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91. Perspectives on Taiwan Insights from the 2017 Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser and Matthew Funaiole
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by the 10 members of the 2017 CSIS Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program (TUPP) delegation. TUPP provides a much-needed opportunity for future leaders to gain a better understanding of Taiwan through first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Each participant was asked to reflect on his or her in-country experience and produce a short article analyzing a policy issue related to Taiwan. These papers are a testament to the powerful impact that follows first-hand exposure to Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

92. Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The issue: China’s increased military presence in the Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise. China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad. The security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities. China’s military forays into the Indian Ocean have triggered a series of warnings. The term “string of pearls” was first used to refer to Chinese basing access in the Indian Ocean by a 2004 report for the U.S. Department of Defense. That report suggested China’s growing regional presence could “deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Other scholars have warned that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Others suggest that the Chinese government is simply following its expanding trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. Thus, the security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, China, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indian Ocean

93. Rebooting U.S.-China Trade Ties: “Enter Ye Through the Narrow Gate”

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Nearly two weeks after the U.S. “Trade Avengers” unleashed during their visit to Beijing what one reasonably could call “trade shock and awe” with a very aggressive—if thoroughly researched and well-crafted—set of demands targeting the yawning U.S. trade deficit with China and the core of that country’s throaty industrial policy, China this week is taking its turn with the visit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and Vice Premier Liu He, President Xi Jinping’s economic point man who is almost universally described as a thoughtful, pragmatic, and mild-mannered policy academic. In the interim, voices from a wide swath of official Washington have sounded the alarm about the dangers of Chinese influence operations and the presence of alleged subversives, while President Trump himself seemed to cast aside these growing concerns by suggesting via Twitter that he would ask the Commerce Department to overturn its action against the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE—long a focus of the U.S. security community for suspected cyber espionage activity and irrefutable violations of U.S. law—in response to protests that reportedly emanated directly from President Xi. With such frenetically sustained action in such a short period of time, the fog of war seems particularly thick at the moment. As such, it seems like a good time to slow down and have a think about how we got here, what actually is going on, and, with a little bit of luck, perhaps think about some ways to craft a viable way forward. Just like milestone birthdays in one’s personal life, important political anniversaries also can incline the mind toward reflection. Next year, of course, marks the fortieth anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China. As such, much breath and a lot of ink have been devoted to analyzing the course of the bilateral relationship over that nearly half-century. Although certainly not a universal opinion, it seems fair, if perhaps overly reductionist, to suggest that the general conclusion among a substantial number of U.S. officials, policy analysts, and journalists has been that the consistent U.S. policy emphasis on engagement with China during those forty years was, at the end of the day, a sham. In this rendering, naïve groups of senior policymakers in succeeding U.S. administrations and in most of the U.S. China-watching community were hoodwinked by wily CCP leaders who talked the talk of integrating into the so-called U.S.-led rules-based international order, but all the while they had a secret master plan to instead subvert that order and challenge U.S. primacy throughout the globe. In a slightly less menacing (if no less absurd) version of this narrative, China was, indeed, headed generally toward this hoped for integration under the stewardship of deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao until Xi Jinping arrived and, through a ruthless consolidation of power, decided instead to change course in what now regularly is referred to in shorthand as Xi’s “authoritarian turn.” But this conclusion seems utterly wrongheaded when examined in the light of hard facts. On the Chinese side of the equation, for example, Deng Xiaoping may have appeared warm and cuddly when donning his cowboy hat during his famous 1979 visit to the United States, but he could be just as ruthless and grasping as any other authoritarian leader. Deng’s exceptionally courageous and dogged pursuit of the policies of reform and opening certainly are worthy of praise, but they cannot, and therefore should not, be separated from the fact that he was content to sit idly by as Chairman Mao’s loyal lieutenant as Mao decimated his political rivals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-59) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62). Nor should we forget that Deng used every ounce of his massive personal prestige with the People’s Liberation Army to, with steely determination, rally his many reluctant commanders to execute the brutal Tiananmen crackdown of June 4, 1989. Similarly, Xi Jinping is no Jack-in-the-Box-like figure who has pulled a fast one with a sharp directional turn in the last couple of years made all the more stark after his sweeping consolidation of power at last fall’s 19th Party Congress. In fact, it is this author’s contention, as supported by a large body of written work and public commentary, that everything Xi has done over the last five years was abundantly clear, whether explicitly or in embryonic form—from the moment he was introduced to the world as China’s new top leader in the fall of 2012, as encapsulated in his call for his country to pursue the “China Dream” set on a foundation of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This by no means suggests the United States should express support for, or even acquiescence in, Xi’s policies, but only that it should not be reacting with the borderline hysteria that now seems to be gripping Washington.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Global Political Economy, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

94. The Korean Civil-Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump's cancellation of the summit with North Korea is a warning as to just how difficult it is to bring any kind of stability to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. It is also a warning that the U.S. cannot focus on the nuclear issue and ICBM, rather than the overall military balance in the Koreas and the impact that any kind of war fighting can have on the civil population of South Korea and the other states in Northeast Asia. The nuclear balance is an all too critical aspect of regional security, but it is only part of the story and military capability do not address the potential impact and cost of any given form of conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

95. Climate Change: Conflict and Cooperation (Full Issue)

Author:
Meagan Torello, Rafael Leal-Arcas, Caitlin Werrell, Francesco Femia, Carmel Davis, Ziad Al Achkar, Ang Zhao, Buddhika Jayamaha, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, William Reno, Molly Jahn, Therese Adam, Peter J. Schraeder, Juan Macias-Amoretti, and Karim Bejjit
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
In the first issue of our 20th volume, the cooperative and conflictual nature of climate change in international relations is explored. Rafael Leal-Arcas analyzes the necessity of a symbiotic relationship between bottom-up and top-down negotiations to implement clean energy consumption. Following, Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia begin this issue's dialogue on climate change and security. Carmel Davis discusses the effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa's ability to develop and subsequently mitigate conflict. Similarly, Ziad Al Achkar outlines the economic, environmental, and security threats in the Arctic as its ice continues to melt. Zhao Ang then discusses China's ability and incentives to pursuing a greener economy. Following, Buddikha Jayamaha, Jahara Matisek, William Reno, and Molly Jahn discuss the security and development of climate change implications in the Sahel region. The main portion of this issue proudly concludes with the Journal's interview with former Swiss Ambassador Therese Adam on climate change negotiations and the great potential for civil society engagement. Following the climate change portion of this issue, we feature a special sup-topic: Africa Rising. Here, Peter Schraeder discusses the effects of President Donald Trump's foreign policy in Africa. Juan Macías-Amoretti analyzes the role of Islam in Moroccan politics, while Karim Bejjit concludes with a discussion on Morocco's growing relationship with the AU.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Islam, Regional Cooperation, Conflict, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, Asia, North Africa, Switzerland, Morocco, Sahel, and Global Focus

96. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

97. Structural Dissonance: The U.S.-PRC Defense Relationship, 1979-1989

Author:
Eric B. Setzekorn
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the decade between U.S. diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 and the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) pursued a military engagement policy with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The 1979-1989 U.S.-PRC defense relationship was driven by a mutually shared fear of the USSR, but U.S. policymakers also sought to encourage the PRC to become a more deeply involved in the world community as a responsible power. Beginning in the late 1970s, the U.S. defense department conducted high level exchanges, allowed for the transfer of defense technology, promoted military to military cooperation and brokered foreign military sales (FMS). On the U.S. side, this program was strongly supported by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who worked to push skeptical elements in the U.S. defense bureaucracy. By the mid-1980s, this hesitancy had been overcome and the defense relationship reached a high point in the 1984-1986 period, but structural problems arising from the division of authority within the PRC’s party-state-military structure ultimately proved insurmountable to long-term cooperation. The 1979-1989 U.S.-PRC defense relationship highlights the long-term challenges of pursuing military engagement with fundamentally dissimilar structures of political authority.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, and North America

98. Representing American Values and Interests in China

Author:
Terry Branstad
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
When I welcome visitors to the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Beijing, they often comment on a black-and-white photo of my first meeting with Xi Jinping. In the picture, the members of the 1985 Chinese agriculture delegation to Iowa stand calmly behind my desk, peering into the camera, as Xi Jinping stands unobtru­sively to my right. Some visitors ask, “Ambassador Branstad, did you know this young man would become President of China?” Indeed, I did not—I treated him with the same Iowa hospitality with which I welcome all my guests. His importance as a rising leader of China, though, became increasingly apparent over the course of six gubernatorial visits I made to China during the subsequent 30 years. The same is true of U.S.-China relations. Today, I have the honor of representing the United States in the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world, one that we absolutely have to get right. During President Donald Trump’s November 2017 state visit to China, the President identified three priority tasks for the two nations’ relationship. First, work with the Chinese govern­ment to address the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Second, seek a more balanced and reciprocal trade and investment relationship. And third, partner with Chinese authorities to reduce the flow of illicit opioids from China to the United States. Each task presents its own unique challenges and opportunities.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North Korea

99. Redefining Success for the Trump-Kim Summit

Author:
Richard N. Holwill
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
A meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (KJU), the Supreme Leader of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), can be a success even if it fails to achieve President Trump’s announced goal: an end to the DPRK nuclear weapons program. This meeting starts by giving KJU one of his long-sought goals. It will, in effect, be more than a meeting. It will be a “summit” and will confer on KJU the status of the leader of a legitimate government. President Trump would be wise to redefine success. He should not fall into the trap of saying that success will be defined by a “denuclearization agreement.” While that should be a long-term goal, it will not happen at this meeting. Still, the summit will be successful if it produces a process that can lead to a substantial reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. This is not to say that an agreement on denuclearization is off the table. Rather, it is to rec­ognize that these talks could present a framework for negotiation that would be very valuable, even if they will fall short of a nuclear disarmament accord. To understand the difficulty of reaching a nuclear arms agreement, we need only look at the way the two leaders speak about denuclearization. Each appears to define it differently. President Trump applies the term to nuclear weapons in the DPRK. KJU speaks of it as applying to the entire Korean Peninsula. He will argue that, if he must allow a mean­ingful verification regime, so must U.S. forces in South Korea.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

100. U.S.-Nepal Relations: Leveraging Operational Efficiencies to Achieve Our Objectives

Author:
Alaina B Teplitz
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Abstract:
Nepal, that mythical Shangri-La nestled in the Himalayas, has long captured the hearts and imaginations of Americans. In the 70 years since the United States established formal relations with the erstwhile hermit kingdom, Nepal has seen dramatic socio-economic progress—often stemming from its partnership with the United States. But in many ways, it still remains under-developed, fragile and vulnerable. As the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu celebrated the 70th anniversary of our partnership in 2017, we pursued a dozen month-long campaigns around today’s policy objectives to highlight our historical collaboration and leverage this retrospective to draw attention to the need for further progress. Combining diplomatic engagements and public events targeted at thought leaders and policy leaders, our campaigns moved forward our shared U.S.-Nepali priorities. As the U.S. government revisits its approach to the Indo-Pacific region and new Nepali leaders form what promises to be the country’s first multi-year government in decades, we now face a unique opportunity to advance our mutual objectives of a stable, prosperous Nepal that is a robust partner of the United States. Coming at the same time as potential adjustments to foreign affairs budgets and staffing, Embassy Kathmandu is reorganizing how we do business to improve our effective­ness, find efficiencies and enhance our focus on an agenda that delivers results. Rather than organize ourselves by the agency that pays our salary, we have structured our unified U.S. government team according to what each unit is doing. Our interagency Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) Teams—co-chaired by section chiefs from separate agencies and physically co-located within the chancery—have designed common strategies for how the U.S. Embassy intends to pursue major objectives and coordinate approaches, as well as explicitly identifying those nice-to-pursue efforts that limited staffing or resources require relegating to the back burner. Through action plans, each ICS Team identifies strategic, impactful and tangible targets to achieve each year—institutionalizing best practices from our 70th anniversary campaigns to sustain meaningful progress toward our goals. As the stakes and challenges facing U.S. diplomacy continue to grow, Embassy Kathmandu is using the strategic opportunity that current U.S.-Nepal relations offer to develop a proof of concept for how a 21st century embassy can organize our people and operations to maximum effect.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Nepal