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51. In Limbo in ASEAN: Pandemic and Irregular Migration

Author:
S. Nanthini
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
COVID-19 has led to stricter border control measures the world over. This has had a particularly harsh impact on irregular migrants. As COVID-19 heightens their vulnerability, even as ASEAN meets in summit this week, this is an opportunity for ASEAN member states to support all those found within their borders.
Topic:
Migration, Borders, Pandemic, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

52. ASEAN Response: Pushing Back Vaccine Nationalism

Author:
Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
As ASEAN economic ministers meet virtually this week to deal with, among other things, the severe impacts of COVID-19, their crucial task should be to strengthen multilateral cooperation. ASEAN should rally its dialogue partners and the private sector to make vaccines available to all. Can ASEAN centrality help push back the worrying trend of vaccine nationalism?
Topic:
Vaccine, ASEAN, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia and Global Focus

53. ASEAN’s Looming Anxiety

Author:
Kitti Prasirtsuk
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The rise of China generally presents both opportunities and challenges, particularly in economic terms. In the past several years, new kinds of challenges have been emerging and are looming larger in ASEAN countries. While ties with Beijing are, by and large, cordial, there are several signs that relations below the state level are increasingly worrisome. First, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) is largely not oriented towards manufacturing. A considerable amount tends to be in non-real sectors, such as real estate and casinos, which may not generate much employment and can be unhealthy to local economies. Second, the way Chinese businesses expand tends to be predatory, as demonstrated in tourism-related businesses and the acquisitions of fruit businesses in Thailand. As a consequence, new Chinatowns are emerging as more Chinese are moving into the region. Third, even business expansion through the Chinese government, e.g., the train projects, is far from smooth. ASEAN countries find themselves in uneasy deals – including onerous loan terms, undue requests for land usage along the train lines, stringent technology transfers, and imported Chinese labor. Moreover, the recent COVID-19 outbreak reveals not only the fragility of economic overdependence on China, but also public resentment towards the Chinese. Overall, the relations at the level of business and the people are far from promising, which can become a risk factor in state-to-state relations. The situation apparently demands good management from both Beijing and the counterpart governments.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, ASEAN, COVID-19, and Real Estate
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

54. Changing Roles of the EU and ASEAN on Peace in the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Sangmin Bae and Martyn de Bruyn
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Continuing tension and competition among Northeast Asian countries complicate the degree to which North and South Korea can actively garner support from regional powers. The involvement of regional powers has not been effective means to overcome the status quo. Bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States, while critical for tension reduction in the region, have not been able to produce an agreement. Instead, international institutions from outside the region may be able to help negotiate a peace agreement that brings acceptable levels of security to all parties involved. This article examines the past and future roles of international institutions located outside of the region -- notably the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Exploring the relations of the EU and ASEAN with the two Koreas, the article assesses their potential as mediators in the process of creating a lasting peace between the Koreas.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Peace, Strategic Competition, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

55. 2019 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: Enhancing Bilateral and Regional Cooperative Security for India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, cooperative security became a catchphrase term used generally to describe a more peaceful approach to security through increased international cooperation. The cooperative security model essentially embraced four concentric and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”: Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Promoting Stability. In 1992, American strategists — Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner discussed cooperative security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace, and argued, “Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war… Cooperative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post– cold war era.” Two years later, in 1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security as tending “… to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

56. Domestic Politics Force India's Withdrawal from RCEP and Broader Trade Disengagement

Author:
Amitendu Palit
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations concluded at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok on November 4, 2019. Fifteen RCEP members, including the ten-ASEAN countries, and Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, agreed to commence preparation of the legal text of the agreement for signing in 2020. India was the only member to opt out, citing significant unresolved outstanding issues. India’s decision was surprising as it actively participated in the negotiations that lasted for 29 rounds and went on for more than six years since beginning in 2013. Domestic pressures forced Prime Minister Modi to withdraw India from RCEP at the last minute. It also points to disengagement becoming the prominent character of India’s trade policy as domestic protectionist interests successfully undermine outward-oriented economic visions.
Topic:
Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

57. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Energy-Security Dimensions

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is officially neither a Chinese “Marshall Plan” nor a geopolitical master strategy. At present, it involves 84 countries, rising from 65 countries in 2015, and 15 Chinese provinces. Over the last year, the number of countries being concerned or ambivalent about China’s motivations and strategic objectives behind the BRI have increased. Despite officially supporting China’s BRI, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also warned last April, that China is supporting unneeded and unsustainable projects in many countries, leading to heavy and unpayable debt burdens. In ASEAN, Chinese investments are welcomed but there are also misgivings about the BRI’s strategic objectives which may constrain ASEAN’s policy options. As China is presently and will remain the single most influential country in global energy markets in the next decades, it is not surprising that its infrastructure plans of building railways, highways and ports are often interlinked with China’s energy and raw materials projects abroad and its domestic energy policies. This paper analyses the energy dimensions of the BRI and its strategic implications for its wider economic, foreign and security policies in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, ASEAN, and IMF
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Asia, and Southeast Asia

58. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.-ASEAN Economic Governance Architecture

Author:
Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Governance, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

59. Securing Energy Supply and Maritime Interests: Seeking Convergence

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
As ASEAN’s energy demand is likely to increase by almost two-thirds in the period up to 2040, the regional oil and gas resources in the offshore zones of the ASEAN member states will become even more important for enhancing the energy supply security of both the individual member states as well as for ASEAN as a whole. Accordingly, access to and political as well as physical control and security of these offshore energy resources will receive even more governmental attention. In context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as well as South China Sea policies and its energy dimensions, they can fuel already existing maritime competition and conflicts in the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the interconnecting sea lanes and regional choke points. This paper analyses the question to what extent are energy security concepts and challenges are interlinked with maritime policies, particularly in regard to the unresolved overlapping claims in the South China Sea and the perceived intensifying naval competition in the Indian Ocean. It also highlights the strategic implications of ASEAN's rising energy demand and growing exploitation of its offshore maritime energy resources for future regional cooperation, enhanced competition and potential strategic rivalries as well as conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Oil, Gas, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

60. Economic Regionalism is Key to Openness and Growth: An ASEAN Perspective

Author:
Sanchita Basu Das
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are involved in several regional economic arrangements, not only their own ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), but also those in a bigger geographic area, such as the ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). A subset of these countries are partaking of Asia-Pacific deals, namely the latest Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Some are pursuing bilateral deals in pursuit of deeper economic cooperation. Finally, all ASEAN countries are members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which although not labelled a trade agreement, is concerned with trade-related measures including transport infrastructure, policy coordination, economic connectivity through trade and investment, customs modernization, financial cooperation, and people-to-people linkages. A common feature of all these trade agreements is that they are not just focused on removing restrictions on trade, i.e. lowering import tariffs and quotas, but are much more comprehensive and include issues like trade in services, investment, labor, intellectual property rights, regulatory standards, and health and safety rules. All of these agreements deal with cooperation measures beyond national borders and can be called deep economic cooperation. They go beyond the WTO framework and are often labeled “new regionalism,” understood as state-led projects in the context of global developments. The extent of deepness varies, mainly depending on the participating countries’ development stage and the economic competitiveness of domestic sectors. What do the ASEAN countries aim to achieve? Theory has elucidated that governments have motives ranging from politics to economics when entering an economic cooperation arrangement. The political motives could be confidence building, i.e. if an international relationship was blemished by a history of conflict, economic cooperation can introduce a process of confidence building.3 For smaller countries, it could be seen as a means to increase bargaining power with the international community. Countries often see economic cooperation as a means to hasten their domestic economic reforms so as to increase attractiveness to foreign investors.4 Governments could follow a regionalism exercise also to defend domestic interests that are threatened by regionalism elsewhere. As for the economic motives, countries prefer cooperation among a limited number of players as it enables continued protection in a bigger geographical space and shuns producers from non-members. This enables them to exclude “politically sensitive,” noncompetitive domestic sectors completely from trade liberalization. Finally, regional economic arrangements are essential for creating economies of scale for producers and offering a larger market for consumers, which increases attractiveness to potential investors. This chapter elaborates on ASEAN’s perspective on economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. It examines key initiatives that ASEAN countries are currently negotiating or implementing in their national economies, discusses economic and strategic motives, and views the future of regionalism from an ASEAN perspective. It concludes that although the ASEAN countries are facing some uncertainties in their pursuit of economic regionalism, they will continue to support the endeavor as it serves their economic structure of openness. The countries have realized the benefits of economic integration in terms of confidence building of investors, thereby bolstering economic growth.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Economic Growth, Trade, ASEAN, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
Asia