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91. The Evolution of Peacekeeping: Suez, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author:
Maria Fernanda Affonso Leal, Rafael Santin, and David Almastdter de Magalhaes
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
Since the first peacekeeping operation was created until today, the UN has been trying to adapt them to the different contexts in which they are deployed. This paper analy- ses the possibility of a bigger shift happening in the way the United Nations, through the Security Council, operates their Peacekeeping Operations. The change here ad- dressed includes, mainly, the constitution of more “robust” missions and the newly introduced Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By presenting three missions (UNEF I, UNAMIR and MONUSCO) deployed in different historic periods, we identified various elements in their mandates and in the way these were established which indicate a progressive transformation in the peacekeeping model since the Cold War - when conflicts were in their majority between States – until present days, when they occur mostly inside the States.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Africa, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Suez

92. The Privatisation of Security in Africa: Challenges and Lessons from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal

Author:
Alan Bryden, Aliou Diouf, Edem K. Comlan, Kadidia Sangaré Coulibaly, Aly Sagne, and Emmylou Boddi
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Private security in Africa is booming. Whether from the perspective of major multinational players or small-scale local enterprises, the market for commercial security has expanded and evolved over recent years. However, policy makers rarely address private security, national parliaments and regulatory bodies provide limited oversight in this area, and the attention of African media and civil society is localized and sporadic. In short, a fundamental shift in the African security landscape is taking place under the radar of democratic governance. "The Privatisation of Security in Africa: Challenges and Lessons from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal" provides expert accounts which portray the realities of the contemporary private security industry in Africa. The volume analyses key characteristics of security privatisation in Africa, offers new insights into the significance of this phenomenon from a security sector governance perspective and identifies specific entry points that should inform processes to promote good governance of the security sector in Africa.
Topic:
Security, Privatization, Governance, Law Enforcement, and Multinational Corporations
Political Geography:
Africa, Senegal, Mali, and Côte d'Ivoire

93. Youth, Peace, And Security: A New Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Margaret Williams
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
The important role of young people in building peace and challenging violent extremism is gaining recognition within the international community. The United Nations Security Resolution on Youth, Peace, and Security (SCR 2250), passed in December 2015, is evidence of this trend. It represents a shift from the dichotomy of youth as either perpetrators or victims of violence to a perspective in which youth are viewed as agents of positive change and peace. In moving forward with this resolution and similarly reflective and supportive policy, one of the greatest challenges for the Middle East and North Africa will be the current geopolitical context and obstacles to opportunity. In a region fraught with conflict, stemming from domestic and foreign policies, as well as a history of unrepresentative and repressive governance systems, leaders have often sought to maintain the status quo. This is a problem in a region where more than 30 percent of the population is between 15 and 29 years of age, and are increasingly frustrated with and stymied by a lack of meaningful political space—leading to lost faith in political systems.1 In such a setting, regional policymakers must be challenged to meaningfully incorporate young people into decisionmaking processes, to ensure that peacebuilding programs target young people early on in their development, to avoid the securitization of youth in the development and implementation of national and local policies, and to address the underlying social, economic, and political grievances that often drive extremism and impact young people’s relationships with their communities and states.
Topic:
Security, Youth, Peace, and Young Adults
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and North Africa

94. The African Union’s Gender, Peace, and Security Mechanisms: Policy Options for Protecting Women in Conflict

Author:
Hussaina J. Abdullah
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
This brief addresses the mechanisms of the African Union (AU) for protecting and promoting women’s rights during conflict and their participation in post- conflict peacebuilding processes. These mechanisms can be found in the policy frameworks and structures of the Protocol Relating to the Establish- ment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (the PSC Pro- tocol) of 2002, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), adopted in 2003, and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) of 2004. Other mechanisms include the AU Action Plans on Gender Main- streaming in peace and security, as well as a special rapporteur on women’s rights, appointed in 1999, a special envoy on women, peace, and security, appointed in 2014, and the AU’s Five-Year (2015–2020) Gender, Peace, and Security Programme. While the AU scores high on de jure instruments designed to improve the legal framework for women’s rights and gender equality, the evidence sug- gests less progress in terms of the de facto practices directed toward their implementation. For example, the Maputo Protocol—the African Women’s Bill of Rights—whose full ratification and enforcement were envisaged by 2015 and its domestication by 2020—has not been ratified by fourteen member states,2 and two countries, Botswana and Egypt, have not even signed the in- strument. Even some of the countries that ratified it did so with reservations. Furthermore, while member states are also expected to send biennial reports on the implementation processes in their respective countries, only Malawi had complied with this provision as of December 2015. And although the protocol demands the protection of women against violence in war and in peace times, reports indicate the continued perpetration with impunity of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women in conflict-affected settings. The PSC protocol, the normative framework on which the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)4 is based, recognizes the need to protect women from violence in conflict-affected areas, but in doing so it makes them appear as mostly passive victims of war. An approach is needed that recognizes women can be perpetrators of violence as well as agents of change pro- moting peace and reconciliation. The integration of an all-encompassing organizational gender strategy to guide the AU’s work in conflict and post-conflict situations will strengthen effectiveness in conflict-affected societies with regard to the women, peace, and security (WPS) goals of participation in post-conflict governance; protec- tion from SGBV and acts of impunity; prevention of the abuse of women, girls, and children; and the promotion of gender equality. The mandate of the AU’s special envoy on WPS to “ensure that the voices of women and the vulnerable are heard much more in peacebuilding and in conflict resolu- tion” is both timely and relevant. Priority should be given to coordinating mechanisms for an Africa-centered gen- der, peace, and security framework and to promoting synergies among women’s organizations, national gov- ernments, and peace support operations to ensure the implementation of actions that make a difference in the lives of women in conflict-affected countries. The spe- cial envoy should also engage closely with stakeholders to ensure full domestication of the Maputo Protocol is achieved by 2020. In sum, although the AU has made some progress in establishing a gender, peace, and security framework to ensure the protection of women’s rights and promote gen- der equality in conflict and post-conflict settings, some gaps and coordination challenges continue to limit its ef- fectiveness. Gender mainstreaming mechanisms across the peace and security sector, including capacity building initiatives, need to be addressed critically to prevent the continued violation of women’s physical and bodily integ- rity in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa

95. Is UNSCR 1325 Empowering African Women to Negotiate? Peace Insights and Policy Options

Author:
Pamela Machakanja
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
Africa faces formidable challenges with regard to the relatively few women influencing decisions and policies related to peace and security. A study on women’s participation in thirty-one peace processes between 1992 and 2011 showed that of the fifteen African countries, only five had women on their ne- gotiating teams (Burundi, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Uganda); five had women witnesses or observers ( Liberia, Si- erra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda); two had women lead mediators (DRC and Kenya); and only one (DRC) had women signatories.1 Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 “reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security,”2 its full implementation remains a work in progress in Africa, as women’s participation in peace and security remains more symbolic than substantive, and their capacity to influence and engage in peace negotiations is often resisted by local cultural norms and patriarchal hierarchies.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Culture, Feminism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa

96. Building a New Foundation for Stability in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
For almost five years, Libyans have struggled to build a new political order for their country out of the wreckage left by Moammar Gadhafi’s four-decade dictatorship. Despite successful national elections in July 2012, political factions backed by various militias have sought power at the expense of their rivals. As a result, Libya’s oil production and, consequently, its economy have collapsed along with any semblance of a post-Gadhafi political order. This violent struggle for power has created a security vacuum, filled in part by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, and various Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia. In the past year, Libya has become a strategic location for ISIS. Due to coalition military pressure, the group has told recruits to head for Sirte in Libya rather than stay in Syria or Iraq. The growing presence of ISIS in Libya—now estimated to total as many as 6,500 fighters—represents a direct security threat to the United States and its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.
Topic:
Security, ISIS, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Libya, and North America

97. Next Steps in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The alarming security, economic, and political trends in Libya are currently a critical issue for the international community. Europeans are particularly concerned about Libya as a point of departure for refugees and migrants. Despite recent progress, the presence of the Islamic State, or IS, in Libya is also an urgent security issue for the country, as well as for the United States, Europe, and Libya’s neighbors. At the same time, Libya is struggling to unify its government. Libya’s downward economic spiral further complicates the possibility of a unified government and a more stable Libya. Libya’s problems are legion, but establishing a single government and creating a more secure environment are the first orders of business. The Government of National Accord, or GNA—a body that reflects an agreement made last December with the help of the United Nations—has begun to establish itself in Tripoli and is trying to incorporate two opposing Libyan governments, which have been fighting each other since 2014. These are the Islamist-led Libya Dawn coalition—also known as the General National Congress, or GNC, which controls Tripoli and the eastern government in Tobruk—and the House of Representatives, or HoR, backed by retired Libyan Gen. Khalifa Hiftar and Operation Dignity. The GNA is working to establish a new government and taking immediate steps to improve conditions. While Libya has made progress in fighting IS over the past few months, the threat remains as long as IS leadership views Libya as a way to extend its caliphate—an Islamic state led by a caliph, a successor to the Prophet Muhammad. This is particularly true in light of recent setbacks for IS in Syria and Iraq. If the international community wants to help Libya rebuild, it needs to have a plan that outlines how it will assist Libya with its economy and the development of institutions that can provide the foundation for a revitalized nation. It is clear that having a functioning, unified government and making Libya significantly more secure is necessary to implement efforts to help Libya rebuild its economy and government. Indeed, a blueprint for such efforts could be an important incentive for the Libyan people to coalesce around a government and a unified approach to security. As President Barack Obama famously said in a press interview earlier this year, his biggest “mistake” was not having a plan to help Libya after the fall of Prime Minister Moammar Gadhafi. But it is not too late to develop plans to put Libya on a path that offers promise rather than chaos.
Topic:
Security, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, and North Africa

98. Towards a Continental Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Author:
Tarek A. Sharif and Joanne Richards
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Peace Operations Review
Abstract:
Violent Extremism is now recognized as a growing threat to peace and security in Africa, as exemplified by the recent terrorist attacks in Garissa, Abidjan, and Ouagadougou. While much of the policy discussion on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) focuses on the return of radicalized foreign fighters to the West, less attention is directed to those foreign fighters who may eventually return from Iraq, Syria, and Libya to other areas of North Africa, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa. Tunisia is one of the world’s largest contributors to the Islamic State in terms of foreign fighters, with smaller contributions from Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Sudan and Somalia. Issues concerning the return of foreign fighters to Africa are particularly salient not only because these individuals may return to their communities, but also because they may link up with other extremist armed groups present across the continent. These include groups affiliated to either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Attempts to counter violent extremism began in Europe in the 1980s with the advent of programs to dissuade and disengage right-wing extremists in Norway, Sweden and Germany. Although no common definition exists, since that time CVE has come to be associated with a range of measures designed to prevent and reverse the radicalization of individuals and groups, and to forestall the participation of these groups and “lone wolves” in acts of terrorism. Given that CVE is preventative and reactive, different CVE strategies are necessary for different stages of the radicalization continuum, including for individuals and communities with no exposure to extremist networks, those with some exposure, and those already radicalized. The latter is often associated with attempts to shift extremists towards acceptance of more moderate ideologies and is known as “deradicalization.” In some ways, CVE is difficult to distinguish from conventional counter-terrorism, which often includes traditional military measures and the sharing of intelligence between nation states. However, because conventional counter-terrorism does not address the root causes prompting radicalization, policy interventions under the rubric of CVE have more recently been designed to focus attention on the grassroots factors, which may render certain individuals more susceptible to radicalization than others. Social exclusion, poverty, and a lack of education are often named as typical contenders in this regard, although CVE practitioners generally acknowledge that no single causal pathway to radicalization can be identified. Reflecting these general trends, this essay charts the development of African Union policy, from its roots in conventional counter-terrorism, to efforts to devise a continental strategy for CVE in Africa. It also outlines a number of policy measures, which any such continental strategy should take into account.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Sudan, Middle East, Libya, Syria, Morocco, and Somalia

99. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta

Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting (“return to the creeks”). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Development, Environment, Oil, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

100. Stability and Security Danish Somali Remittance Corridor Case Study

Author:
Danielle Cotter and Tracey Durner
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies
Institution:
Macalester College
Abstract:
The vast majority of Somalis who have remained in their country con- tinue to rely on remittance money sent from abroad. Although smaller waves of immigration have occurred for many years, prolonged political and economic turmoil coupled with periods of violence and humanitarian crisis have caused the number of Somali immigrants to spike in the last twenty years. This population outflow has resulted in an extensive diaspora network across the globe, with communities established across the Greater Horn of Africa, the Gulf States, North America, and Europe. Estimates on the size of the Somali diaspora range from 1–1.5 million people globally,2 or approximately 14 percent of Somalia’s total population. These diaspora communities have traditionally remained actively engaged on Somali political and economic developments from their adopted countries. One of the diaspora’s primary ties to the homeland comes in the form of remittances—money that is sent on a regular basis to family and friends in Somalia. These funds have often been called a lifeline for the Somali people, covering the costs of needs such as food, education, and health care. Although the exact scale of remittance flows is difficult to pinpoint, estimates have ranged from $750 million to $1.6 billion annually and these funds account for nearly 60 percent of the Somali recipients’ average annual incomes.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Political stability, and Immigrants
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia