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2. “Open” Telecom Networks (Open RAN): Towards a Reconfiguration of International Competition in 5G?
- Author:
- Mathilde Velliet
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- In line with the anti-Huawei diplomatic campaign of the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has promoted an alternative: Open RAN, a concept defined by "open" network architectures. At the intersection of 5G geopolitics and standards, what risks and opportunities does Open RAN present for European technological sovereignty? The Radio Access Network (RAN) is the radio part of a mobile telecommunications system that enables the connection between a mobile device (such as a phone or computer) and the core network. While traditionally a single vendor (such as Huawei, Ericsson, or Nokia) provides a “proprietary” or “closed” solution for this part of the network, Open RAN (Open Radio Access Network) is a concept describing disaggregated architectures that divide the RAN into several bricks connected by open interfaces. The objective is to allow the operator to buy these hardware and software bricks from various suppliers, and to choose freely the most suitable option for each part. In the current context of a concentrated 5G market, dominated by three major manufacturers and even facing the risk of an Ericsson-Nokia duopoly with the exclusion of Huawei from many countries, telecom operators emphasize the flexibility and diversification of suppliers allowed by Open RAN, which would allow both more innovation and cost reduction. In line with its diplomatic campaign against “unreliable” Chinese suppliers, the United States has actively promoted Open RAN as an alternative. However, Open RAN seems far from being a panacea for Europe: in addition to the difficulties that remain in terms of maturity, security, performance and transparency of the specification process, it risks increasing European dependence on foreign suppliers. Although Huawei is not part of the international bodies working on Open RAN (such as the Telecom Infra Project or the O-RAN Alliance), many companies close to the Chinese political and military authorities are. Beyond the question of supplier security, American lobbying is linked to the commercial opportunity that Open RAN represents for American companies, currently leaders in the cloud, software and generic hardware components…even though they do not have a major 5G champion. Open RAN is therefore an issue at the crossroads of the geopolitics of 5G and standards, to which the European Union is beginning to provide a common political and analytical response, despite the diversity of positions among member states.
- Topic:
- 5G, Telecommunications, and International Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
3. Who Leads China's 5G Technology Ecosystem? A Network Analysis of China's Cooperation on Association Standards
- Author:
- Won Seok Choi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- This study suggests who is leading the ecosystem of China's 5G industry through analysis of the association standard network. Our study finds that the Chinese government think tank is in the most important position in the related network. Our study also suggests that it is important to monitor association standards in China and strengthen the standard cooperation of companies, scholars, and institutes in the Korean ICT industry.
- Topic:
- Government, Science and Technology, Think Tanks, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
4. Europe and the Geopolitics of 5G Walking a Technological Tightrope
- Author:
- Julien Nocetti
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The acute Sino-American tensions which started in 2018 have been coupled with controversies around 5G technology, exemplified by the spotlight placed on Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei and the security risks associated with its use. For Europe, the 5G challenge at the international level is drawing a very complex landscape. Just like artificial intelligence, 5G materializes a very strong geopolitical sensitivity around the control of critical technologies. 5G is indeed critical because of its expected quasi-ubiquitous use, the gradual shift towards network technologies based entirely on software, and the potential strengthening of already dominant players (including digital platforms via cloud services). The United States-China rivalry is limiting the European Union’s room for action, against a backdrop of security considerations and low levels of investment. The continent’s various players (the European Commission, the main European powers, private players such as Nokia and Ericsson) have not adopted a uniform stance, reflecting an entanglement of technological dependencies on China and the United States. Meanwhile, the issue of semiconductors, symbolizing both the technological decline and the renewal of the EU’s ambitions, is fully integrated into the development of 5G. These chips constitute the "muscle" of the system and trigger new geo-economic challenges in which Europe must still find its place.
- Topic:
- European Union, Internet, 5G, Telecommunications, and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
5. Convince and Coerce: U.S. Interference in Technology Exchanges Between its Allies and China
- Author:
- Mathilde Velliet
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The tough-on-China policy adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations has – and will increasingly have – important consequences for Washington’s allies, both on their infrastructure choices (5G, submarine cables...) and on their technological exchanges with China. Indeed, the U.S. objective of slowing down China’s technological development has been translated into multiple policies, primarily targeting China but also – directly or indirectly – U.S. partners. On the one hand, Washington deploys a range of coercive and incentive tools to prevent its allies from adopting certain technologies, supplied by Chinese companies and « untrusted » by American authorities (in terms of cyber, data or infrastructure security). Case studies of U.S. efforts against the deployment of Huawei’s 5G or Hengtong Group’s undersea cables reveal a similar strategy, combining direct diplomatic pressure, a threat awareness campaign, and financial incentives. On the other hand, in line with the United States’ historical use of the extraterritoriality of its law and its position as an economic superpower to influence its allies’ decisions, Washington seeks to restrict transfers of critical technologies from allies to China. As the main manufacturers (along with the United States) of these technologies, American allies are increasingly constrained by these legal and diplomatic restrictions, which target one of their main trading partners and tend to extend beyond strictly military or cutting-edge technologies. For example, in order to limit sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, U.S. authorities are combining changes to the American export control regime with diplomatic efforts (bilaterally and multilaterally) to persuade allies to align their own export policies with those of the United States. While the Biden administration appears to be placing greater emphasis on cooperative and incentive approaches, it seems likely that the multidimensional U.S. strategy serving these two objectives will continue, and even be strengthened. Among allies (and especially in Europe), this trend has raised awareness of the security challenges posed by certain Chinese suppliers, but also of the risks associated with the growing coercive practices of the great powers.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, Semiconductors, and Submarine Cable
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
6. The Real U.S.-China 5G Contest is Just Getting Started
- Author:
- Philip Hsu
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- On June 6, China declared the three-year anniversary of its business deployment of 5G, with the country having invested nearly 185 billion yuan in related infrastructure in 2021 alone (Xinhua Baoye, June 5). However, China’s 5G ambitions, which continue to form a substantial component of its national and international development policies, began years ago with Huawei. After Apple revolutionized the smartphone, demand for sophisticated computer “chips” and other components skyrocketed. Companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and Foxconn capitalized on this shift to become the main pillars of Taiwan’s economy. In addition to supplying Samsung, Apple and HTC, a lesser-known, nominally private Chinese company, Huawei was also starting to make smartphones around this time using Taiwanese hardware (Nikkei Asia, 2016). Although in recent years up to 60 percent of 5G-capable Huawei phone components have been manufactured in China, which is due in large part to U.S. sanctions against it and other Chinese technology companies, a new technological Cold War is unlikely to materialize over 5G. The economic stakes over advanced computing and a new generation of telecommunications infrastructure are too high for the international community to afford any one nation or corporation primacy across the deep and diverse set of software, hardware and human capital requirements this technology will demand.
- Topic:
- Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
7. Digital Platform Markets of ASEAN and India: Implications for Cooperation with Korea
- Author:
- Jeong Gon Kim, Seung Kwon Na, Jaeho Lee, ChiHyun Yun, and Eunmi Kim
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- The growth of digital platform markets in ASEAN and India is prominent. With COVID-19, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms are expected to rise further; especially five sectors (e-commerce, sharing economy, education, healthcare and fintech) are fast growing seectors. Korean is a potential partner of ASEAN countries and India. Korea's Digital New Deal policy now stresses tasks such as sharing and utilizing data, convergence of 5G and artificial intelligence across whole industries, spreading digital education, digital healthcare, etc., which are closely related to the economic and social needs of ASEAN countries and India. In order to promote regulatory harmonization and cooperation with ASEAN and India, it is necessary for Korea to promote digital economy and trade agreements.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, ASEAN, COVID-19, 5G, and Regional Economy
- Political Geography:
- India, Asia, and South Korea
8. Subsidising Balkanisation: What China’s 3G Subsidies Teach us about 5G Open RAN
- Author:
- Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- Open RAN is increasingly becoming the answer to how to diversify 5G networks and beyond, especially in the light of a potential exclusion of China’s participation in western networks. In recent times, the US and Japan have jointly pledged $4.5 billion to support its development. Much – or perhaps entirety – of this support is predesignated for the O-RAN Alliance, a closed-door and private industry consortium. State interventionism is back – in a sector hereto characterised by open western markets and free competition. The public support currently pledged to the O-RAN consortium bear many resemblances to the Chinese government’s attempt to support TD-SCDMA, a unique standard for the Chinese market that was designed to support local vendors. Its use was a pre-condition for public subsidies for R&D or public procurement. As recent as 2020, the US Trade Representative reported on China’s standard-setting practices and subsidies as one of the world’s worst trade barriers. Those who advocate similar support in the West are either indifferent or nescient about how EU and US trade negotiators worked to address subsidies and opaque standard-setting. It is an open question whether the US and Japan will offer a level-playing field to European vendors – or non-O-RAN members who may develop their own Open RAN variants. Nowadays, Chinese scholars and senior officials openly talk of “TD-style innovation” as a disaster for the nation that delayed China’s rollout of 4G and plunged the economy into a performance and innovation lag. A key lesson for policymakers today is how vendors that cannot survive without subsidies will not optimise the organisation for innovation but public grant-seeking. This is an eerie warning for the 5G debate in some western capitals.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Digital Economy, 5G, and Subsidies
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
9. China’s Techno-Industrial Development: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry
- Author:
- Alex He
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
- Abstract:
- This paper reviews the strategies and plans, policy-making institutions, process and problems in China’s techno-industrial development. Although it has made noticeable progress in some areas in the past two decades, China still lags behind in most core technology and advanced manufacturing fields, such as high-end chips. There have been several real breakthroughs in the semiconductor sector by private companies such as HiSilicon and rapid advancement in frontier technologies — artificial intelligence, fifth-generation wireless communication network technology, big data, blockchain and the Internet of Things — by private companies such as Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu; however, state-sponsored technological innovation and breakthroughs have been crippled by the existing problems in China’s science and technology research system and a campaign-style catch-up strategy that rewards bureaucrats on short-term goals, as well as by weak links between academic research and industry and a swing between the market-oriented approach for technology acquisitions and indigenous innovation for technology breakthroughs. A case study of China’s semiconductor industry demonstrates both the problems and progress in China’s techno-industrial development, as well as the implications for the country's prospects of evolving into a technological powerhouse.
- Topic:
- Development, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
10. Digital Entanglement; Lessons Learned from China’s Growing Digital Footprint in South Korea
- Author:
- Kristine Lee, Martijn Rasser, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The South Korean experience is an illustrative case study of digital entanglement with China. This paper focuses on South Korea’s 5G networks for the purposes of scoping, but the spotlight on telecommunications networks offers just one window into a broader trend of technology and economic interdependencies between Seoul and Beijing. In particular, the paper’s focus on 5G illuminates four central observations that could also apply to other technology areas: (1) the U.S.-China strategic competition has wedged South Korea between its most important ally and its largest trading partner; (2) geopolitical risk assessments are not top of mind in South Korea’s technology policymaking calculations; (3) the country’s political leadership largely defers to private industry on the use of Chinese equipment; and (4) South Korean privacy regulations remain relatively fluid and are evolving both to meet domestic pressures and to generate new market opportunities. These trends are evident in the history of South Korea’s economic entanglement with China and the risk of coercion carried with it. Ongoing entanglement with digital infrastructure—and 5G networks in particular—increases the potential for and reach of adverse economic statecraft by Beijing and will make it more difficult and costly to unravel.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Communications, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea