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72. Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive
- Publication Date:
- 01-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- The failure of President François Bozizé and his close circle to follow through with many of the concessions agreed on during the Inclusive Political Dialogue risks exacerbating the many conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR) and stalling national reconciliation. Those December 2008 talks made a valuable contribution to both reducing levels of violence and shaping the long-term reform agenda. The promised integration of rebel leaders into civilian political life, the precedent of decision-making by consensus and a concrete set of agreements that included rebel disarmament and security sector reform were welcome steps towards greater stability. To ensure these gains are not undone by another political crisis, however, the president must abandon the uncompromising attitude he displayed through much of 2009 and the government must quickly resolve new conflicts in the north east and prepare credible elections. Otherwise, donors should suspend financial support to a regime that is largely dependent on foreign aid.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, and Political Violence
- Political Geography:
- Africa
73. International Engagement with Somalia
- Author:
- Stephanie Schwartz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, supported by the U.S, had the unintentional consequence of fueling splinter insurgent groups including Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam. Currently Somalia faces a humanitarian crisis with 3.6 million people displaced. Countering the insurgency and alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Somalia demands a creative rethinking of international policy. While the 2008 Dijbouti Accord created a more inclusive Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the international community must weigh whether continued support for the TFG will bring real progress in governance or if it will strengthen popular support for the insurgency. If the international community sees support for the TFG as beneficial, they could consider policies including: Flooding Somalia with development aid and investing in civil society; Expanding the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission to include representation from other Muslim countries; Finding creative solutions for inter-Somali governance and reconciliation. If the international community calculates that support for the TFG is not beneficial because it will only fuel the insurgency, they should consider a policy of "constructive disengagement," withdrawing support from the TFG and the AU peacekeeping mission, while simultaneously investing in local and regional development projects.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Terrorism, and Fragile/Failed State
- Political Geography:
- Africa, United States, China, Ethiopia, and Somalia
74. Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta
- Author:
- Annegret Mähler
- Publication Date:
- 01-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper studies the oil-violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource-specific and non-resource-specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political-institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the “oil era.” Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Crime, Economics, and Oil
- Political Geography:
- Africa
75. Nonstate Policing: Expanding the Scope for Tackling Africa's Urban Violence
- Author:
- Bruce Baker
- Publication Date:
- 09-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Violent crime in Africa's cities is endemic and in many places worsening. Africa as a whole has a homicide rate of 20 per 100,000 (in Europe it is 5.4, in North America 6.5, and in South America 25.9). The problem is particularly severe in some urban areas. Kinshasa's homicide rate is estimated to be as high as 112 homicides per 100,000. The Nigerian police have recorded consistently rising rates of murder and at - tempted murder over the last 20 years. Rates of armed robbery in Africa are also very high. In Nairobi, 37 percent of residents reported being victims. The rate is 27 percent in some Mozambican cities and 21 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC).
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Political Violence, Civil Society, and Crime
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Nairobi
76. Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur
- Author:
- James Traub
- Publication Date:
- 09-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- Starting in mid-2003, the government of Sudan responded to an armed rebellion in the western state of Darfur with a massive campaign of killing and expulsion carried out both by regular army troops and by a proxy force known as the Janjaweed. United Nations (UN) sources estimate that this orchestrated effort led to the death of at least 300,000 people, while over two million were forcibly displaced. Extensive documentation by the UN, human-rights organizations and the media leaves no doubt that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and did so over a period of many years. Yet all attempts to stop the killing, whether by neighbors, regional organizations, Western states or the UN Security Council, proved ineffective. In 2005, states-including Sudan-unanimously agreed that they had a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities; but this abstract commitment has had little effect on the Sudanese government or on other UN member states who had made this pledge.
- Topic:
- Security, Political Violence, Genocide, Human Rights, United Nations, Armed Struggle, and Sectarian violence
- Political Geography:
- Africa
77. The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges
- Publication Date:
- 08-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- The passing of the 4 August constitutional referendum in Kenya is a promising sign in the broader context of efforts to prevent atrocities and uphold the responsibility to protect (R2P). The peaceful referendum sharply contrasts with the wave of violence that erupted in the wake of the disputed December 2007 presidential election, when within hours of the announcement of the results violence broke out. Less than two months later 1,133 Kenyans had been murdered, unknown numbers raped, and over 500,000 forcibly driven from their homes. The perpetrators included individuals, militias and the police with victims often targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and corresponding perceived support for a particular presidential candidate.
- Topic:
- Political Violence and Ethnic Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Kenya and Africa
78. Atrocities in Nigeria's Plateau State and the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 03-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- On 7 March 2010, between 1 and 3 am, groups of armed men launched simultaneous attacks on the villages of Dogo Nahauwa, Zot, and Ratsat, in Du District of Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau state, Nigeria. Driven from their homes by the sound of gunfire, villagers were maimed and killed by machete wielding men who also set homes on fire, displacing the survivors.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Human Rights, and Torture
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Nigeria
79. The International Response to 28 September 2009 Massacre in Guinea and the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 01-2010
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- On 28 September 2009, government forces opened fire on opposition supporters peacefully protesting in a stadium in Conakry, Guinea. Demonstrators had gathered to contest junta leader Captain Dadis Camara's reported intention to run in the January 2010 elections, and break his promise to cede power to civilian rule. Over 150 civilians were killed in attacks that Human Rights Watch reports were premeditated and that the United Nations Commission of Inquiry concluded amounted to crimes against humanity. Over 1,200 people were injured, rape and sexual violence was widespread, and unknown numbers of protestors and political opponents were detained.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Crime, and Human Rights
- Political Geography:
- Africa and United Nations
80. Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria
- Author:
- Ebere Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind-Dart
- Publication Date:
- 12-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Nigeria's 2011 polls will mark the fourth multiparty election in Nigeria and, if a power transfer occurs, only the second handover of civilian administrations since the country's return to democracy in 1999. Past election cycles have featured political assassinations, voter intimidation, intra-and interparty clashes, and communal unrest. Party primary season, the days immediately surrounding elections, and the announcement of results have been among the most violent periods in previous cycles. Although the most recent elections in 2007 derived some benefit from local conflict management capacity, they were roundly criticized for being neither free nor fair. The 2011 elections could mark a turning point in the consolidation of Nigeria's democracy, but they could also provoke worsening ethnosectarian clashes and contribute to the continuing scourge of zero-sum politics. President Umaru Yar'Adua, who died in May 2010, kept his 2007 inauguration promise to create an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) but failed to adopt key recommendations that the committee made. His successor, President Goodluck Jonathan, appointed a widely respected professor, Attahiru Jega, to head the Independent National Electoral Commission, inspiring hope that electoral processes will improve in 2011. The issue of “zoning,” the political elite's power-sharing agreement, has taken center stage in the current election cycle and will drive significant conflict if the debate around it devolves into outright hostilities. his unusual election cycle, local and international organizations and Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) must redouble their efforts both to prevent and resolve conflicts and to promote conflict sensitivity. The near term requires an increasingly important role for the judiciary in combating electoral fraud, and the longer term requires the creation of the ERC–recommended Electoral Offenses Commission, which would specialize in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Local agencies and respected community leaders must remain proactive and creative in violence-prevention programming, irrespective of international funding. Established local organizations with preexisting networks are best situated to perform early-warning and conflict management functions. High voter turnout and citizen monitoring are vital for ensuring that the 2011 elections in Nigeria are credible and civil.
- Topic:
- Security, Political Violence, and Democratization
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Nigeria