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Begin New Search Topic Deterrence Political Geography Asia

1. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. Japanese Economic Security as “Derisking”

Author:
Kazuto Suzuki
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “derisking” and how the Japanese Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) has responded to it within the framework of deterrence theory. It explores how ESPA allows deterrence by denial against economic coercion by other states and is itself a derisking measure. It contends that deterrence by denial, which means reducing dependency and improving resilience, could include stockpiling strategic materials, diversifying sources of supply, developing alternative materials, and developing alternative products. However, this paper argues that there is a need to strengthen the mechanism for collaborative deterrence by denial, such as the “Coordination Platform” presented at the G7 Hiroshima Summit. As for other forms of deterrence, such as institutional deterrence and deterrence by punishment, their effectiveness is insufficient, and they face many implementation problems. Therefore, this paper argues that the most optimal derisking strategy at this point is the combination of ESPA and the “Coordination Platform” to strengthen the capabilities of deterrence by denial.
Topic:
Risk, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

3. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:
Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

4. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

5. Deterring an attack on Taiwan: policy options for India and other non-belligerent states

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
India has a vital role to play in deterring China from unifying Taiwan by military force, a new Australian Strategic Policy Institute report finds, highlighting New Delhi’s significant economic, diplomatic, legal and strategic narrative levers. The report looks beyond traditional thinking on military preparations to dissuade Beijing from taking the island by force and offers six ways for India, with its great strategic and economic weight, to “help shape Beijing’s calculus away from the use of force”. The author writes that the use of such long-term measures is vital to New Delhi’s own interests, as the economic and regional security impacts of a major war would be devastating for India itself.  India and other “non-belligerent states” could apply a range of measures to persuade Beijing that the time is not right for a military attack. The aim would be to convince Beijing that "its ducks aren’t quite in a row... so that it defers military action to some uncertain point in the future". The report states that China remains deterrable. While it is determined to assume control of the island as a paramount strategic priority, it knows a military invasion would be enormously costly and uncertain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
India, Taiwan, and Asia

6. Japan’s multi-layered security strategy: Deterrence, coalition-building and economic security

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
At the end of 2022, Japan announced substantial changes to its defence posture with the publication of a new National Security Strategy, a National Defence Strategy, and a Defence Buildup Programme. These included a boosted defence budget and the addition of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. The policy shift is partly driven by the war in Ukraine, even if it can also be seen in the light of a much longer process of incremental changes. Furthermore, the new defence policy should be viewed in a broader context as part of Japan’s evolving multi-layered security strategy. In addition to deterrence, other central pillars of this multi-layered strategy include coalition-building through alignment, Official Security Assistance for developing countries, a normatively pragmatic engagement with the Global South, and economic security. Japan’s enhanced capabilities and increasingly proactive stance on coalition-building and alignment policy offer opportunities for cooperation, including with the EU and NATO. However, a more robust defence posture is offset by domestic challenges, including institutionalized self-imposed restrictions, political opposition, public opinion, economic and fiscal factors, and a greying population.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Aging, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

7. One Thing It Lacks: South Korea’s North Korea Policy in 2023 National Security Strategy

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute, conducts a critical analysis of the new National Security Strategy published on June 7, 2023 and offers policy recommendations for the ROK government’s DPRK policy outlined in the document. While Kim identifies with the National Security Office’s emphasis on strengthening deterrence measures against growing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, he highlights that South Korean countermeasures create a feedback loop that affects North Korea’s threat perception. The author, therefore, points out the limits of the current 3D (Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue) approach and recommends including a “Development” strategy to encourage Pyongyang to envision an alternative future path of prosperity and voluntarily take the denuclearization path.
Topic:
Development, National Security, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

8. Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

Author:
Yu-hwan Koh
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Yu-hwan Koh, the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, acknowledges the progress made in maintaining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime and bolstering extended deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear threats through the Washington Declaration. Nevertheless, he underscores the lack of a fundamental solution to halt further advancements in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Koh emphasizes the importance of establishing normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, particularly considering that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and is unlikely to return to denuclearization talks. In response, he reiterates the significance of the ROK-US alliance in strengthening the Three-Axis system and developing new weapon systems that can effectively counter North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

9. U.S. Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative

Author:
Hyun-wook Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hyun-wook Kim, Professor at Korean National Diplomatic Academy, assesses that North Korea is advocating a new Cold War discourse to strengthen its strategic solidarity with China. However, the intensified Cold War dynamic would lead the United States to prioritize its strategic competition with China, and the Biden administration should turn to a more passive approach toward North Korea. In this context, Dr. Kim anticipates that Washington would not offer incentives to Pyongyang for engaging in dialogue, which would lead Pyongyang to continue its military provocations to influence the direction of Washington’s policy course and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Given the volatility of the situation, Dr. Kim emphasizes the importance of reaffirming the ROK-US military alliance to counter the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Cold War, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

10. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:
Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia