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1. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

2. Camp David and US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation: Consolidating the Northeast Asia Anchor in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Yasuyo Sakata
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Yasuyo Sakata provides a historical overview of US-Japan-ROK defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, from the Korean War to the Camp David Summit, explaining how the trilateral partnership was redefined as an Indo-Pacific partnership and incorporated the “Northeast Asia Anchor.” Sakata argues that Japan and the United States have taken the lead in reconstructing the Indo-Pacific security architecture through their Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies, and that the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship has been incorporated into this framework alongside other alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. Sakata explores how Korea’s shift back towards the Indo-Pacific under President Yoon’s leadership has allowed for expansion of the scope of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, as affirmed during the Camp David Summit. However, Sakata contends that a comprehensive defense approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific involving allies and partners to build upon this foundation and strengthen defense and security cooperation amidst the challenges posed by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, maritime security, cybersecurity, and space. Action is essential, as time is running out to solidify gains from the Camp David Summit and build a stable relationship. Therefore, Sakata argues that Japan and South Korea should strengthen relations deliberately yet cautiously before domestic politics potentially spoil recent progress.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

3. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

5. US-Japan-Taiwan Dialogue: Deterrence Signaling, Domestic Politics, Defense Cooperation, and War Termination

Author:
Michael Beckley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The risk of a war over Taiwan is higher today than at any time in the past half-century. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is an “inevitable requirement” for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Yet peaceful means of reunification have all but disappeared because most Taiwanese are more determined than ever to maintain their de facto independence. This stance threatens China’s territorial integrity, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Xi’s legitimacy as top leader. In response, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three years, it has conducted the largest and most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in a generation. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than fifty combat aircraft, menace Taiwan almost daily and often simulate attacks on Taiwanese, Japanese, or US targets. Meanwhile, China has been amassing ships, aircraft, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Its military budget increased tenfold from 1990 to 2020. From 2020 to 2023, it doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal. China now militarily outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile inventory and navy by number of ships. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly belligerent in its relations with neighbors from Japan to India. The United States has tried to deter Chinese aggression by declaring its support for Taiwan. But it is no longer clear that the US military could immediately respond to a Chinese assault on the island. Historically, the United States has relied on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries after a war starts. But now that China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation by output, it is possible that both sides could sustain a protracted conventional war—and might be tempted to break the stalemate by using nuclear weapons against military targets. These dangerous trends make deterrence and defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan extremely important. Toward that end, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) convened a US-Japan-Taiwan Track 2 dialogue in November 2023 to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

6. Governing the Global Commons: Challenges and Opportunities for US-Japan Cooperation

Author:
Kristi Govella, John Bradford, Kyoko Hatakeyama, Saadia M. Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, James Lewis, and Motohiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The global commons—domains beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any single state but to which all states have access—are essential to the stability and prosperity of the international order. In addition to the high seas, outer space, the atmosphere, and Antarctica, which are defined as global commons by international law, analysts have also suggested that other domains such as cyberspace may also qualify as potential commons. These domains provide essential public goods such as trade routes, transportation and communication networks, fish stocks, satellite imagery, global positioning, and e-commerce infrastructure that benefit countries around the world. To successfully manage the resources of the global commons and ensure open access to their spaces, effective governance structures must exist to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. Consequently, states have tried to come to agreements in each domain about how to enable broad access, avoid conflict, and enable cooperation. Over time, these discussions have resulted in the creation for each domain of a “regime,” a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge (see Box 1). These regimes can take shape in the form of international law, national law, local regulations, private standards, and institutional bodies. They differ dramatically in maturity and complexity: the governance regime of the oceans has developed over the course of centuries, while the rules and norms of cyberspace have only had a few decades to coalesce. However, all these regimes attempt to solve similar dilemmas surrounding shared access and resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Democracy, Economy, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

7. Building a Quad-South Korea Partnership for Climate Action

Author:
Kristi Govella
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Climate change is a pressing global problem that requires action at the local, national, and international levels. While most policy has logically focused on creating international pacts to address and mitigate climate change, interest in regional or minilateral cooperation among smaller groups of countries has also grown in recent years. When the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—more commonly known as the Quad—convened its first leader-level summit in March 2021, its member countries Australia, India, Japan, and the United States identified climate change as a priority for the grouping and for the Indo-Pacific. They established a Quad Climate Working Group to strengthen implementation of the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity building, and finance.1 Since then, the Quad has continued to expand its climate activities. In September 2021, the grouping added the formation of a green-shipping network and the establishment of a clean-hydrogen partnership to its goals.2 In May 2022, the four partners took the additional step of launching the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP).3 Why have the Quad countries decided to include climate change on their agenda? They share serious concerns about climate change, which poses a significant threat to themselves and to the Indo-Pacific as a whole. In recent years, climate change has risen in prominence on the domestic political agendas of the four Quad partners, and there are gains to be achieved through coordination and cooperation of their separate national efforts. At a time when many countries feel that international institutions simply are not working quickly or effectively enough, minilateral initiatives such as the Quad have gained appeal as a more flexible way to facilitate joint action.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Partnerships, Quad Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

8. Next-generation Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, Taiwan has received a surge of international attention. As the coronavirus pandemic began to spread worldwide in 2020, Taiwan emerged as a success story with relatively low numbers of cases and deaths. In the global battle against the virus, it provided medical supplies, medicine, and technology to countries in need, cooperated on vaccine research and development, and shared its best practices. The pandemic’s impact on global semiconductor supply chains also led to heightened interest in Taiwan, which dominates the foundry market, or the outsourcing of semiconductor manufacturing. The island is home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which produces more than 90 percent of global output of the most advanced semiconductors and is gearing up to launch next-generation three-nanometer chips this year. Another reason for increased attention to Taiwan stems from international awareness of China’s growing diplomatic and military pressure on the island. Since President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, Beijing has poached eight of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked it from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization. The Chinese military flew nearly 1,000 warplanes in Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone in 2021. China has also stepped up its use of disinformation, United Front tactics, and other measures to widen splits within Taiwan’s political system and induce pessimism among its people about their future to achieve its goal of taking over the island. With the upswing of global interest in Taiwan, there is a pressing need for greater knowledge about the many factors that make it so crucial to the world. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to provide future leaders a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work, their writing, and their overall worldview. It imbues them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s experience and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. After a two-year hiatus due to the coronavirus pandemic, TUPP resumed in January 2022 for a virtual session. Although holding virtual meetings with officials and experts from Taiwan and the United States was not ideal, the program was nonetheless successful in achieving its goals. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s cohort also included for the first time a few experts from Europe, expanding the program’s reach. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with knowledge about Taiwan and support for sustaining and expanding its ties to the world. Hopefully, TUPP will contribute to ensuring that Taiwan remains peaceful and prosperous. The contributions here, written by nine of the eleven members of the 2022 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate even greater global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, COVID-19, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

9. Expanding Engagement among South Korea and the Quad Countries in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kristi Govella, Garima Mohan, and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since its revival in 2017, the quadrilateral dialogue among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States known as the “Quad” has become a stronger, more institutionalized grouping with a broad and growing agenda. As a leading economy, a vibrant democracy, and a key US strategic ally, South Korea stands out as one of the most promising potential partners for the Quad. With a new administration in office in Seoul, the time is ripe for South Korea to expand its engagement with the Quad countries in the Indo-Pacific. Even without formally expanding the membership of the Quad, which is currently not under consideration by its members, there are pragmatic and effective ways for these five countries to pursue their shared interests and values through a flexible set of mechanisms across a wide variety of crucial issues. After a brief review of the debates about the Quad in South Korea, this paper presents a framework for the country to consult, coordinate, and cooperate with Quad members through distinct institutional pathways: bilateral mechanisms, sub-Quad minilateral mechanisms, issue-specific engagement to achieve a specific functional goal, and more formal Quad Plus engagement on a broad strategic level. The paper offers the following recommendations for South Korea and the Quad countries to deepen their engagement in eight areas that correspond with Quad working groups and activities: critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, health, climate change, education and people-to-people exchange, maritime safety and security, cybersecurity, and outer space.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Quad Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

10. Six Lessons from a Decade of Asia Strategy Simulations

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
How can the United States and its allies and partners succeed in the Indo-Pacific and better prepare for long-term competition in the region? Since the US rebalance to Asia began, the German Marshall Fund of the United States has brought together rising experts from Asia, Europe, and the United States to examine this question through a series of workshops and simulations conducted via the Young Strategists Forum (YSF). The discussions that have taken place during these sessions suggest six lessons about effective long-term strategies for the Indo-Pacific. First, trying to maintain the status quo is neither realistic nor strategic. Established powers tend to describe their objectives in terms of maintaining the status quo. This aim is not just unrealistic, but often deprives them of the ability to adjust the existing order in potentially beneficial ways. US leaders must present a vision of the future that is defined by looking forward not backward. Second, the United States needs to calibrate its responses to near-term crises with an eye to mobilizing the largest possible balancing coalition in the long run. In the simulations, US teams often miss short-term opportunities that could yield long-term benefits. Thinking strategically sometimes means allowing other countries to recognize that they face a serious threat today and cannot simply rely on the United States to solve problems. Third, overreaching by China presents opportunities for the United States. Over the last decade, China’s growth in power has been accompanied by increased assertiveness, in YSF simulations and in real life. China’s behavior creates opportunities for US and other leaders to create and expand coalitions that can push back against it. Fourth, acknowledging the reality of impending multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific can benefit the United States. US experts, including participants in YSF simulations, often tend to see the competition in the Indo-Pacific as largely bipolar between the United States and China. Regional actors, however, typically regard the Indo-Pacific as increasingly multipolar. By championing the rise of new power centers, the United States can foster a regional order that is broadly supportive of its interests yet less dependent on US guarantees. Fifth, focusing on “swinging” states as well as “swung” states pays dividends for the United States. Over the last five years, the United States has done an impressive job of bringing together those countries that are most willing to push back against China. But the region’s “swinging” states—those that have not yet made a clear alignment decision—deserve more attention. Quick wins with these actors are unlikely, but sustained engagement today can set the stage for realignment tomorrow. Finally, building robust coalitions requires US leadership. Many of the lessons we have learned over the last decade have to do with the importance of recognizing that other countries have greater capacity for independent action than is often acknowledged by US observers. That does not mean that US leadership is unimportant—in fact, YSF simulations suggest that it is critical if other states are to join coalitions to push back against China. The United States often labels its various allies as “lynchpins” or “keystones” in the region, but the fact remains that the most effective regional groupings are still reliant on its coordinating role, especially when it comes to China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Planning, Simulation, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America