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Begin New Search Political Geography Armenia Publication Year within 10 Years

31. The End of the Karabakh Conflict: Winners, Losers and New Expectations

Author:
Shota Utiashvili, Alex Petriashvili, Zurab Batiashvili, and Kakha Gogolashvili
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In this publication, which includes four expert opinion papers, Rondeli Foundation fellows Shota Utiashvili, Alex Petriashvili, Zurab Batiashvili, and Kakha Gogolashvili analyze the geopolitical consequences of the end of the Karabakh conflict as well as the positions and expectations of two South Caucasian countries and several external actors.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

32. Azerbaijan and Armenia: War Looms as Prospects for Negotiated Settlement Recede

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Due to their failure to resolve disputes through negotiations, tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia have escalated, potentially to the point of a new war and even armed conflict between Iran and Turkey.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Negotiation, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

33. The Lobbying Battle for Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:
Ben Freeman and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Long before Azerbaijani forces took the Nagorno-Karabakh region by force in September — displacing 100,000 Karabakh Armenians in an act that’s been described as ethnic cleansing — Azerbaijan and Armenia were waging a furious lobbying and influence battle in Washington. A closer examination of the countries’ respective attempts to influence U.S. policymakers before the Second and Third Nagorno-Karabakh Wars provides critical context for understanding Washington’s muted reaction to Azerbaijan’s recent aggression, seemingly at odds with the strong moral position U.S. officials have taken over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan has spent years pursuing a course of “caviar diplomacy” in our nation’s capital: using the authoritarian petrostates’ wealth to court officials, journalists, and scholars. Since 2015, the government of Azerbaijan has spent just over $7 million on lobbying and public relations firms registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Azerbaijan’s agents — like BGR Government Affairs — have conducted vigorous advocacy for Baku’s interests, including continued military assistance to Azerbaijan following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. Azerbaijan’s influence in the U.S. has also been aided considerably by Israel; Baku boasts powerful American-Israeli advocates like Ezra Friedlander as registered lobbyists for its interests. And this only constitutes what’s publicly known which, given Azerbaijan’s history, is likely just the tip of the iceberg. As the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) has painstakingly documented, the Azerbaijan government has a history of laundering its influence in Europe and the U.S. Azerbaijan’s extensive influence efforts in the U.S. stand in stark contrast to those of the Armenian interests which, until earlier this year, had not had a FARA registered lobbying or public relations firm on their payroll since 2020. Armenia has traditionally relied on its extensive diaspora to garner influence in the West, with repeated successes including a boycott of lobbying and PR firms working for Azerbaijan and President Biden’s recognition of the Armenian genocide. But as the negligible U.S. response to Azerbaijan’s use of military force in Nagorno-Karabakh shows, Washington’s perceived strategic interests continue to trump Armenians’ concerns. As the negligible U.S. response to Azerbaijan’s use of military force in Nagorno-Karabakh shows, Washington’s perceived strategic interests continue to trump Armenians’ concerns. U.S. officials’ overly-cautious and restrained reaction to the lightning offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting mass exodus of Armenians from the region seems to reflect a stalemate in the lobbying and influence battle the two countries have been waging in the U.S; it may also be a product of the selective approach to human rights within U.S. foreign policy. No matter how one weighs the precise causes, the effect remains the same: a country used military might to reclaim its territory during a negotiating process, faced little consequences from the U.S., and seems emboldened to continue its aggression in an already volatile region. Time will tell the dangers of that decision.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Lobbying, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

34. Rethinking Resistance and Redress

Author:
Khatchig Mouradian and Michelle Allas Molina
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Dr. Khatchig Mouradian is a lecturer in Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies at Columbia University, and the Armenian and Georgian Area Specialist at the Library of Congress. Mouradian is the author of the award-winning book The Resistance Network: The Armenian Genocide and Humanitarianism in Ottoman Syria, 1915-1918. He is the co-editor of After the Ottomans: Genocide’s Long Shadow and Armenian Resilience and the forthcoming The I.B.Tauris Handbook of the Late Ottoman Empire: History and Legacy.
Topic:
Political Violence, History, Interview, Resistance, and Armenian Genocide
Political Geography:
Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, and Armenia

35. Averting a New War between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The European Union is sending monitors to Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan, so as to lessen the danger of renewed fighting between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh and other issues. Brussels must give the mission the means and mandate it will need to succeed.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, and European Union
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

36. Acts of normality: The potential for Turkey-Armenia rapprochement

Author:
Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia created an unexpected opportunity for Turkey and Armenia to normalise their relationship. For nearly a century, Turkey and Armenia have had almost no relationship and a closed border due to the legacy of the Armenian genocide, the cold war, and the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But both countries now feel it is in their interest to normalise the relationship and open the border – not least to promote trade and to balance against Russian influence in the region. In recent months, Turkey and Armenia have increased the pace of this normalisation by opening air corridors, appointing special representatives, and initiating direct bilateral negotiations over the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and reopening the border. This process is a rare example of a positive sea change – and is likely to be one of the few bright spots in an increasingly unstable and competitive international order.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Normalization, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:
Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

37. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:
Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

38. Trade Flows Between the European Union and the Eastern Partnership Countries: Dynamics and Prospects

Author:
Tomasz Grodzicki
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The Eastern Partnership is a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy focusing on the EU’s Eastern neighbours. Its main objective is to deepen the political and economic integration of the EU with six countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The aim of this paper is to assess the development of EU trade relations with Eastern Partnership Countries from 2002 to 2021 and to indicate its prospects. The results show that the EU is in a group of main trading partners of the Eastern Partnership countries. The EU noticed both: a trade surplus with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia (except in 2005); and a trade deficit with Azerbaijan. The volumes of imports and exports had increased over the years which also led to better economic integration with the EU. However, the future EU-Eastern Partnership trade characteristics and dynamics remain unknown due to the Russian invasion on Ukraine that caused troubles in trade flows in Ukraine and economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Exports, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus

39. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

40. Armenia Adapts to New Postwar Realities

Author:
Richard Giragosian
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
To many observers, Armenia’s non‑violent change of government in 2018 represented an unusual victory of “people power.” In what became heralded as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan surprised many with the relative ease with which he displaced an entrenched elite and emerged as the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. After an important free and fair election in December 2018 cemented Pashinyan as Armenia’s new leader, the country ushered in a new period of democracy and reform. Endowed with a rare degree of legitimacy bolstered by popular support, the new democratically‑elected government promised a critical reassessment of a number of critical issues, ranging from Armenian relations with Russia to its policy regarding the conflict over Karabakh. Yet despite these important gains in democratic change and advances in reform, the Armenian leadership faced a looming challenge that was largely obscured by a legacy of arrogance and complacency. With a focus overwhelmingly devoted to domestic reform priorities, the Pashinyan government seemed increasingly ill‑prepared for the inescapable geopolitical and foreign policy demands that loomed large over Armenia. And through much of the period between mid‑2018 and early 2020, Armenia embarked on a foreign policy course characterized more by overconfidence than any realistic reassessment, marked by sporadic mistakes and missteps in its approach toward Russia but also Azerbaijan. Although somewhat explainable by a combination of inexperience and simplistic idealism, Armenia greatly overvalued the advantages of democracy and reform while also overstating its strategic significance. Against that backdrop, such diplomatic overconfidence only exacerbated a mounting crisis over Karabakh, as tensions increased and vulnerability intensified.
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Europe and Armenia