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1. Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania?

Author:
Thomas Scurfield
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Tanzania’s unique approach to mining taxation, described as an equitable sharing of economic benefits between government and mining company according to a negotiated split, could leave the country shortchanged. Tanzanian citizens have access to the terms of only one profit-sharing deal, a 50-50 framework agreement for Barrick’s gold mines. The rest remain unpublished, despite laws that require the government to disclose deal terms. The Barrick deal predicates government revenues more heavily on mine profitability than a more typical regime, making these revenues more uncertain. This structure also increases the risk that companies may seek to avoid tax payments. Negotiating the split on a project-by-project basis, without any legal guardrails on the approach, increases the risks of corruption and unfavorable deal terms. The Tanzanian government could eliminate these risks by borrowing provisions from other countries that also require a specific government share of mine profits but take a different approach. However, unless the government has identified benefits from its current sharing mechanism that a more typical regime does not offer, it should not pursue a sharing mechanism and instead focus on improving the underlying regime, such as increasing its flexibility with regards to profits and reducing tax avoidance risks. To gain more trust from citizens, Tanzania’s government should explain how the mechanism works in existing deals.
Topic:
Government, Natural Resources, Tax Systems, Mining, Transparency, Contracts, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

2. Relational Contracts in the Rwandan Coffee Chain

Author:
Kasper Vrolijk
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Businesses often engage in long-term relationships with firms and people they trust and know, in which they informally sell and exchange information and services (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002). As postulated by Arrow (1972, p. 357), “virtually every commercial trans-action has within itself an element of trust”. Within these relations, trust is defined as the belief that market actors adhere to informal contract arrangements. Particularly in lower-income countries, which are often described by distortions – such as inefficient institutions (e.g., contract enforcement), imperfect markets (e.g., access to credit), and market distortions created by firms (e.g., lobbying) (Atkin & Khandelwal, 2020) – such relational contracts are important for commercial interactions locally and internationally and are an important complement to formal contracts. In low-income economies, how are relational contracts used to foster economic activity? What policy measures can be used to aid trust-based relational contracts, or to address its inefficiencies? This Policy Brief presents the results from a study on the Rwandan coffee chain, which surveyed coffee mills, farmers and exporters on their performance and relational contracts. The main findings are that relational contracts are an important component at two levels of the chain: (a) between cooperatives, washing stations and mills, and its members, and (b) between mills and buyers. Mills, for example, offer informal provisions to its farmers to ensure timely delivery of high-quality beans. Exporters and mills invest in trust-based relationships with buyers by spending on getting market access and productivity-increasing activities (e.g., investing in new machinery) in anticipation of future buyer demand and prior to formal contracting. Buyers likewise invest in creating and maintaining relational contracts to local firms by providing informal technical and financial support. With the exception of certification programmes, few of the activities that both mills and buyers undertake are formally enforced through contracts but instead are done at the discretion of producers and buyers. Such informal relations are important and necessary because in low-income countries there can be market risks (e.g., limited access to inputs for farmers) that, if not addressed, affect the coffee supply and quality. The coffee sector in Rwanda is to a large extent com-parable to the coffee sector in other countries and other agricultural supply chains in low-income countries (like labour- and quality-intensive products, such as tea and cocoa). Therefore, this study may offer some valuable lessons to policy makers: 1. Promote brokerage services to support trust-based relationships between local firms and international buyers. Brokerage services include programmes (either by governments of international organisations) that bring together and facilitate buyer-supplier linkages. These services have proven successful in creating long-term buyer-supplier relationships, while also facilitating financial and technical support for local firms and market access. There is a role for both international organisations and national governments to provide financing or facilitate such services. 2. Use certification to formalise quality upgrading and market access. Certification programmes include credible, internationally recognised standards and evaluation protocols that are used across multiple commodities. Certification can help formalise some of the quality upgrading and market access activities that firms and farmers otherwise would receive informally through relational contracts. There are roles for national governments to promote and subsidise certification practices and for international organisations and certification providers to expand such services.
Topic:
Development, Markets, Business, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Africa and Rwanda