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1. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

2. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence

Author:
Kenton Thibaut
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
Topic:
Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:
Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

4. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
Topic:
Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Pacific

5. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:
Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:
Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

7. Safeguarding Democracy against Disinformation: Insights from Taiwanese Civil Society

Author:
Nelson Wen
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
On August 2, 2022, pedestrians near convenience stores and a few public spaces around Taiwan began noticing that the content on digital billboards had been replaced with strident messages in Chinese, such as “Greater China will ultimately be unified!” That same month, the websites of a Taiwan university and other organizations were defaced with messages, including “There is only one China in the world!” Meanwhile, the military of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was conducting days of drills and missile launches on a scale previously unseen, though certain photos and videos claiming to show Chinese military exercises near Taiwan were later proven by Taiwan-based fact-checking organizations to be doctored or fabricated. This combination of disinformation, military saber rattling and hacking activity was the latest example of what Taiwan authorities, scholars and civil society have termed “cognitive warfare.” The experiences of Taiwan in trying to protect the integrity of its information environment against such influence attempts merit close attention from all societies and the United States in particular. This is because Taiwan provides a model for a multifaceted, grassroots response to combat disinformation, and also because a large proportion of disinformation in Taiwan relates to discrediting the United States as a reliable security partner.[ii] Based on interviews with a select group of Taiwan non-governmental organizations (NGOs), this article will illustrate how parts of Taiwan’s civil society are dealing with the challenges posed by foreign and homegrown disinformation.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Rachel E. Brooks, Taro Nishikawa, Ryohei Suzuki, Jonathon Marek, and Koutaka Yuichiro
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Pacific Forum, like the US government and much of the international security community, considers the information space a crucial theater in the United States’ ongoing great power competition with the People’s Republic of China and Russia. To meet the need for fresh policy ideas, as well as Pacific Forum’s long-standing mandate to train the next generation of policy professions in the US and its partners, we present to you this volume. In it, readers will find the finalists of our Young Professionals Essay Contest, as part of our ongoing program, The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation. Open to nationals of the two countries, the contest received numerous entries and the final decision was not an easy one—especially when comparing our finalists. On the Japanese side, Yuichiro Kotaka raises the threat posed by generative AI and poses solutions for how governments can address it, while Ryohei Suzuki suggests putting the public broadcaster NHK to use. On the US side, Jonathon Marek raises the alarm over the threat posed by authoritarian governments who have recognized disinformation as a valuable tool, while Thomas Ramage offers suggestion on how the alliance itself can address the threat that disinformation poses. However, our committee ultimately settled on two essays that stood out above the rest: on the Japanese side, Taro Nishikawa’s essay on counter-disinformation campaigns in the age of cognitive warfare was singled out for addressing the current discourse within China and for its focus on US-Japan responses. Among the American entries, Rachel Brooks’ take on how countering disinformation can be part of school curriculums received praise for its originality, creativity, and for providing both an educator’s narrative and an educator’s solution. We thank all of our contestants for their participation, and for contributing potential solutions in this age of information competition.
Topic:
International Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:
Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

10. Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers. In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image. Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’. The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs). For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state. Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform. The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content. This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,1 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally. This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China and Asia