baseline, it is possible to deduce the most likely scenarios for personnel turnover at the apex of CCP power and decision-making, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). As with so many things in Xi Jinping’s unique political universe, it seems that the outcome will probably be one of two fairly binary, and perhaps nearly equally likely, possibilities. The first, a “stasis” scenario, would see very little change to the PBSC as Xi either strictly adheres to the convention, followed since 2002, that officials 68 or older must retire, or largely abides by it except for some PBSC incumbents, most probably Premier Li Keqiang, who may step down even though he is 67. In the second “sweep” scenario, Xi could adjust the age criteria downward or just outright ignore it, creating a lot more room for new entrants to the PBSC.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

14. The Third Term: Messages from China’s CCP’s national congress to the US

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held from October 16 to October 22, is the most significant event in China. The event only happens twice every decade, but this particular Congress is extraordinarily important. President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third five-year term in power, breaking with the party’s rule of not allowing a sitting leader for more than two successive five-year terms in office. The rule was established by former president Deng Xiaoping and was enshrined in the country’s constitution which was later amended by president Xi in 2017.
Topic:
Economy, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

15. China Is Playing by Turkey’s Media Rules

Author:
Çağdaş Üngör
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese players have localized their strategies to improve China’s image in Turkey in recent years. Although China and Turkey have long maintained friendly relations at the official level, Turkish people remained notably skeptical of China throughout the 2000s. Indeed, Turkey’s unfavorable public opinion has been a constant headache for China, whose propaganda outlets in the country produce little Turkish language content that actually resonates with domestic audiences. Turkey also has few explicitly pro-China voices and no sizable overseas Chinese community, which has made positive public relations into an uphill battle for Beijing. But having acknowledged these weaknesses in recent years, the Chinese regime has opted for strategies that aim at building a new synergy with local actors in the Turkish mediasphere. Beijing has adapted to the local rules of Turkish media and sought new opportunities to elevate China’s image in Turkey by leveraging its friendly ties with Ankara. The Turkish government, which exerts substantial influence over domestic media, has provided new platforms for China to realize its soft power goals within a largely polarized setting with little press freedom. In this context, Turkey’s progovernment newspapers have published “advertorials” celebrating the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, journalists from Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency have participated in Chinese-sponsored press tours to Xinjiang, where Beijing has sought to undercut the Turkish narrative around abuses against the Uyghurs. On the other end of Turkey’s polarized ideological spectrum, China has also appealed to left-wing opposition groups through its narratives, which emphasize the country’s anti-imperialist credentials. Such messaging strategies may already have produced some results in Turkey, as the most recent opinion polls reflect a gradual increase in the number of Turkish citizens who perceive China as a potential partner.
Topic:
Media, Domestic Politics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

16. Raising the Curtain on China’s 20th Party Congress: Mechanics, Rules, “Norms,” and the Realities of Power

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is preparing to convene its 20th Party Congress in late 2022, and the party apparatus is already in full swing making the necessary arrangements for the political conclave, held every five years. President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping had hoped to tread an easy path toward an atypical third term in power, but unexpected events at home and abroad have complicated that trajectory. Xi would like the congress to mark the beginning of what could be a sustained period of strongman rule, making it one of the most consequential party gatherings in decades: Xi has spent his current term laying the groundwork for a major win at the 20th Party Congress. The regime’s key power centers are more beholden to him personally than they were five years ago, and Xi has orchestrated a methodical campaign of highly personalized aggrandization of his position within the leadership by garnering progressively more grandiose ideological laureates, making Xi and his policies very difficult to challenge. Xi’s third-term gambit leaves him in a much stronger position to dictate outcomes than his two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom were preparing to step down from formal office at roughly the same time in their tenure. Xi has rewired the regime’s policymaking ecosystem to deemphasize the formal government bureaucracy, bolstering his ability to steer a course that is favorable to his personal and policy goals. Against this backdrop, this paper reviews the official building blocks that shape what is and is not permissible in CCP politics, as well the mechanics of producing a new top leadership lineup at each party congress, and considers whether these mechanisms might restrict Xi’s freedom of action despite his impressive accrual of personal power atop the CCP hierarchy.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Norms, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. 2022, Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis: Or is it?

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The year 2022 is proving to be a difficult one for China and for President Xi Jinping. Choices like Xi’s embrace of Russia and the zero-COVID policy have prompted sporadic outbursts from the Chinese public and a backlash abroad. Unsurprisingly, this has spawned speculation that Xi is facing political difficulties at home that could hamstring or even disrupt his plan to remain China’s top leader after the 20th Party Congress later this year. Despite the real challenges Xi and the party have faced in 2022, however, this paper will argue that such narratives rest on a series of faulty assumptions about the impetus for Xi’s consolidation of power, the presence of powerful opposition voices within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system, and the judgment that Xi’s policy approach amounts to a series of blunders that may help his critics as they try to diminish him at the party congress.
Topic:
Economy, Domestic Politics, Olympics, Xi Jinping, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

18. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

19. Why Beijing Wants the Dalai Lama to Reincarnate

Author:
Tenzin Dorjee
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
A strange battle is waiting to unfold at the center of the Sino-Tibetan conflict: the fight over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. As the 86-year-old Tibetan leader, who has spent most of his life in exile, advances further in age, there is growing uncertainty about where, or whether, his reincarnation might appear. In a 2011 statement, he laid out several different succession scenarios, one of which was the possibility that he might bring the lineage to an end (Office of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, September 24, 2011). The Chinese government was incensed; it vowed to install its own 15th Dalai Lama after the demise of the incumbent—with or without his consent (Tibetan Review, December 3, 2015).
Topic:
Religion, Domestic Politics, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Tibet

20. After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era

Author:
Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
After more than eight years in office, Xi Jinping has made himself into China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping, but in doing so, Xi has destabilised elite politics and demolished the power sharing norms that evolved since the 1980s. By removing de jure and de facto term limits on the most senior position of power, and thus far refusing to nominate his successor, Xi has solidified his own leadership position but potentially pushed the country towards a destabilising succession crisis. There are various scenarios for what happens after Xi, ranging from a peaceful transfer of power to a split at the top if he is forced out of office in a coup or by illness or death.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia