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41. Beyond Corona: Getting EU Economic Security Right

Author:
Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The corona crisis, the US-China great power competition and lacklustre international rules vividly demonstrate the vulnerability of economic interdependence. Interdependence is a power struggle, not a mutual aid society. For the vast benefits of a globalised economy to continue to outweigh its risks, policies to build greater resilience are necessary. For the EU, the unprecedented events also offer an opportunity to forge a new economic security approach to better manage its dependencies in strategic sectors.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Europe, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

42. Crisis from Kolkata to Kabul: COVID-19’s Impact on South Asia

Author:
Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The world’s most populous region, South Asia, with almost 1.9 billion people living in eight countries, has so far had fewer reported infections and fatalities per capita from the novel coronavirus than projected in early models. However, the region is unlikely to escape the widespread disruption and damage felt across the globe, and its worst health-care crisis may be yet to come. In South Asia, as in other regions, the COVID-19 pandemic is testing the capacities of states to provide security and effective healthcare and to maintain essential services. It is also having an impact on fragile democratic institutions and societal bonds, in addition to putting considerable strains on the economy. [...] Following is a country-by-country report, with inputs from experts on the ground, on the coronavirus pandemic’s impact in South Asia and its human, economic, and political consequences.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Sri Lanka

43. Post-workshop Briefing Paper: Preventing a COVID-19 Crisis in Africa

Author:
Atif Choudhury, Yawei Liu, and Ian Pilcher
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
In May 2020, the Carter Center’s China Program partnered with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) to organize a virtual workshop on Africa-U.S.-China cooperation on COVID-19 response. The workshop brought together a range of experts from the U.S, China, Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, and South Africa to discuss the public health impact and wider policy implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the African continent. Emory University’s Global Health Institute and The Hunger Project also helped identify speakers and moderate panels.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, United States, China, Asia, South Africa, North America, Ethiopia, and Burundi

44. Pandemic (COVID-19) Policy Regional Cooperation and the Emerging Global Production Network

Author:
Fukunari Kimura
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In this paper, we explore the possible policy responses to the pandemic shock as well as the related economic (financial crisis) shocks on trade and global value chains (GVCs) in East Asia. We find that regional policy coordination is critical to mitigate and isolate the pandemic shock. It is important to identify the pandemic events early to flatten the pandemic curve at the national and regional level. This supports a recent study by the World Bank (2020) which highlights the importance of early mitigation policies during the pandemic shock. The cost of the pandemic and economic shocks increases significantly when several countries in the region experience the systemic pandemic shock concurrently. In this case, flattening the regional pandemic curve becomes important. The results also indicate the need for greater coordination in East Asia to mitigate the pending economic shock in terms of unemployment, corporate bankruptcy, and financial market fragility. The paper also highlights that the stability of the GVC network is critical during the pandemic in terms of hedging the risk of disruptions to the procurement of critical medical and health products as well as the stability of the services linkages to manufacturing, such as the logistics sector. Regional policy coordination and the stability of GVCs are valuable in the post-pandemic recovery of the region.
Topic:
World Bank, Pandemic, Global Value Chains, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
East Asia and Asia

45. Digital Entanglement; Lessons Learned from China’s Growing Digital Footprint in South Korea

Author:
Kristine Lee, Martijn Rasser, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The South Korean experience is an illustrative case study of digital entanglement with China. This paper focuses on South Korea’s 5G networks for the purposes of scoping, but the spotlight on telecommunications networks offers just one window into a broader trend of technology and economic interdependencies between Seoul and Beijing. In particular, the paper’s focus on 5G illuminates four central observations that could also apply to other technology areas: (1) the U.S.-China strategic competition has wedged South Korea between its most important ally and its largest trading partner; (2) geopolitical risk assessments are not top of mind in South Korea’s technology policymaking calculations; (3) the country’s political leadership largely defers to private industry on the use of Chinese equipment; and (4) South Korean privacy regulations remain relatively fluid and are evolving both to meet domestic pressures and to generate new market opportunities. These trends are evident in the history of South Korea’s economic entanglement with China and the risk of coercion carried with it. Ongoing entanglement with digital infrastructure—and 5G networks in particular—increases the potential for and reach of adverse economic statecraft by Beijing and will make it more difficult and costly to unravel.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

46. The Razor’s Edge: Liberalizing the Digital Surveillance Ecosystem

Author:
Kara Frederick
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating global trends in digital surveillance. Public health imperatives, combined with opportunism by autocratic regimes and authoritarian-leaning leaders, are expanding personal data collection and surveillance. This tendency toward increased surveillance is taking shape differently in repressive regimes, open societies, and the nation-states in between. China, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is leading the world in using technology to enforce social control, monitor populations, and influence behavior. Part of maximizing this control depends on data aggregation and a growing capacity to link the digital and physical world in real time, where online offenses result in brisk repercussions. Further, China is increasing investments in surveillance technology and attempting to influence the patterns of technology’s global use through the export of authoritarian norms, values, and governance practices. For example, China champions its own technology standards to the rest of the world, while simultaneously peddling legislative models abroad that facilitate access to personal data by the state. Today, the COVID-19 pandemic offers China and other authoritarian nations the opportunity to test and expand their existing surveillance powers internally, as well as make these more extensive measures permanent. Global swing states are already exhibiting troubling trends in their use of digital surveillance, including establishing centralized, government-held databases and trading surveillance practices with authoritarian regimes. Amid the pandemic, swing states like India seem to be taking cues from autocratic regimes by mandating the download of government-enabled contact-tracing applications. Yet, for now, these swing states appear responsive to their citizenry and sensitive to public agitation over privacy concerns. Open societies and democracies can demonstrate global surveillance trends similar to authoritarian regimes and swing states, including the expansion of digital surveillance in the name of public safety and growing private sector capabilities to collect and analyze data on individuals. Yet these trends toward greater surveillance still occur within the context of pluralistic, open societies that feature ongoing debates about the limits of surveillance. However, the pandemic stands to shift the debate in these countries from skepticism over personal data collection to wider acceptance. Thus far, the spectrum of responses to public surveillance reflects the diversity of democracies’ citizenry and processes.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

47. Open Future: The Way Forward on 5G

Author:
Martijn Rasser and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Communication networks are the central nervous system of the 21st century economy. The fifth generation of wireless—5G—will be essential to and inseparable from all we do. In many ways, we are already there. What for most was an abstract concept became all too real during the COVID-19 crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the critical importance of communication networks: They are integral to our daily lives and our ability to function economically and as a society. Shutdowns of offices, schools, and stores have meant turning to apps to work, learn, and buy. Frontline medical workers and vaccine researchers have consulted colleagues via teleconference to get the latest insight and advice on combating the virus. Being connected means resilience, coping, surviving. Getting 5G right is all the more urgent. Next-generation 5G networks will enable telemedicine, self-driving cars, and a proliferation of Internet of Things devices to fuel the future digital economy. Secure, reliable 5G networks will be essential elements of national infrastructure. Policymakers in Australia, Japan, and Vietnam understood this early on and took decisive action to secure their 5G networks. U.S. officials, slower out of the gates, are now the loudest voice on the risks of having equipment from untrusted vendors in 5G networks. The spotlight is brightest on the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage or disruption. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to exercise control over Huawei, there is justifiable concern over data integrity on networks that deploy Huawei equipment. More serious is the potential to use 5G equipment as a vector to cripple critical infrastructure. Such risk is not only about communications—5G will be the backbone of controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. Despite this, the United States has had only limited success convincing its allies to join it in banning Huawei. The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces. A modular architecture allows an operator to choose multiple vendors for a range of offerings, rather than being locked in with a single large integrated vendor. Open interfaces—the ability of equipment from any vendor to work with that of another—make that possible. Such a shift means upending the industry status quo that is dominated by four telecommunications equipment providers: China’s Huawei, Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, and South Korea’s Samsung. Whereas other proposed responses to the Huawei dilemma and the problematic current state of competition in the telecommunications industry fiddle at the margins, switching to an industry centered on open interfaces would change the game altogether. A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. U.S.-China Relations and the Need for Continued Public Diplomacy

Author:
William A. Rugh
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
During the pandemic that swept the world in 2020, President Trump sought to focus major blame on China, where the virus first emerged. At a press conference on March 20, as American cases increased dramatically, he began to call it the “Chinavirus”, crossing out the word “coronavirus” in his prepared text. He continued to use that term, so criticizing China became a central theme in American “public diplomacy”. A new burden was added to the U.S.-China relationship, at the very time we need more, not less, mutual understanding.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Transparency in the Fight against the Coronavirus: The South Korean Example

Author:
Hülya Görkem Demirbulak Bae
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
South Korea constitutes an important example in fighting the pandemic. South Korea handled the process in a planned, rapid manner, and at the same time transparently. In fact, transparency has been one of the secrets of the country’s current success. In light of all of these developments, this essay will lay out how South Korea managed the coronavirus pandemic process and the policies it implemented, with a special emphasis on the role of transparency in the country’s fight.
Topic:
Accountability, Transparency, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

50. The PLA’s Mask Diplomacy

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Much has been written about China’s “mask diplomacy” during the Covid-19 pandemic. As the epicenter of the pandemic shifted from China to the rest of the world, China’s government sent planeloads of masks and medical supplies to hard-hit countries around the world. Beijing’s “mask diplomacy” sought to bolster China’s image as a responsible global power and was widely perceived as part of Beijing’s attempt to control the narrative around the pandemic and distract from its initial cover-up. But while all the attention focused on the Chinese government’s actions, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was carrying out its own, much quieter version of mask diplomacy. According to MERICS data, in the three months between March 13 and June 19, the PLA sent military planes full of medical material to 46 countries. The material, which mostly consisted of masks and personal protective equipment (PPE), was invariably donated to the recipient countries’ armed forces or defense ministries. The PLA also set up video conferences with foreign militaries to share its experiences of fighting the Covid-19 outbreak and strengthen military-to-military relations. At first glance, the Chinese government’s mask diplomacy campaign and the PLA’s look remarkably similar. However, a number of differences suggest there were different goals and strategies at play.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Public Policy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia