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261. Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey's European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Genocide, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Turkey, Caucasus, Asia, Soviet Union, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

262. China: stumbling through the Pacific

Author:
Fergus Hanson
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
What is the problem? China lacks a coherent strategy for its aid program in the Pacific – beyond checking and reversing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan – and tends to pursue short-term objectives. China pledges aid in an erratic manner, funds projects without regard to recurring costs, and the secrecy surrounding its program obstructs development outcomes, and breeds suspicion. This short-termism has likely led China to miscalculate by over-engaging the dictatorship in Fiji. This approach is a legacy of its long-running battle with Taiwan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

263. Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009

Author:
Grzegorz Gromadzki, Vitali Silitski, Margarita M. Balmaceda, Sabine Fischer, Andrei Liakhovich, Astrid Sahm, and Leonid Zlotnikov
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The EU and Belarus have arrived at an important but difficult crossroads. After a long freeze, relations between Brussels and Minsk have been thawing over the past year. In September 2008, the Council of the European Union announced its readiness to 'begin to review the restrictive measures against Belarusian leaders and to take positive and concrete measures that may lead to a gradual engagement, including via a meeting between the European Union troika and the Belarusian Minister for Foreign Affairs'. A month later, on 13 October, the Council decided to restore political dialogue with the Belarusian authorities and to suspend travel restrictions against leading Belarusian officials for a period of six months. The package of restrictive measures imposed on Belarus in 2006 was extended for one year. Since October 2008, three Troika meetings between the EU and Belarus have taken place. They were complemented by a visit to Minsk by EU High Representative Javier Solana in February, and a visit by EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner in June. Mean- while, the European Commission and the Belarusian govern-ment held consultations and began technical cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, phytosanitary regulations and agriculture at the beginning of 2009. In May 2009, Belarus was included in the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partner- ship. The EU and Belarus launched a dialogue on human rights issues in June 2009.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

264. Russia in Central Asia: Old History, New Challenges?

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Russia is a power unlike others in Central Asia, given its role as the region's former coloniser, which started in the 19th century and even in the 18th for some of the northern parts of Kazakhstan. This legacy has its positive and negative aspects: it has been positive insofar as it has involved a long period of Russo–Central Asian cohabitation that has given rise to a common feeling of belonging to the same 'civilisation'; it has been negative insofar as it has accrued all the political resentment and cultural misinterpretations of the coloniser–colonised relationship. Russian–Central Asian relations are therefore complex, with each of the actors having a highly emotional perception of its relation to the other.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Post Colonialism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

265. U.S.-China Cooperation on Nuclear Power

Author:
John R. Lyman
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In 2007, the Atlantic Council of the United States (the Council) partnered with the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center (EETC) at Tsinghua and Tulane Universities to hold a series of dialogues to foster cooperation between the United States and China on developing secure and sustainable energy supplies. Over the past several years, the Council and EETC have invited key organizations, experts from industry and government, and representatives from relevant United States (U.S.) and Chinese government agencies to become directly involved in several meetings designed to identify concrete recommendations for increasing official governmental and industry cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

266. Japan-China Relations

Author:
James J. Przystup
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
After months of anticipation, Prime Minister Aso Taro dissolved the Diet on July 21 and scheduled elections for the Lower House. On Aug. 30, Aso's Liberal Democratic Party suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Democratic Party of Japan and DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio became prime minister on Sept. 16. With Japan focused on the historic shift of power for most of the quarter, politics took primacy over diplomacy. In this environment, Japan-China relations continued to tread water, waiting for the arrival of a new government in Tokyo. Perhaps the good news is that there were no major dilemmas or disruptions and the new Japanese leadership had early opportunities to establish a relationship with their Chinese counterparts.
Topic:
Diplomacy and Environment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

267. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

268. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity

Author:
Seongho Sheen
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

269. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

270. Japan between Alliance and Community

Author:
Yul Sohn
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In a series of town hall meetings during the winter of 2005–2006, Aso Taro, then Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi cabinet, introduced an interesting concept of Japan’s role in Asia. Japan can and should play the role of a “thought leader,” who through fate has been forced to face certain very difficult issues earlier than others. Because Japan has put great effort, both monetarily and socio-politically, into resolving issues that include ultra-nationalism, an aging society, and environmental protection, it has become the forerunner for other Asians to emulate (Aso 2005). This role as a soft power leader contrasts with the existing hard power–oriented (i.e., economic) discourse of international contribution as well as the conventional soft power discourse that is rooted in the Japanese culture and sensibilities, such as animation, fashion, and cultural products. Japan’s strength lies in the firstmover knowledge it provides for Asia, creating a network of knowledge available to others (Aso 2006). Three years later, Aso, this time as the Japanese Prime Minister, proudly announced a "Growth Initiative" that planned to double the current scale of Asia's economy by 2020 (Aso 2009a). This initiative, Aso’s first and thus far most important vision for Asia as Prime Minister, is aimed at moving Asia's economy from one driven by exports to one led by domestic demand, through encouraging region-wide development and expanded consumption. To make this effort, Japan has committed (a) US$20 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA); (b) US$20 billion for infrastructure development in Asia; (c) US$5 billion over two years for an initiative investing in Asian environmental projects; and (d) US$22 billion over two years to provide additional support for trade financing in order to underpin trade credit, and so on. Japan will mobilize all possible policy measures to support the efforts being made by Asian countries. In addition, Aso seeks to increase the attractiveness of Japan by utilizing cultural sources (such as manga, animation, fashion, authentic food) to create jobs in Japan and the region (Aso 2009b). Aso’s recent initiative appears to have tilted in a direction different from his earlier vision of Japan as a thought leader, a well thought out and creative idea. Today, given Japan’s rapid economic contraction caused by its “once in a century” crisis, Japan finds it difficult to attain the regional leadership it desires merely by spending more money. Utilizing cultural resources will yield only a limited outcome. Finally, the initiative is targeted at Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with few attempts to assist or engage the members of Northeast Asia such as China and South Korea. Japan has so far failed to play its desired role as a thought leader for Asia. The inconsistency between words and actions underlines the strategic dilemmas that Japan has faced as China has risen to be a formidable rival in the region.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Alliance, and Community
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia