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1. No Women, No Peace – A Snapshot of Oxfam’s Engagement with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Lessons and Opportunities

Author:
Marie Sophie Petersson, Lydia Ayikoru, Souhadou Diasso, Fatma Jaffer, and Moath Jamal
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This briefing paper summarizes the important lessons learned since 2018 by Oxfam Denmark and the wider Oxfam confederation while promoting the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda and supporting WPS programming in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen, including under the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) strategic partnerships. It contains practical and policy-level recommendations for international actors working on the WPS agenda in various crisis and conflict contexts globally. The briefing paper shows that supporting and amplifying locally led feminist action by diverse women-led, women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights organizations, networks and groups is a central foundation for peace and justice.
Topic:
Leadership, Crisis Management, Gender, Protection, Localization, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

2. Institutions and governance in Mozambique :A bird’s eye view based on existing databases

Author:
Ines A. Ferreira
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Using publicly available databases and drawing on a wide range of indicators, this paper reviews the institutional performance of Mozambique across seven broad categories: rule of law and judicial independence; voice and freedom of expression/association; political participation; accountability and transparency; political instability and violence, and external relations; state legitimacy and political leadership; and governance and state capacity. Overall, the selected indicators point to similar trends within each dimension and suggest limited progress during the last decades. Still, it is fundamental that these insights and the scores presented by the indicators are put into context, and that we understand the historical path of Mozambique, the internal and external factors at play, and the fact that it takes time for progress achieved to be reflected in this type of data.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Freedom of Expression, Rule of Law, Accountability, Institutions, Judiciary, Instability, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

3. Remittances and corruption perceptions in Africa

Author:
Alex Yeandle and David Doyle
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The relationship between remittances and corruption is contested. For some authors, external income endows individuals with financial buffers, which undermine these individuals’ incentive to hold governments to account and allow rent-seeking politicians to invest fewer resources in public goods. For others, remittance payments undermine clientelist networks and increase individual-level political engagement and accountability. For others still, remittances diffuse social norms, since senders are likely to live in large cities or wealthier countries where corruption is less tolerated. However, despite being rooted in individual-level assumptions, many of the conflicting results in the extant literature have an empirical focus at the aggregate level. In this paper we offer a corrective, explaining variation in individual-level perceptions of corruption among remittance recipients through a new mechanism. With survey data from 34 African countries, we show that recipients are endowed with greater cash income, which is used to bribe officials in the hope of securing preferential access to basic services. This act of paying bribes, coupled with the fact that access does not appear to improve, fuels perceptions that the government is corrupt.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Africa

4. America’s Best Choice in Sudan Is the Least Bad Option

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Long-simmering tensions between Sudan’s two most powerful generals broke into open warfare on April 15. A series of ceasefires have failed, and fighting continues in the capital city, Khartoum, and in other areas throughout the country. Street protests in April 2019 prompted Sudan’s security services to oust the former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, and forced them to include civilians in the subsequent transitional government. Ever since, the United States has tried to help those civilians consolidate power.1 In October 2021, however, the two most senior generals in the transitional government—Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (usually known as “Hemeti”), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)—forced the civilians out. Still, the United States supported negotiations between the junta and elements of the civilian protest movement until both generals’ desire for supreme power forced the confrontation that now threatens to dismember the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Leadership, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and United States of America

5. MIT X TAU Series: Africa's Future Leaders

Author:
Oby Ezekwesili and Claude Grunitzky
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The final webinar in the third annual webinar series focused on various aspects of sustainable development in Africa. Featuring: Oby Ezekwesili is the former Minister of Education in Nigeria and a co-founder of the #BringBackOurGirls movement. She is an economic policy expert, an advocate for transparency, accountability, good governance and human capital development, a humanitarian and an activist.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Leadership, Sustainable Development Goals, and Human Capital
Political Geography:
Africa

6. The Leadership Conundrum in Nigeria and Implications for the Development and Peace of the Niger Delta Region

Author:
Tapuka Gerald and William H. Arrey
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
In 1999, a new political era opened in Nigeria with the inauguration of the Presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo. This marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Though a retired military General, Obasanjo’s Presidency was rooted in a civilian platform following Presidential elections organised by the military leader, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Prior to this, Nigerians had witnessed only one political transition through the ballot box. This occurred in 1979, when General Olusegun Obasanjo relinquished power to a civilian President, Shehu Shagari. Since 1999, Nigerians have unabatedly enjoyed the luxury of political transitions without military intervention or the barrel of the gun. In the past two decades, political transitions in Africa have been a rare phenomenon given the multiplicity of protracted presidencies and constitutional changes to foster the reign of long serving political leaders. For example, in Cameroon, President Paul Biya has ruled unabatedly for forty one (41) years. The multiplicity of elections has rather certified Biya’s protracted presidency. Likewise, though the country has been independent for more than six decades, there has not been a single ballot-based political transition. As such, incumbents have always won every election with a crushing majority. Moreover, within the six countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) of the Central African Monetary Community (CEMAC), political transitions have been inevitably limited to the dead syndrome and not ballot box. It has paved the way for family succession as in Chad and Gabon and the subsequent unconstitutional change of governments and military coup , respectively in these countries. While ballot box transitions are still a challenge in most African countries, Nigeria’s transition have morphed to the level where an incumbent is defeated in an election by an opposition candidate. Going by this, in 2015 incumbent Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. Since the advent of multiparty elections in most African countries in the early 1990s, such political transitions have been sustainable in few African countries including Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and The Gambia. This puts Nigeria in a more comfortable political situation than most African countries. Coupled with its estimated population of 213.4 million persons in 2021 (World Bank, 2023), Nigeria has the second largest crude oil reserves (37 billion barrels) in Africa, after Libya (US Energy Information Administration, 2020). Nigeria ultimately projects itself as a pinnacle of success and an African political giant which should evidently be translated into an Eldorado of peace and development especially in the Niger Delta area. Notwithstanding, the record breaking political successes on paper has not been translated into meaningful stability on the ground. In the last two decades, Nigeria has become one of the most unsafe countries in Africa and Niger Delta in particular even though not officially engaged in any civil war or military takeover as in precedent decades. Daily happenings reveal that the situation is becoming dire and civilians are caught in the web of violence and kidnappings. In 2018 alone, there were 416 violent incidents resulting in over one thousand deaths. In 2018, 351 of such incidences were recorded resulting in 546 deaths (Campbell, 2019). This shows a steady increase in violence in the Niger Delta. Within this period, there was also a significant rise in militant activities mainly against oil companies and Nigeria’s capacity to produced crude oil. Less than a decade after the Federal Amnesty in 2009 which saw a lull in militant activities including the main militant group MEND, another militant group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) emerged in 2016. Equipped as MEND with similar tactics and motives, the group succeeded in reducing Nigeria’s oil producing capacity from 2.2 million barrels of oil per day to 1.4 million. The militarisation of the area by Presidents especially Muhammadu Buhari who promised to use his military strategy to put out any uprising in Nigeria instead amplified the violence. Between 1999 and 2022, four Presidents have ruled Nigeria. However, none of these leaders have succeeded in alienating the Niger Delta from a past, rooted in insecurity and acute development challenges. Despite promises of alleviating poverty and curbing the rise of insecurity by successive Presidents, the area has still maintained a negative blueprint. Ethnicity is still rife and politics is decided on ethnic lines and the wealth produced by the area is unable to raise the standard of living of the people. Bamidele and Erameh (2023) argue that despite a flurry of measures, the Niger Delta remains stuck in environmental degradation because the policies of the government and companies is focused on gains at the expense of resource-related environmental utility. A better understanding of the Nigerian situation is sourced from the leadership and culture of violence (I), Nigeria’s leadership and violent resolution of conflicts (II), and the failure to convert Niger Delta’s wealth to national blessings (III).
Topic:
Security, Development, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa and Niger Delta

7. Can cities cope?

Author:
Francis Kibirige, John Martin Kewaza, Ronald Makanga Kakumba, Stevenson Ssevume Male, Muhammad Ssenkumba, George William Kayanja, Fred Male, and Pius Tibaingana
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
On 1 July 2020, less than a year before January 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, Uganda’s minister of local government, acting under the Local Governments Act and with the approval of Parliament, elevated 10 of the 15 earmarked municipal councils across the country to city status (Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 1997, 2020). City status, equal in stature to district local government status, is the highest level that local government units can attain under the current law and is synonymous with near-autonomy, including significant political influence and more control over resource mobilisation and use. Residents in the newly elevated city environs celebrated this administrative milestone amid surging expectations of immediate upgrades of public-services infrastructure and jobs. But the respective administrations awoke to the realities of over-stretched, outdated services infrastructure, and inadequate funding incapable of meeting the heightened level of demand. Can these new cities fulfil their mandate – even in the face of COVID-19-related impacts on the economy and personal living conditions – and cope with soaring public expectations? Evidence from the 2022 Afrobarometer survey suggests that it will not be easy, as the public mood, engagement with elected local leaders, and public service-delivery ratings are on the decline while mistrust, perceptions of official corruption, and resentment toward paying taxes are on the rise.
Topic:
Education, Health, Governance, Leadership, Institutions, Social Services, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

8. Paradoxical Africanisation of Libya after 2011. Growing influence of sub- Saharan African government, rebel, diplomatic and criminal actors in the post-Gaddafi state

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The 2011 downfall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi marked a tipping point for Libya’s southern neighbours in re-defining their roles on the regional north-south axis. The era of an assertive Libyan foreign policy on Africa came to a halt. Simultaneously, as a consequence of the civil war, multiple African actors, both state and non-state, assumed greater influence inside and over Libya. The country moved from being an exporter of security and insecurity to sub-Saharan Africa, as under Gaddafi, to becoming an importer. Some aspects of this largely unnoticed, multi-dimensional “Africanisation” [1] of Libya are likely to take root. Changes in Libya’s and sub-Saharan African actors’ standings within the regional setting represent a new reality on the ground that has not been contextualised and analysed thoroughly enough. Only when the international actors do so will they be able to adequately navigate and constructively engage social, political and security structures within the Libya- sub-Saharan Africa framework. Thus, this paper aims to answer the following research questions: in which specific north-south security-related phenomena did sub-Saharan African actors assume agency? Are the motivations of the actors involved opportunistic or do they include long-term political goals? Which aspects of “Africanisation” are taking solid roots and could be sustained beyond the period of Libya’s instability? Will this change to the regional order be temporary and reversible? What are the implications for the European Union (EU) policies related to peace, security and governance in Libya? For the research, several interviews with representatives of the regional armed groups, policy advisors, policy-makers and researchers with an insightful understanding of local and regional dynamics have been conducted since 2018, including during field research in Sudan in 2019. Those have been supplemented by a comprehensive review of existing literature on cross-border conflict dynamics in the Libya-Sudan-Chad-Niger borderlands, Libya-sub-Saharan African relations and relevant documents of international organisations. Historical methods focusing on the long-term and comprehensive processes seen within a big picture are being supplemented with an analytical approach seeking logical consequences and formulating predictions out of hard data and a comparative approach, where models, institutions and experiences are put together with more or less adequate processes found elsewhere.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Governance, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

9. Justifications of Repression in Autocracies: An Empirical Analysis of the Maghreb, 2000–2010

Author:
Maria Jousa
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Previous studies on the justification of repression have analysed large-scale protests, about which autocratic officials communicate to avoid backlash effects. However, we know much less about how everyday repression against dissidents and ordinary citizens is communicated and justified under authoritarianism. This paper is the first to systematically investigate how officials in autocracies justify, conceal, or deny different forms of repression employed by different state institutions. It studies the communication of repression in two North African autocracies, drawing on the novel Justifications of Repressive Incidents in Morocco and Tunisia Dataset. The dataset contains 439 events between 2000–2010 and disaggregates the various dimensions of repression and its communication. The empirical analysis shows that the chosen forms of repression influence patterns of communication and justification. Studying the communication of repression helps us better understand the nexus of authoritarian legitimation and political violence in the Middle East and North Africa region and beyond.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Leadership, and Repression
Political Geography:
Africa and Maghreb

10. Military Coups in Africa: A Continuation of Politics by Other Means?

Author:
Nana Amoateng
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The military has been an important institution for protecting States from external threats since antiquity. In fulfilling this fundamental role, military institutions have also posed security risks to their own governments, given that the ‘ability to use coercive force, though necessary to defend the nation against threats, creates the danger that the military will turn its weapons on the very regime that empowered its existence’.[1] Military personnel can fuel civil conflicts and undermine the stability of political regimes mostly in States with loose political control of the military. As Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast have argued, ‘Societies experiencing a civil war, by definition, do not have consolidated control of the military’.[2] In Africa, military institutions have, on one hand, helped to protect States from both internal and external threats, including local insurgencies. On the other hand, they have destabilised several political regimes through coup d’états. Military coups – ‘when the military, or a section of the military, turns its coercive power against the apex of the state, establishes itself there, and the rest of the state takes its orders from the new regime’[3] – have been relatively common in post-independent African States,[4] thereby raising several issues, including how to understand the relationship between politics and military coups. This article contributes to the discussion by highlighting how coups are a continuation of politics by other means, particularly in West Africa.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Leadership, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa