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71. Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B

Author:
Nathan J. Brown
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The international effort to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has come to a dead end, at least for the present. Things can—and might well—get worse unless the United States and other outside actors couple a realistic view of the present with a serious effort to push for a more promising future. The first step in a new diplomatic approach must be to establish a cease-fire that builds on the common interest of both Israel and Hamas to avoid fighting in the short term. A new cease-fire should be clear and perhaps even written; mediators (whether Arab or European) must be willing to make an agreement more attractive to both sides to sustain (Hamas can be enticed by some opening of the border with Egypt; Israel will demand serious efforts against the supply of arms to Hamas). The second step must be an armistice that would offer each side what they crave for the present—Israel would get quiet and a limit on arms to Hamas; Palestinians would get open borders, a freeze on settlements, and an opportunity to rebuild their shattered institutions. Such an armistice must go beyond a one-year cease-fire to become something sustainable for at least five to ten years. Finally, the calm provided by the armistice must be used to rebuild Palestinian institutions and force Palestinians and Israelis to confront rather than avoid the choices before them.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Peace Studies, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and Egypt

72. Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq's Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. Anger over AQI's brutal radicalism infused the Sunni backlash against jihadists, but AQI also made two fundamental strategic overreaches that exacerbated its alienation from Sunnis in Iraq. First, it incited a sectarian backlash from Iraqi Shi'a without the means to defend Iraq's Sunnis from the onslaught it provoked. Second, AQI created a formal political entity, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), to dominate Iraq after a U.S. withdrawal without adequate support from Iraq's Sunni population.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

73. Transition in Egypt: Radicals on the Rise?

Author:
Myriam Benraad and Mohamed Abdelbaky
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Amid the uncertainty over Egypt's impending political succession, Egyptian security forces have cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the country's largest opposition group, in an attempt to curtain MB participation in Egyptian political life. Since late June, the government has arrested dozens of mid- and high-level Islamists, including the leader of the movement's guidance council, Abd al-Muanem Abu al-Fatouh. These Islamists oppose President Hosni Mubarak's bid for a sixth presidential term and reject his son Gamal as a potential replacement in 2011. After more than a decade of relative political moderation and successful deradicalization of the main Islamist groups, Cairo's policy of exclusion and persecution threatens to foment a return to radical Islamism in Egypt.
Topic:
Political Violence and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Egypt

74. Saudi Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing

Author:
Michael Jacobson
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This past week, Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner traveled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for his first official visit to the Middle East since assuming his current position. Although in many respects the Obama administration is off to a bumpy start with Saudi Arabia, Geithner praised Saudi efforts in combating terrorist financing, which is a significant departure from statements made by senior Treasury officials in recent years. His remarks in Riyadh were more than just empty praise, reflecting the broader view in Washington that the Saudis are finally beginning to make progress on this important front. Despite improved Saudi efforts, however, the kingdom remains one of the major sources of terrorist financing throughout the world, with significant funds continuing to go to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Laskhar-e Taiba (LET), among other groups.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

75. Waning Vigilance: Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in Yemen

Author:
Gregory Johnsen
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recent reports suggesting that al-Qaeda fighters are leaving Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the group has suffered serious setbacks, have renewed international concerns that Yemen is reemerging once again as a major terrorist safe haven. Although the assessments of al-Qaeda's resurgence in Yemen are accurate, the deteriorating situation is not due to U.S. successes elsewhere; rather, it is the result of waning U.S. and Yemeni attention over the past five years. Renewed cooperation between Sana and Washington in tackling al-Qaeda and addressing Yemen's systemic problems could help reduce the terrorist organization's appeal in this troubled country.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

76. Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility

Author:
Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Although peaceful coexistence between Israel and Hamas is clearly not possible under the formulations that comprise Hamas's 1988 charter, Hamas has, in practice, moved well beyond its charter. Indeed, Hamas has been carefully and consciously adjusting its political program for years and has sent repeated signals that it may be ready to begin a process of coexisting with Israel. As evidenced by numerous statements, Hamas is not hostile to Jews because of religion. Rather, Hamas's view toward Israel is based on a fundamental belief that Israel has occupied land that is inherently Palestinian and Islamic. For Hamas, “recognition” of Israel would represent a negation of the rightness of its own cause and would be indefensible under Islam. It considers unacceptable for itself the actions of those Muslim countries that have recognized Israel, such as Egypt and Jordan, and those that have indicated their willingness to do so, such as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab League, because they have provided no theological justification for their policies toward Israel. Although Hamas, as an Islamic organization, will not transgress shari'a, which it understands as forbidding recognition, it has formulated mechanisms that allow it to deal with the reality of Israel as a fait accompli. These mechanisms include the religious concepts of tahadiya and hudna and Hamas's own concept of “Palestinian legitimacy.” Tahadiya refers to a short-term calming period between conflicting parties during which differences are not put aside. A tahadiya stopped most violence between Hamas and Israel from June to December 2008. Hudna is a truce for a specific period, which is based on the practice of the Prophet Mohammad and on subsequent events in Muslim history. Hamas has indicated on a number of occasions its willingness to accede to a hudna with Israel, assuming basic Palestinian rights as set forth in the Arab Peace Initiative (API) are agreed to first. Palestinian legitimacy is a term employed by Hamas to describe its willingness to consider accepting a binding peace treaty, such as the proposal set forth in the API, so long as the treaty is first ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum. Although Hamas would not directly participate in peace negotiations with Israel, Hamas has indicated that it would be willing to be part of a Palestinian coalition government with Fatah under which Fatah would negotiate the actual treaty. Although a peace process under such circumstances might, for Israelis and Westerners, seem involved, arcane, and of dubious utility, it is necessary to consider the possibility of such a process because there is no realistic scenario under which Hamas will disappear. Understanding the Islamic bases of Hamas's policies and worldview will be essential for the success of any process in which it is engaged.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan

77. Islamic Peacemaking Since 9/11

Author:
David Smock and Qamar-ul Huda
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Muslims in general and Muslim leaders particularly have often been severely criticized for not more energetically condemning the violent acts of Muslim extremists. Violent extremists are on one edge of the Muslim community. They are counter-balanced by a growing movement of Muslim peacemakers.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia

78. West Bank Hardball: Fatah's Offensive Against Hamas

Author:
Jeffrey White
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After several political and military setbacks, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have waged an effective campaign against Hamas's political, economic, and military position in the West Bank. And as long as Israeli security forces remain in the West Bank, a Hamas seizure of power there is effectively impossible. Although this is an important positive development, Hamas is an adaptive opponent that should not be counted out in the long-term power struggle in the Palestinian territories.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Arabia

79. Just Deserts in Iraq: American Vengeance for 9/11

Author:
Linda J. Skitka and Peter Liberman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
In January 2002 national survey data, we find a strong relationship between Americans' desire to avenge 9/11 and their bellicosity toward Iraq, even after controlling for the perceived terrorist threat, left right ideology, and approval of U.S. political leaders. This effect could have been due to suspicions of Iraqi complicity in 9/11 stemming from prior enemy images of Iraq, or to the effects of anger and desires for revenge on out-group antipathy, displaced blame, and optimistic assessment of war risks. We test the out group antipathy hypothesis and find evidence that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim antipathy partially mediated vengefulness's effect on bellicosity. Vengeance, in turn, was boosted by retributiveness (proxied by rightwing authoritarianism) and patriotism. While perceptions of the Iraqi threat probably assumed greater importance over the course of the following year, additional survey data shows that even as war approached, most supporters acknowledged it would satisfy a desire for revenge.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, Middle East, and Arabia

80. Is the Maghreb the 'Next Afghanistan'?: Mapping the Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement

Author:
Noureddine Jebnoun
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies
Abstract:
On March 4, 2004, General Charles Wald, then-deputy commander for the European Command (EUCOM), observed that “there has, without a doubt, been some al-Qaida presence in portions of North Africa. But it isn't like Afghanistan or other places, and what's more, Pakistan, for that matter.” On March 10, 2005, Rep. Edward R. Royce (R-California), chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, mentioned in a prepared statement that the “train and equip efforts [undertaken by the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)] are aimed at eliminating the 'next Afghanistan': another terrorist sanctuary” across the Sahara-Sahel region, which allegedly harbors Islamic militants and bin Laden sympathizers. More recently, Rep. Jane Harman (D-California) argued that “North Africa could be the next front in [the] war on terror.”
Topic:
Political Violence, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arabia, Algeria, and North Africa