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21. SOUTHCOM Commander ADM Faller on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in the Western Hemisphere

Author:
Craig S. Faller
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Project 2049 Institute is pleased to announce the publication of remarks made by Admiral Craig Faller at our recent event, “Near and Present Danger: SOUTHCOM Commander ADM Faller on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in the Western Hemisphere.” In his remarks, Admiral Faller addresses the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambitions in Latin America and the Caribbean, from both an economic and strategic perspective, which support its pursuit of global dominance and the imposition of authoritarian values on international institutions. In addition, Admiral Faller highlights SOUTHCOM’s recent activities in the Western Hemisphere and suggests a practical framework to develop and sustain trusted partnerships in the region that will promote democratic values in the face of CCP coercion.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. Stemming the Flow: The United States Needs a Strategy to Address China’s Strategic Exportation of Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Many of China’s technology companies perfect their products in the domestic market by facilitating the party-state’s oppression and data control, and subsequently seek to export the technology to fledgling authoritarian states or nations with fragile democracies. This is part of Beijing’s strategy to enhance its digital instruments of national power, normalize illiberal uses of technology, and equip foreign governments with the tools to replicate aspects of the CCP’s authoritarian governance model. If Washington wants to blunt this strategy, the US government needs to implement a comprehensive strategy of its own to address this.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Law, Authoritarianism, Grand Strategy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Myanmar’s Generals Recoup: The recurrence of military-defined “disciplined democracy”

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Myanmar’s generals cited election fraud as the motive behind their coup. However, as the country’s transition during the past decade has been rooted in military-orchestrated “disciplined democracy”, the real drivers behind the coup are likely different.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Coup, and Military Government
Political Geography:
Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

24. The Geostrategic Interests of External Actors in Myanmar: A Struggle for Influence in a Country in Turmoil

Author:
Bart Gaens and Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Countries with geostrategic stakes in Myanmar have reacted in different ways to the military coup of 1 February 2021 and its aftermath, which have resulted in over 750 casualties thus far. China benefits from stability in Myanmar but, given its vast geoeconomic and geopolitical interests as Myanmar is a vital part of the BRI, will not criticize the military. Thailand, itself a military-dominated pseudo-democracy, is certainly reluctant to exert pressure. India focuses on its own national interest and prioritizes the partnership with its strategically important neighbour. Japan applies quiet diplomacy and aims to function as mediator, while at the same time protecting its business interests. The EU and US have sanctions in place, but history shows these do not have much effect on the junta. Russia’s presence is not significant, but Moscow uses arms sales to establish a foothold in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN aims to mediate with Indonesia in the lead, and even achieved a broad consensus on the situation in Myanmar, but likely remains too divided to deliver lasting change on the ground. Given the divergent geostrategic interests of external actors in Myanmar, a concerted effort to achieve change in the country is unlikely. Hence, sustained change has to come from within the country.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Coup, Military Government, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:
Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

25. Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In order to silence opposition to the February coup, Myanmar’s military is vigorously policing the internet as it quashes street protests. Outside powers and technology companies should endeavour to keep the online space free of interference and deny the junta tools of virtual repression.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Protests, Coup, Military Government, and Oppression
Political Geography:
Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

26. China’s Digital Currency: Adding Financial Data to Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Yaya J. Fanusie and Emily Jin
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China is pushing aggressively to be a global leader in financial technology. Over the last several years, use of mobile payment platforms has exploded in China while cash transactions have declined. At the same time, global interest in the development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) has also risen, with dozens of central banks now researching ways to offer digital versions of their fiat currency to ordinary citizens. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is leading in these efforts, aiming to release a central bank digital currency of its own. This CBDC system, which the Chinese government calls Digital Currency/ Electronic Payment (DCEP), will likely enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to strengthen its digital authoritarianism domestically and export its influence and standard-setting abroad. By eliminating some of the previous constraints on government data collection of private citizens’ transactions, DCEP represents a significant risk to the long-held standards of financial privacy upheld in free societies. The PBOC’s DCEP strategy is motivated by a number of factors. The dominance of private mobile payment firms in China has given such companies an outsized role in retail commerce, making them indispensable to the economy. The PBOC is seeking a digital currency to harness the market share and technological innovation of private financial firms and to gain better access to information about the financial activities of Chinese consumers. DCEP is also part of China’s geopolitical ambitions, and CCP officials frame the progress of DCEP as similar to advancements in other strategically important emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and robotics. DCEP’s development also comes against a backdrop of China’s broader push to internationalize the renminbi. Few technical details about DCEP are publicly confirmed. The PBOC has indicated that DCEP will have a two-tier structure, with the PBOC managing the back-end infrastructure while employing banks and other companies to aid in distribution to the public. It is clear that, despite much initial PBOC discussion about distributed ledger infrastructure, DCEP will not use blockchain as part of its design. DCEP is also likely to allow for some basic programmability involving its transactions and to offer users the opportunity to access the currency via software wallets. Despite some official statements and reporting about these general features, much of the precise operational architecture is still being worked out.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Finance, Data, and Digital Currency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

27. The Folly of a Democracy-based Grand Strategy

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
President Biden’s Summit for Democracy exacerbates regime security fears in states such as Russia and China, further destabilizing relations and making it more difficult to advance U.S. interests. U.S. policymakers may claim democracy promotion and regime change are clearly different policies. But years of excessive pursuit of both to prop up U.S. hegemony mean Russia, China, and other non-democracies perceive them as part of a unified U.S. threat to their regimes. China and Russia’s fears for their regime security may be overwrought, but regardless, they encourage those states to collaborate more with each other; resist diplomacy with the United States on other issues, such as arms control; and crack down on dissidents and civil society. Viewing U.S.-backed democracy promotion as a tool of regime change, China and Russia do more to suppress democracy at home and work to undermine it abroad. The U.S. alleviating all of China and Russia’s apparent concerns is impossible and unnecessary; indeed, some regime insecurity is welcome for its restraining influence. But to advance its own interests, the United States should find ways to diminish piqued regime security fears. To reduce regime security fears, especially in China and Russia, the United States should separate democracy promotion from its grand strategy—democracy promotion is not a security priority. Democracy promotion is good but starts at home, by being an exemplar of liberal values.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

28. The Era of Dis-and-Misinformation Volume XXII, Number 1

Author:
Nicole Kalczynski, Rebecca Blaser, Nicholas J. Cull, Peter J. Phillips, Gabriela Pohl, Michael Christensen, Leonie Holthaus, Bohdan Harasymiw, Feeza Vasudeva, Nicholas Barkdull, Arthur D. Soto-Vásquez, Nadra Hashim, and Vincent Chenzi
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
As the world continues to recover from the devastating fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, navigating the harms of misinformation and disinformation remain at the forefront of global conversations on paving the path forward. Preventing the dissemination of false information—particularly during a time where the ways in which we engage with information environments have fundamentally changed—is increasingly complex. Social media platforms have enabled users to not only engage with media but become distributors of it themselves. When coupled with bad actors, limited repercussions, and poor content regulation, social networks are easily weaponized. At all scales of governance misinformation and disinformation campaigns pose a multidimensional threat. In Myanmar and China, disinformation campaigns were leveraged to target minority groups, while in Central and Eastern Europe, they serve as the cornerstone of destabilizing operations between adversarial states. In yet another facet, countries like Turkey, China, Russia, and Iran have embraced digital authoritarianism and restrict policies on internet accessibility under the pretext of stemming the spread of “fake news.” This year’s issue seeks to shed light on the nature of these evolving threats from a variety of innovative and understudied perspectives. This issue explores the causes and effects of the spread of misinformation and disinformation throughout different parts of the world and will be timely for years to come given the ever-increasing role and breadth of new technologies infiltrating people’s everyday lives.
Topic:
Corruption, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Media, Internet, Social Media, Surveillance, COVID-19, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Sudan, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Eastern Europe, Asia, Myanmar, Central Europe, and United States of America

29. Starr Forum: Myanmar and South Asia: Democratization, Authoritarianism, and Refugees

Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
On Friday, May 14, 20201, experts explored the current crisis, including: the historical and regional perspectives on resolution; the democratization and current protests; and the history and current situation of India and Burmese refugees.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Refugee Crisis, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia and Myanmar

30. Towards open and secure digital connectivity: Europe’s and Taiwan’s paths after the world’s first digital pandemic

Author:
Brigitte Dekker, Xiaoxue Martin, and Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Surveillance capitalism and digital authoritarianism have become facts of life in recent years. Set against the US–China trade–tech–data standoff, the European Union (EU) and its member states are navigating their course of open strategic autonomy, assessing how to position themselves in the digital age. Synergies and coordination with like-minded partners – including the United States (US) and countries in the Indo-Pacific – seem inevitable. This raises the question of to what extent Taiwan can be a partner for closer cooperation on digital matters. Can the EU, and specifically the Netherlands, and Taiwan move beyond diverging priorities, and promote a human-centred approach to the digital domain by leveraging their economic, scientific and cultural ties? In answering this question, this Clingendael Report examines the approaches of both sides to strengthening resilient societies, so-called ‘Big Tech’ regulation and digital development assistance. Findings suggest that while the underlying strategic interests and goals of Taiwan and Europe on digital connectivity align, priorities and strengths diverge. China’s growing influence and assertive behaviour pose a substantial challenge to both sides’ open, inclusive democracies, economic competitiveness and standard-setting power. As Europe and Taiwan improve policies domestically, as well as in and with third countries, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, they can benefit from each other’s complementary skills in specific digitalisation and digital connectivity domains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Pandemic, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe, Taiwan, and Asia