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2551. The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Rise of Chinese Civil Society

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
According to figures provided by People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities, the COVID-19 pandemic peaked in early March. One day after Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping made his only inspection tour of Wuhan on March 10, the epicenter of the outbreak, official statistics indicated that only eight new cases had appeared in the city—with only 15 new cases in China overall. Also per official figures, on February 25 more newly confirmed cases of COVID-19 originated from outside of China rather than inside the country (WHO, February 26). At least from one perspective, the authority and prestige of Xi seem to have been salvaged to some extent. However, public intellectuals, journalists, whistleblowers and other members of civil society have insisted that if Xi had been forthcoming about the outbreak from day one—and if adequate medical facilities and equipment had been transported to Hubei Province in good time—the number of cases in China would have been significantly lower than 80,000 and that almost certainly, the number of fatalities would have been much less than the official figure of 3,199 as recorded on March 15 (Economic Times, March 15; Straits Times, March 12). At a time when parts of China are under quasi-martial law, Xi has taken this opportunity to hit out at China’s nascent civil society. A large group of intellectuals risked their personal safety to eulogize the contribution of the late Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang (李文亮), who was one of the first whistle blowers to expose the severity of the coronavirus. On December 30, Li was among the first medical professionals to warn of a large virus outbreak; he subsequently fell victim to COVID-19 associated pneumonia and passed away on February 6 (Radio French International, February 20; BBC Chinese Service, February 7). Public intellectuals such as famed law professor Xu Zhangrun (许章润) of Tsinghua University and constitutional expert and activist human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong (许志永) have disappeared (Chinese PEN, February 20; Radio Free Asia, February 19). Meetings of institutions of civil society, such as both the legally recognized and the underground churches, have also been suppressed in the name of curtailing public gatherings (Christian Times (HK), March 20). The police state apparatus also took advantage of the quasi-curfew atmosphere to mete out a ten-year jail term to Hong Kong’s Causeway Bay bookseller Gui Minhai (桂敏海), who was first detained in Thailand in 2015 for publishing a rash of books deemed embarrassing to the CCP’s red aristocracy. While Gui has nothing to do with the pandemic, his heavy sentence seemed a warning to intellectuals who dare expose the party’s treatment of advocates of freedom of expression (HKEJ.com, February 25; Apple Daily, February 25).
Topic:
Civil Society, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2552. Military Activity and Political Signaling in the Taiwan Strait in Early 2020

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 16, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft conducted a set of unusual nighttime sorties over the sea to the southwest of Taiwan. At least one KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft and an undisclosed number of J-11 FLANKER-L jet fighters participated in the mission, and at one point crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which prompted a scramble by Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) F-16 fighters in response (Focus Taiwan, March 17; Taipei Times, March 18). Although the nature of the mission was unusual—this marked the first time that PLA aircraft flew in the vicinity of Taiwan at night—the incident was otherwise consistent with a pattern of increasingly provocative naval and military aviation operations conducted in the vicinity of Taiwan by PLA units in the first quarter of 2020. This uptick in tactical military activity has been accompanied by more assertive rhetoric from People’s Republic of China (PRC) media outlets and spokespersons since the landslide reelection of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) on January 11 (China Brief, January 17). These military operations (see further discussion below) have also taken place as PRC officials and citizens have scrambled to cope with the social, economic, and political impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in December (Jamestown, ongoing). This suggests that senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials wish to project the message that the crisis has not inhibited the PLA’s capabilities to defeat Taiwan “separatism”—and may further wish to use such operations to assert an image of strength in the face of the internal crisis produced by the pandemic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

2553. The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas

Author:
Roderick Lee
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted the fifth iteration of its “ZHANLAN” far seas training series (Ministry of National Defense, February 2, 2019). [1] The PLAN established ZHANLAN in 2016 as an annual far seas training event, with each iteration growing in complexity (Ministry of National Defense, May 27, 2016). Live fire and combat training often draws the most attention during such PLA training events, but the critical highlight of ZHANLAN-2020A was the training focus on combat support, rather than kinetic operations. The key takeaway from this training event is that the PLAN is developing the proficiencies to sustain limited offensive strikes against U.S. forces—perhaps as far out as Hawaii. This article argues that the PLAN is close to being able to execute offensive naval operations outside of the first island chain (and perhaps beyond the second island chain) in a wartime environment. The PLA has long discussed the concept of conducting offensive naval operations beyond the first island chain, and by comparing observables from the ZHANLAN-2020A training event with the list of proficiencies necessary to conduct deep strike, the PLAN is likely close to operationalizing this concept. The ZHANLAN-2020A training task force consisted of four vessels: DONGDIAO-class AGI (AGI-857); FUYU class (Type 901) support ship CHAGAN HU (查干湖) (AOR-967); LUYANG III class (Type 052D) guided missile destroyer HOHHOT (DDG-161); and JIANGKAI II guided missile frigate XIANNING (FFG-500). A fifth vessel, the ocean-going tug NANTUO-195 (南拖-195), took part in a limited role during the task force’s return journey.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2554. Mind the Trap: What Basing Rights in Djibouti and Sri Lanka Reveal About the Limitations of Debt as a Tool of Chinese Military Expansion

Author:
Scott Wingo
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On November 24, 2019, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa told reporters during his first interview as president that he hoped to renegotiate the terms of the deal that gave a Chinese firm a 99-year lease over the Hambantota Port (Strategic News International, November 24, 2019). The port had been handed over as Sri Lanka struggled to make loan payments on the loss-making Chinese-built facility—thereby leading to debates as to whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had set a “debt trap” by intentionally lending Sri Lanka more than it could afford to repay, in hopes of eventually foreclosing on the port (China Brief, January 5, 2019). The subtext was that with a leasehold in hand, the PRC could use the port as a naval installation geared toward patrolling Indian Ocean shipping lanes. As can be observed by the Sri Lankan government’s desire to renegotiate, this has not happened. To the contrary, Sri Lankan security policy has trended against China since the debt-equity swap occurred. A comparison with Djibouti, where the PRC has established its only overseas military base to date, illuminates how this came to pass. In both Djibouti and Sri Lanka, Beijing has used infrastructure loans as a means to entice political leaders to allow naval access. However, three factors led to very different outcomes: 1) the recipient countries’ inherent willingness to host a base; 2) the degree of political competition faced by recipient leaders; and 3) the degree to which recipient leaders can diversify toward different sources of funding to reduce overreliance on China.
Topic:
Debt, Imperialism, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2555. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

2556. Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military Logistics

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has portrayed its response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in heroic terms: battling against an insidious enemy, PLA personnel courageously and tirelessly helped to mitigate the disaster in the epidemic-ravaged city. The PLA has even made the amazing (and highly improbable) claim that it accomplished this while suffering zero infections within its own ranks (China Military Online, March 3). Despite the hype, the crisis has provided an opportunity for the PLA’s newly reformed logistics system to test its ability to mobilize resources in exigent circumstances. The Joint Logistic Support Force (联勤保障部队, Lianqin Baozhang Budui) or JLSF, which was created in September 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s larger overhaul of the military, has been at the forefront of the PLA’s response. [1] The JLSF’s role in Wuhan illuminated several key strengths of the PLA logistics system—including centralized control, effective use of information technology, and civil-military coordination—while also suggesting potential deficiencies. At a minimum, the crisis likely resulted in “lessons learned” that could improve the JLSF’s role in supporting commanders during wartime.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2557. Epidemic-Related Unrest and the CCP’s Reinforced Political Loyalty Indoctrination for China’s Police

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The central Chinese city of Wuhan, in Hubei Province, was the original epicenter from which the COVID-19 viral outbreak first emerged in November-December 2019. Hubei Province was placed under a strict lockdown in mid-January that lasted for over two months (China Brief, January 29). On March 25, authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the lifting of most travel restrictions for residents of Hubei Province, with the exception of Wuhan City itself (Xinhua, March 25). (Restrictions for residents of Wuhan were later eased on April 8). However, the lifting of these restrictions has not proceeded entirely smoothly. On March 27, a major social disturbance occurred on the bridge over the Yangzi River that connects the town of Xiaochi in far eastern Hubei with the town of Jiujiang in northern Jiangxi Province. On that Friday, Hubei residents attempted to cross the bridge, but were blocked by police from the Jiangxi side. A tense stand-off escalated into a riot that reportedly involved not only citizens and police, but also clashes between police from the two bordering provinces (see accompanying images) (Radio Free Asia, March 27). Regional tensions were revealed in video of the incident, in which angry citizens could clearly be heard to chant “Let’s go, Hubei” (湖北加油, Hubei jiayou) when marching to confront barricades set up by Jiangxi police (HK Free Press, March 27). The police barricades were presumably ordered by Jiangxi officials—acting in apparent contravention of official national policy—who were fearful that an influx of people from Hubei could once more spread COVID-19 infections. This likely revealed skepticism on the part of regional officials towards the central government’s message that the epidemic has been contained in Hubei. It also revealed issues of fear and discrimination against Hubei persons on the part of Chinese from other provinces, a problem acknowledged in official PRC press outlets (China Daily, March 30). The March 27 incident provided a dramatic example of the sort of social unrest that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials have clearly feared could materialize in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths inside China and across the globe. [1] Hubei citizens have been subject to harsh conditions under government quarantines, resulting in a steady build-up of popular anger (China Brief, April 1). This incident may not be the last of its type to emerge as a result of the pandemic, and the CCP has taken active steps over the past two months to reinforce political indoctrination for local police agencies—thereby attempting to ensure that police officers will remain loyal to the ruling party in the event of any major incidents that might threaten “social order and stability” (社会治安稳定, shehui zhi’an wending) in the country.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Police, Police State, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2558. Tashkent COVID-19 Video Conference Calls for International Cooperation

Author:
Gregory Gleason, Pál Dunay, and Robert Baumann
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 infection spread rapidly through the Central Asian states in early 2020. Political leaders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan were quick to adopt containment and mitigation policies to counter the spread of the disease, announcing national emergencies, establishing quarantines, ordering commercial and public institutions to temporary close, and restricting road, rail, air, and maritime transport routes. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, in particular, swiftly took steps to implement restrictions, impose curfews, and initiate sheltering-in-place measures. The neighboring Central Asian states of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, meanwhile, instituted a number of counter-infection measures but did not acknowledge instances of COVID-19 infection.1 The Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies, a leading foreign area studies center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, conducted an international video-teleconference on the topic of the coronavirus pandemic on April 22, 2020. George C. Marshall Center professors Dr. Pál Dunay and Dr. Gregory Gleason were invited as presenters at the international video conference. Also invited as a presenter was Dr. Robert Baumann, the director of graduate degree programs for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth. The Uzbek Academy of the Armed Forces was included in the video conference. Marshall Center alumni also participated and actively contributed to the discussions. The key questions facing the crisis caused by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic were introduced by Gulchekhra Rikhsieva, Uzbekistan Senator and Rector of Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies. Professor Rikhsieva opened the video conference, describing the seriousness of the dangers presented by the spread of COVID-19 in Uzbekistan and other countries. She called upon the fifty-three video attendees of the conference to use the opportunity to meet the challenges of the crisis objectively and realistically. She called upon the attendees to identify international cooperation measures that could augment Uzbekistan’s state policies in reducing the risks inherent in this and other potential subsequent pandemics. The two-and-a-half-hour conference included eighteen brief video presentations, surveying and comparing the current state of affairs in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and other countries. Professor Rikhsieva concluded the discussion with remarks regarding the challenges and opportunities inherent in addressing public policy issues of international cooperation in the context of the video format.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Asia

2559. CoronaShock and Socialism

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
In late December 2019, the Wuhan Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in central China’s Hubei Province detected cases of pneumonia of an unknown cause. In the first few days of January 2020, Chinese authorities were regularly informing the World Health Organisation (WHO) as well as other major countries and regions with close ties to China’s mainland, such as Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan about the outbreak. On 5 January, the WHO released its first briefing on a ‘pneumonia of unknown cause’ in Wuhan. Little was known about the virus, neither how to properly understand it nor whether transmission could occur between humans. The genome sequence for the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) was published by the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) on 12 January. Dr. Zhong Nanshan, a leading Chinese pulmonologist who is advising the Chinese government on this pandemic, confirmed human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus on 20 January. As soon as it was clear that this virus could be transmitted between humans, the Chinese authorities acted. Wuhan, a city of 11 million people, was shut down, the scientific establishment in China – and its collaborators around the world – went to work to understand the virus and the disease (COVID-19), and medical personnel in China rushed to be trained and to help break the chain of the infection. Inside Wuhan, the neighbourhood committees, which include members of a range of other associations, Communist Party cadres, and volunteers of all kinds, hastened to assist with temperature checks, food and medicine distribution, and assistance in hospitals. After ten weeks in lockdown, Wuhan opened once more on 8 April. On 15 May, the authorities started to test all the residents of Wuhan once again in order to protect public health and to resume social and economic activities (China shared the results of this test to aid with studies on the feasibility of the herd immunity theory). On 30 January, WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared that the outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). From its Geneva headquarters, the WHO sent up a flare which effectively read: a highly contagious virus has been detected that requires stringent measures of tests, physical distance, and aggressive sanitation. At this point, in the aftermath of 20 January, a gulf opened between the capitalist states and the socialist states. Our analysis shows four main areas of differentiation between the socialist and capitalist approach to the virus. The socialist approach is based on: Science-based government action Public sector production of essential materials Public action mobilised to facilitate social life Internationalism In the capitalist states (such as the United States, Brazil, and India), the governments have instead operated in a hallucinatory manner, pretending that the virus is either not real or not contagious and hoping that some extraneous factor would protect their citizens from its dangers. For-profit sector firms have failed to provide the necessary equipment, while public action has been hard to galvanise in atomised societies that lack the habit of organisation and struggle. Finally, to cover up their incompetence, the ruling political class in these states has resorted to stigmatisation and jingoism, using – in this case – the lethal combination of racism and anti-communism to blame China. In this report, we look at three countries (Cuba, Venezuela, and Vietnam) as well as one state (Kerala, India) to investigate how these socialist parts of the world have been able to handle the virus more effectively.
Topic:
Governance, Capitalism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Socialism
Political Geography:
India, Asia, Brazil, Vietnam, South America, Cuba, Caribbean, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

2560. China and CoronaShock

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
This is the first in a multiple part series of studies on CoronaShock. It is made up of three articles on how China identified the novel coronavirus and then how the Chinese government and Chinese society fought against its wider diffusion. The report is researched and written by Vijay Prashad (Director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research), Du Xiaojun (a translator and linguist from Shanghai), and Weiyan Zhu (an attorney from Beijing). These articles first appeared through the Globetrotter service of the Independent Media Institute. The paintings in this booklet have been done by Li Zhong, an artist from Shanghai. At the end of the booklet is an interview with Li Zhong conducted by Tings Chak (Lead Designer at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research).
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia