Search

Begin New Search Topic Decarbonization Political Geography Asia

1. Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia's Industrial Giants

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Asia’s transformation in recent decades into a global manufacturing hub has fueled economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty. However, this success has also massively increased the region’s emissions footprint, making it essential for Asia’s industries to rapidly transition to green technologies and processes. “Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia’s Industrial Giants” assesses the future potential and trajectory for electrolyzers needed to meet green hydrogen (H2) demand in Asia’s four largest economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The report, which was commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero and carried out by Global Efficiency Intelligence, highlights the role of manufacturers as agents of change in the Asia’s net zero transition. The study focuses on the role of green H2 in three priority industries — steel, ammonia, and methanol — under various decarbonization scenarios. In these sectors, green H2 has the capacity to significantly reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive processes with renewable energy-powered electrolysis. Should the four countries adhere to their declared net zero targets, the collective market potential of electrolyzers for these industries is expected to skyrocket to $180 billion by 2050, with a compound annual growth rate as high as 12% between 2030 and 2040. This is nearly five times as large as the market potential under a business-as-usual scenario. The report offers a suite of recommendations for policymakers, industry players, investors, and think thanks aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of green H2 and electrolyzer manufacturing. These targeted strategies aim to collectively support a robust ecosystem for green H2 production and use in these countries toward a net zero industry.
Topic:
Industry, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

2. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS

Author:
Alistair Ritchie
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The power sector is one of the most important areas to cover in any emissions trading system (ETS), due to the scale and abatement potential of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in that sector. However, some critical challenges need to be overcome before an ETS can fulfil its emissions-reduction potential by driving fuel switching away from coal and toward renewables and low-carbon fuels. This is one of the most important topics for ETS development in Asia given the tight controls on power markets. The case of the Korean ETS (K-ETS) provides valuable insights for the pathway to an effective interaction between an ETS and the power market to support power sector decarbonization, based on recent developments and potential next steps. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS describes the details of recent developments in Korea's power market and the emission trading system to address insufficient emission reductions in the power sector, key future developments required, and learning points for ETSs in other Asian jurisdictions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

3. De-risking and decarbonising: a green tech partnership to reduce reliance on China

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Heather Grabbe, and Axel Källenius
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Trade in renewable energy goods is a global public good; all countries gain when others cut emissions, and all suffer from climate change if decarbonisation is delayed. Yet this trade depends on China, which controls most of the world’s production of solar panels and electric vehicle batteries, and some of the global trade in wind turbines. These supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, natural disasters and weaponisation by China, which has already exercised its dominant position in some critical raw materials to put pressure on other countries. Part of the European Union and United States response to reduce reliance on China is reshoring production, but this is economically inefficient given their limited access to critical raw materials and high production costs. Moreover, Chinese firms are far ahead of the rest of the world in green tech manufacturing and innovation, and in extraction and processing. To reduce reliance on China, incentive-aligned governments and businesses should form a green tech partnership. This would produce green tech with the aim of decarbonising faster, while ensuring greater diversification of resources and improving security of supply. Each partnership economy would use its comparative advantage within a new green-tech supply chain. The aim is to supplement, not substitute, the Chinese supply chain, since both will be needed to meet rising global demand for green tech, including in China. Although such international coordination is difficult, the partnership would offers benefits to many different countries. Emerging economies that are rich in critical raw materials and/or have moderate wages would gain economic development opportunities. The US and the EU should share technology and provide financing, as they will gain from reduced dependence on China and from sourcing than is still cheaper than reshoring. China would have more room to use its clean tech to meet its own decarbonisation targets. The partnership could be organised through a combination of trade and investment agreements, together with tech transfer and financial agreements, under some form of inter-governmental oversight. The dependence of all countries on China for green tech is so great that non-market incentives might also be needed, such as subsidies or, preferably, a system of carbon pricing within the partnership.
Topic:
Partnerships, Green Technology, Risk, Renewable Energy, Supply, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

4. US-Korea Cooperation on Climate Change

Author:
Troy Stangarone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Troy Stangarone, Senior Director and Fellow, Korea Economic Institute of America, explains that "the United States and South Korea have taken steps domestically to reduce their emissions, while making climate change an important part of their efforts to expand the US-Korea alliance beyond traditional security and economic issues."
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

5. Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges

Author:
Edmund Downie
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
In September 2020, China announced its intentions to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The neutrality goal in particular was a breakthrough for global climate ambitions: a net-zero target from the world’s largest emitter, responsible for around one-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The two new goals—referred to in Chinese policy discourse as the “30-60” goals—are not China’s first public targets on GHG reduction. They are, however, the centerpieces of a new Chinese climate policy in which GHG cuts are a standalone goal rather than an ancillary benefit of more immediate priorities like energy efficiency and industrial upgrading. Prior approaches had required little engagement from firms in carbon management. Indeed, none of the largest Chinese firms in the coal power, cement, and steel sectors had publicized quantitative targets for reducing or controlling carbon emissions before the government announced the 30-60 goals. They faced little pressure to do so; authorities pressed firms in climate-adjacent areas like reducing air pollution rather than carbon management. The 30-60 announcement appears to mark a break from this era, forcing firms to adjust accordingly. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, assesses how China’s high-emitting industries have responded to the 30-60 targets and the accompanying elevation of climate within national policy priorities. It focuses on corporate and sectoral emissions reduction targets through June 2021 among 30 major firms in three of China’s largest sources of direct emissions: coal power generation, cement, and steel.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Coal, Industry, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. U.S. and China Climate Goals: Scenarios for 2030 and Mid-Century

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute and Climate Analytics
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In September 2020, President Xi Jinping announced new goals for China to reach carbon neutrality before 2060, as well as to strengthen its existing 2030 commitments under the Paris Agreement. With these announcements, China has signaled a move to join the European Union—as well as the United States under a Biden administration—in leading long-term climate action among the big emitters. Our analysis demonstrates that if China’s new long-term goal covers all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and not just carbon dioxide (CO₂), this could bring the country within reach of the emissions reductions required by mid-century for its actions to be in line with the Paris Agreement’s long-term goal of limiting average global temperature increases to 1.5°C. However, if President Xi’s announcement is only meant to cover CO₂, then China would need to achieve carbon neutrality around 2050 for this to be compatible with the Paris Agreement.1 Either way, China’s short-term actions will also need to be quickly brought into line with its new long-term trajectory. This includes doing more than simply peaking CO₂ emissions before 2030 as President Xi foreshadowed. Instead, our analysis demonstrates that China would need to peak its emissions by 2025 and rapidly reduce these thereafter to be compatible with the Paris Agreement. This also implies a need for significant adjustments to the other quantifiable targets identified in China’s existing Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement and the ramping up of action to achieve these. Reducing coal-fired power generation quickly and phasing it out entirely by 2040 would be an important step toward achieving this early peak and rapid reductions. Under the Trump administration, the United States has reneged on past climate action promises and rolled back existing policies resulting in an increase in emissions compared with the Obama administration. As a result, this report highlights that even under a Biden administration, the United States is likely to miss its previous 2025 target under the Paris Agreement. However, a Biden administration means that the United States now has the potential to reverse the Trump administration’s rollbacks and make a significant contribution to closing the Paris Agreement’s ambition gap in a new 2030 NDC. Indeed, by taking the initiative to reboot U.S. action in line with the Energy and Climate Package touted by President-elect Biden during his campaign, including its goal to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, U.S. emissions could be reduced substantially by 2030.2 For example, our analysis indicates that if the Biden campaign’s policies were to be fully implemented with the support of Congress (see below), and continue to be supported by strong subnational action, they could bridge more than half of the U.S. share of the global ambition gap by 2030 through reducing emissions by up to 38%–54% below 2005 levels (GHGs, including land use, land-use change and forestry)3. This would also reduce estimates for average global temperature increases in 2100 by 0.1°C, on top of the 0.2°C–0.3°C reduction achieved by China’s recent announcement. As this report shows, President-elect Biden’s plan to decarbonize the U.S. electricity system by 2035 would represent by far the biggest contribution to this effort and is in line with the Paris Agreement temperature goal. It would result in savings of ~1,350 MtCO₂ out of a total abatement potential of ~1,810 MtCO₂e [1,630–2,100] in 2030 across his Energy and Climate Package. However, this report also estimates that potentially only half of this potential could still be achieved through Executive Authority in the event of Congress not supporting action, although this estimate carries a large degree of uncertainty. We also outline how additional emissions reductions could come from action in other areas, including freight transport and industry—with the electrification of end-use sectors and green hydrogen important opportunities to achieve this. If the United States and China fully implement these ambitious goals and are able to achieve net-zero GHG emissions around mid-century, it would be a monumental step forward toward bringing the Paris Agreement goals within reach. It would also mean that for the first time more than 60% of the world’s emissions are in countries with a clear pathway to decarbonize their economies. However, achieving the goals will require bold action in all sectors of the economy, with an early coal phaseout being paramount for both countries.
Topic:
Climate Change, Carbon Emissions, Paris Agreement, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Prospects of a Hydrogen Economy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Kevin Tu
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This study assesses the prospects of a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. Against the backdrop of an escalating US-China trade war and the ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, key Chinese stakeholders become increasingly interested in moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward. During the first six months of 2020 alone, 37 policies in support of the hydrogen economy have been published by various level governments, including 7 by central government authorities, and 30 by local governments. Shandong alone issued 6 hydrogen supporting policies, followed with 5 by Guangdong. In sum, hydrogen economy development not only gains traction in China, but also is in great danger of overheating. The ambition in China is to expand hydrogen production and create new end-uses: in the transport segment (e.g. 1 million fuel cell electric vehicles – FCEVs – and 1,000 hydrogen refueling stations by 2030), but possibly also, in other hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement manufacturing or in the electricity storage segment (Power to X). Hydrogen production from low carbon electricity could bring many benefits, notably to address curtailments of renewable electricity from wind, solar and hydro. It could also be blended into the nation-wide gas grid especially for low-concentration hydrogen (e.g. 5-10%). Until recently, China’s interest in developing the hydrogen economy has not been primarily triggered by the decarbonization objective. Nevertheless, on September 22, 2020, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak national carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Given the significant amount of carbon emissions reduction implied by the above announcement, hydrogen is now expected to play a much more important role to drastically decrease the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over time. China’s very large hydrogen production from fossil fuels, mainly coal, would make it quite challenging to consider decarbonizing the current uses of hydrogen. What decisively drives the current interest into hydrogen is innovation and technological leadership on the one hand, which China can achieve through industrial clusters and economies of scale, and energy security on the other: reducing dependence on imported oil and gas, with rising importance of air pollution control- and decarbonization-related considerations. It remains to be seen whether China can avoid the shortcomings of its electric vehicles (EV) supporting policies as it aims to boost a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. A simplified SWOT analysis presented in the report identifies the most important strength, weakness, opportunity and threat for hydrogen economy development in China: Strength - ability to significantly bring down unit manufacturing cost through industrial network clustering and economy of scale. Weakness – lag far behind advanced economies in key hydrogen-related technologies. Opportunity – enthusiasm on hydrogen economy by local governments against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Threat - looming danger of global supply chain decoupling caused by an escalating US-China trade war. In order to move the hydrogen economy agenda forward, a preliminary “to do list” for Chinese decision-makers in this field would include: A coordinated national mechanism should be established at the central government level to lay out principles for moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward in China. Comprehensive and transparent statistical reporting and accounting throughout the Chinese hydrogen value chain should be established. In the hydrogen production segment, renewable hydrogen should be prioritized for intensive Research and Development (R&D) and deployment in the near future, and greening China's existing hydrogen flow should be on the Chinese government's policy radar especially in the longer term. In the hydrogen storage and transport segment, national and local government should continuously direct subsidies towards hydrogen refueling stations, and also consider to encourage low concentration blending of hydrogen into China’s natural gas network. In the hydrogen consumption segment, China should selectively focus on R&D and deployment of advanced hydrogen end-use technologies notably for cement and steel, ideally coupled with expansion of the horizon of national energy planning framework. Opening up the Chinese market to better integrate technology innovations in advanced economies and manufacturing-related competitive advantages of the Chinese economy, aiming to create a win-win situation between China and the international community.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Decarbonization, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
China and Asia