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61. Improving Peacekeeping Performance – Dilemmas and Goals

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The recent adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2436 on UN peacekeeping is the latest development in an ongoing debate on how to improve peacekeeping performance. Africa’s status as both the largest provider of troops and the continent hosting most current peace operations, positions it at the heart of this discussion. This policy brief critically examines two of the options identified to improve peacekeeping: more troop contributions from states with advanced military capability and better training for peacekeepers. Specifically, it highlights challenges with training troops from (semi-)authoritarian and post-conflict states and points to the importance of improving civil-military relations in order to enhance peacekeeping performance.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa

62. Climate Change and Violent Conflict: Sparse Evidence from South Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Florian Krampe and Pernilla Nordqvist
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The impacts of climate change are increasingly viewed as global security risks, which will have far-reaching implications for both human and renewable natural systems. Most climate–conflict research has focused on East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. This SIPRI Insights explores and summarizes the findings from a systematic literature review of climate–conflict research on South Asia and South East Asia. Although these regions have been greatly affected by both climate change and conflict, there have only been a small number of rigorous academic studies that focus on the climate–conflict relationship. While this constrains the ability to draw general conclusions, there is context-specific evidence that climate change can have an effect on the causes and dynamics of violent conflict in the region when: (a) it leads to a deterioration in people’s livelihoods; (b) it influences the tactical considerations of armed groups; (c) elites use it to exploit social vulnerabilities and resources; and (d) it displaces people and increases levels of migration. In acknowledging that these mechanisms are often interlinked and more noticeable in some climatic, conflict and socio-economic contexts than in others, the need for more research in both regions is clear.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Conflict, and Risk
Political Geography:
Africa and Asia

63. ‘Land Bandits’ or ‘Land Grabbers’: Fulani Herdsmen and Local Farmers Incessant Bloody Clashes in Nigeria

Author:
Seun Bamidele
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
Incessant bloody clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in Africa have resulted in deaths and displacement. Different parts of Africa including Nigeria have experienced clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers throughout the colonial periods in Africa and even beyond (Abubakar 2012). The dire need for Fulani herdsmen to increase the productivity of their livestock farming in the midst of unfavourable climatic conditions have necessitated the search for adequate pasture for cattle grazing. In Africa, the Fulanis are about twenty million in number; they are one of the most widely dispersed and culturally diverse people scattered across Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. The Fulanis, also known as the “Fula people or Fulbe” are the largest pastoral nomadic group in the world with root in West Africa, Northern part of Central Africa and Egypt (Adisa and Adekunke 2010). The common business of Fulanis is livestock production, they move from one region to another for grazing purposes. Livestock account for one third of Nigeria’s agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes 16% of agricultural GDP; it is an important component of general agriculture and a key contributor to economic growth and development of any nation (Ojiako and Olayode 2008, 114). [...] The failure of the government policy on grazing reserve has left Fulani herdsmen to their fates, in determining where and how to raise their livestock. Amidst this situation, some medium and large corporate livestock farms have emerged, while many other Fulani herdsmen maintain their nomadic lifestyles. The latter live a sort of jungle life, characterized by selfhelp, in the search of grazing fields across the states, trying to protect their lives and properties from wild animals and cattle rustlers. These, among other things, have led to Fulani herdsmen being armed with dangerous military weapons like AK 47 and other dangerous ammunitions, which in turn have led to series of incessant bloody killings involving the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers in different rural communities across the country
Topic:
Agriculture, Conflict, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

64. Post-Conflict Peace-Building in a Contested International Border: The Nigeria-Cameroon Border Conflict Settlement and Matters Arising

Author:
Kenneth Chukwuemeka Nwoko
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The political solution under the Green Tree Agreement which led to the handover of the contested Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by Nigeria following the International Court of Justice (2002) ruling signaled the end of the protracted Nigeria/Cameroon border conflict, at least on the surface. However, some analysts believed that it marked the beginning of what may result into a future conflict (Agbakwuru 2012; The Guardian 2006). From the analysis of the verdict of the Court, it would appear that while the interests of the two states involved in the conflict appeared to have been taken into cognizance, the interest of the indigenes and inhabitants of Bakassi was not. Apart from alienating these local people from their ancestral homes, cultural sites and livelihood opportunities, activities such as fishing; interstate water transportation, trading etc, which were operated as early as the precolonial days by the local inhabitants, appear to have been disrupted, thus, endangering their means of livelihood and survival. The Anglo-German agreement of March 1913 which the ICJ ruling relied on for its verdict on the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict represents the earliest milestone in the process of alienation of the inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula, the causus bellum; especially since the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar exercised sovereignty over the Bakassi3 , a title which was subsumed in that part of Nigeria as the sovereign state during the period of this conflict. While the ICJ ruling gave precedence to contemporary western constructions of the notions of boundaries and sovereignty to the detriment of the historical consolidation (Sama & Johnson-Ross 2005-2006, 111), “protectorate treaty made without jurisdiction should not have taken precedence over a community title rights and ownership existing from time immemorial” (Nigerian Information Service Centre 2002; The Guardian 2002, 1-2) In other words, Germany transferred to Cameroon what it did not derive from Britain, since the right to title ownership lay with the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar. The focus of this article is not to delve into the juridical issues relating to legal ownership of the territory since the ICJ ruling had put that to rest. Rather the objective is to analyse matters arising from the settlement that could jeopardise the “cold peace” between the two countries; issues relating to psychological, socio-economic and political fallouts which the method of settlement of the conflict and its application brought on the indigenes and inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula as well as proffer recommendations for lasting peace in this troubled region.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Border Control, Conflict, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, and Cameroon

65. Is Kurdistan Independence Inevitable?

Author:
Yerevan Saeed
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
On 25 September, residents of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will cast their votes in a referendum that may trigger an official process of separating Kurdistan from Iraq. International friends and foes alike have opposed the controversial Kurdish move, contending that the referendum will fuel further instability in Iraq, and cause repercussions across the Middle East. The Kurdish bid for independence is not unique, however. Ethnic groups in Asia, Europe, and Africa have in the past pursued their own dreams of statehood — some with success, while others ended in failure. Whatever the outcome, the process is often costly in terms of both its human toll and economically. For that reason, the secession of any region from its parent state has to be justified on strategic, political, and economic terms. For their part, Kurdish leadership asserts that Baghdad’s mentality of power monopoly has not changed and the long-term potential for future violence against Kurds remains high. For them, the only viable, albeit risky, path is to seek complete sovereignty. The stakes are high all round, and the international community could have a constructive role to play. Conversely, international disengagement leaves both Baghdad and Erbil exposed to greater uncertainty in the near future. Iraq and Kurdistan could follow the model of Kosovo, East Timor, or South Sudan, all of which realised their statehood but to varying degrees of stability; or, instead, the catastrophic pathways taken by the Biafra region of Nigeria and Katanga in Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Though South Sudan is still reeling from its civil war and ongoing territorial disputes, international intervention has been key in preventing clashes between Khartoum and the new state. Some important steps included the signing of the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and the active participation of the United Nations in the referendum process in 2011. Likewise, international support was a determinant in amicable separation of East Timor from Indonesia in UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, as well as the separation of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008. By the same token, instead of mounting further pressure on Erbil to cancel the poll, it could be more constructive for all stakeholders to assist Baghdad and Erbil to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. This is likely to be beneficial for all sides. A deal would mitigate the chance of violent conflict between Kurdish forces and the Iraqi army, and could save the UN and major powers from investing blood and treasure in case of a potential later conflict. It would also remove Kurdistan from international legal limbo and provide a more viable route for diplomatic recognition. In contrast to these experiences, the anticipated absence of international engagement means a unilateral declaration of independence by Erbil could prove costly for all sides. This is evidenced by the declaration of independence of the Biafra Region in Nigeria in 1967–1970. The Igbo-dominated region of Biafra did not hold a referendum to pursue its dream of statehood. Instead, the 300 members of the joint Consultative Assembly of chiefs and elders voted in favour of secession from Nigeria on 26 May, 1967. The following day, the same Consultative Assembly passed a binding resolution, forcing the head of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, to declare independence unilaterally on 30 May, 1967. Despite some international support from African and European countries, the move was met with harsh military and economic warfare against the infant republic by the Nigerian government, leading to a three year conflict. One million people, including many civilians Biafrans civilians died, primarily from starvation. Further evidence of the potential danger can be found in the case of Katanga. When Moise Tshombe declared Katanga province as an independent republic from Congo on 11 July, 1960, the move was initially supported by Belgium, and came just two weeks after the Congo’s independence. Tshombe famously said, “We are seceding from chaos,” referring to the messy state of affairs of postcolonial Congo. However, the republic, located in the mineral heartland of Congo, failed to receive diplomatic recognition — even from Belgium, and faced strong opposition from Congo and the international community. The events descended into political turmoil, and forced the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces. In addition, the competing interests and support for different groups from the US, Soviet Union, Belgium, and other powers further complicated the crisis from 1960–1965. It took three years to defeat Tshombe and reintegrate Katanga into Congo, with a high human and economic toll . Beyond these examples and above all, the right of the Kurds to pursue statehood can be historically and legally justifiable. At the dawn of the last century when the Ottoman Empire crumbled, Kurds were deprived of statehood by the Great Powers. They were subject not just to marginalisation, but to genocide as well. Even so, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish leaders actively participated in the political processes in Baghdad, helping rebuild the Iraqi state and contributing to the defeat of terrorism. From their point of view, Baghdad has not lived up to its commitments to the 2005 constitution. Furthermore, the Kurds in Iraq believe they have strong grounds legal for a Kurdish state. Under the UN Charter, they have the right to self-determination. Finally, legal scholars argue that the principle of “territorial integrity” — enshrined in the UN Charter — is not unbreakable, should a country oppress a particular ethnic group and refuse to provide equal citizenship. International and regional powers have expressed understanding for the Kurdish aspirations for statehood, but are concerned the result could lead to violence. However, if instability is the concern, they are well-positioned to facilitate an amicable outcome between Erbil and Baghdad. Kurdish leaders have said that they have reached a point of no return with regard to their status quo within Iraq. Yet, they have shown flexibility in a willingness to postpone the referendum, should the international community offer alternatives or agree to officially support a legally binding referendum in the future. Indeed on 14 September, 2017, envoys of the US, UK and UN, in coordination with Baghdad, presented an ‘alternative to the referendum’ to the KRG President. Details of the ‘alternative’ is not known but short of providing political and economic incentives and security assurances, it is hard to see the current momentum for the referendum coming to an end
Topic:
United Nations, Election watch, Conflict, and Independence
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

66. Can Indigenous Associations Foster Trust, Tolerance, and Public Goods? Exploring the Role of Grins in Post-Conflict Mali

Author:
Jaimie Bleck and Philippe LeMay-Boucher
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Education
Abstract:
People gather in structured, if informal, community groups for many reasons—social, such as a book club or softball league; economic, such as a team hosting a fundraiser for a member’s medical expenses; or political, such as neighbors meeting to address flooding caused by poor infrastructure. But how does participating in such groups affect people’s well-being or decisions to work for other community improvements? Level of political knowledge? Level of trust toward group members, people in the broader community, or institutions such as the government? Or willingness to tolerate differences that are often at the root of conflict, such as ethnicity and religion? Through an Innovation and Research Grant funded by USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance under the Democracy Fellows and Grants Program, Professors Jaimie Bleck from the University of Notre Dame and Philippe LeMay-Boucher from Heriot-Watt University, in collaboration with Jacopo Bonan from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart and Bassirou Sarr from the Paris School of Economics, worked to answer these questions by studying community groups called grins that meet in neighborhoods across Mali’s cities. The research, which included both survey data and data generated through the public goods and trust experimental games, was implemented in two sites in Mali: the capital Bamako and the twin cities of Mopti and Sevare, on the border between the formerly occupied north and the south. Key findings include: Grins’ primary purpose is social, but the groups also help members meet economic needs and provide a venue for political discussion and community service, such as neighborhood cleanup. The majority of grins are male-only, and the majority of grin members are male, comparatively better educated, and unmarried; however, members of male-only grins trusted one another less than members of mixed-gender or female-only grins. Members are better able to produce public goods than non-members, but only when working with members of their own grin. Members are considered more trustworthy than non-members, except for grins with internally displaced persons as members. Grinmembers had more trust in social institutions and diverse ethnic groups, though no more trust of the government; members of ethnically homogenous grins trusted diverse ethnic groups less.
Topic:
Politics, Ethnicity, Conflict, Institutions, and Indigenous
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

67. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 01: 'Annual Threat Assessment 2017'

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna, Remy Mahzam, Iftekharul Bashar, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Abdul Basit, Sara Mahmood, Nodirbek Soliev, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, Vikram Rajakumar, and Shahzeb Ali Rathore
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
2016 saw the so-called Islamic State (IS) in retreat following sustained bombardment and military attacks and airstrikes by the US-led coalition as well as Russian and Syrian forces. It has conceded large swathes of territory, towns and cities, and lost some of its top commanders and strategists and more than 25,000 fighters. The group‘s revenue has declined and so has the flow of new fighters. It has to contend with desertions, in-fighting and scarce resources. Its fall-back wilayats (provinces) in Libya have been lost and many in the liberated areas of Iraq and Syria are jubilant at its ouster after holding sway for more than 20 months. Its declaration of the caliphate is rejected by the Muslim world, which has denounced its acts of violence and misreading of religious texts. Since its formation, IS remains the object of condemnation and denunciation by the whole world. Even so, the terrorist threat posed by IS and its decentralised networks in 2016 shows no sign of abatement. Throughout the year, IS‘ active worldwide networks demonstrated the ability to plan, direct, train, recruit and radicalise from abroad, operating with impunity and surpassing the threat from Al Qaeda‘s old guard. The year saw a number of IS-directed or IS-inspired attacks by terror cells or ‘lone wolves‘ in major cities like Brussels, Nice, Orlando, Istanbul, Dhaka, Jakarta and Berlin resulting in thousands of casualties. Its propaganda machinery and online presence remain formidable, exploiting technology for communications, recruitment, finance, training and terrorist operations. IS has caused the displacement of millions and triggered a humanitarian crisis among refugees and in the battle zones. The group‘s extremism and violence have contributed to inter-religious tensions and discord, and strengthened anti-Islamist movements in the West. The stage is therefore set for 2017 to be a portentous and decisive year for IS and countries afflicted by the threat of terrorism. As IS loses control of Mosul and Raqqa in coming months, it will change strategy, focus and priorities. How it will change and what the impact will be are issues addressed by Rohan Gunaratna in his article on Global Threat Forecast, as well as in accompanying articles on the terrorism situation in selected countries and regions. As IS continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria, it will transform itself from a caliphate-building entity to a terrorist organisation. It will seek refuge in its many wilayats and enclaves, and consolidate, expand and use them as launching pads to mount terrorist attacks. The group will continue with its strategy of expanding the ‘battlefield‘ to the West and elsewhere, and hit ‘soft‘ and easy targets. Overall, the terrorist threat will endure in the New Year and will continue to require effective counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism measures.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Iraq, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, South America, Syria, Asia-Pacific, and North America

68. Post-conflict Stabilization in Africa

Author:
Anke Hoeffler
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)
Abstract:
Post-conflict peace is fragile, about half of all conflicts break out again during the twelve post-conflict years. In Africa this risk is even higher. Using survival analysis this paper suggests that while it is difficult to find correlates of peace stabilization, there are some policy relevant results. How a conflict ends is important. Negotiated settlements are fragile but the chances of peace surviving can be significantly improved through the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations. The data suggest that many operations start before the end of the armed conflict, thus they should be viewed as ‘peace preparation’ operations. The paper recommends the use of additional case studies, given that the small sample size prevents further quantitative examination of these important issues.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Economics, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa and Global Focus

69. Acute Food Insecurity and Conflict in Africa

Author:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Nineteen African countries are facing acute levels of food insecurity. Ten of those countries are experiencing internal conflict.
Topic:
United Nations, Refugee Issues, Authoritarianism, Food Security, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sahel, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sahara

70. Conflict and Famine in South Sudan

Author:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
While much of East Africa suffers from drought, it is conflict, rather than lack of rain, that has been the cause of famine in South Sudan.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Famine, Food Security, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, East Africa, South Sudan, and Central Africa