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21. Terrorism and governance crisis: The Boko Haram experience in Nigeria

Author:
Efehi Raymond Okoro
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Terrorist acts by Boko Haram have attracted enormous scholarly attention in recent years. A majority of the studies have implicated Islam in the emergence and dynamics of the uprising. In contrast to this popular view, this article argues that, despite the strategic role played by Islamic religion in the uprising, terrorism and its security threats in northern Nigeria are more a product of a governance crisis including pervasive corruption, growing youth unemployment and poverty. It further argues that if good governance concurrently with development is not employed as a remedial strategy, the Nigerian State will further create a much more enabling environment for the growth of resistance from below. Thus, it concludes that good governance and credible leadership practices are antidotes to terrorism in Nigeria.
Topic:
Religion, Terrorism, Governance, Al Qaeda, Youth, Al Shabaab, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

22. Purveyors of Terror: Counterterrorism in Africa's Failing States

Author:
Thomas Dempsey
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Weak and failing states in Africa continue to offer challenging environments for counterterrorism campaigns in both a military and a civil law enforcement context. Weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in these states offer venues that violent extremist groups continue to exploit as platforms for terrorism. These groups – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are simply two of the more prominent examples – use these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces to recruit new followers, build capability and capacity, and launch new terrorist attacks while avoiding the scrutiny and attention of African security sectors and their international partners. A defining feature of these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in Africa is the predominance of non-state security actors, including local militias, neighborhood watch organizations, traditional hunting societies, and traditional, customary, or religious justice processes that operate outside of the formal court system. Some of these non-state actors themselves represent violent extremist groups involved in acts of terror. Others play central roles in the mediation of disputes (administration of justice), delivery of police services, or as military surrogates in providing for local defense. I argued in Counterterrorism in African Failed States that collaboration between U.S. military forces and law enforcement agencies is essential to effective counterterrorism interventions in African failed states.[i] Subsequent counterterrorism operations in the region have confirmed that argument, and African senior police and militaryleaders increasingly emphasize the importance of collaboration between military and police forces.[ii] In addition to military forces and law enforcement services, counterterrorism in Africa must effectively address the need for effective partners in the justice sector – prosecutors (and defense counsels), courts, prisons and corrections – in implementing counterterrorism strategies. All three components of counterterrorism strategies must confront the reality that weakly governed and ungoverned spaces are ground zero for counterterrorism on the continent, and that non-state security actors are a defining feature of those spaces. To address the purveyors of terror – in most cases, non-state security actors like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or AQIM in the Sahel – counterterrorism strategies in ungoverned and weakly governed spaces in Africa must address all of the non-state security actors that proliferate in those areas.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:
Africa

23. Beware of Imitators: al-Qa`ida through the lens of its Confi dential Secretary

Author:
Nelly Lahoud
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“I should write a history of the jihadis in my time as I witnessed it and not as it is perceived by the West or those who disagree with us,” explains Fadil Harun regarding his motivation to publish his two-volume manuscript al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War against Islam: the Story of Fadil Harun). The spirit driving Harun’s manuscript is to produce a corrective history of al-Qa`ida distinguishing it from jihadi groups acting in its name. He believed that unlike al-Qa`ida, many jihadi groups have deviated from the true path of jihad: they lack a sound ideological worldview and many of their operations, particularly those which involved resorting to “tatarrus” (i.e., the use of non-combatants as human shields), are in breach of what he deems to be “lawful jihad.” This report is a study of al-Qa`ida’s ideology, organizational structure, strengths and weaknesses through Harun’s lens and in light of captured battlefield documents.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Kenya, Africa, Tanzania, and Somalia

24. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

Author:
Clint Watts, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa draws on recently declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, original field work by CTC personnel, and careful country studies. The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, al- Qa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction. This report assesses al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn of Africa by identifying the organizational challenges al-Qa’ida faced in managing the jihad in the Horn. We also examine the individual motivations of the Somali clans and people that largely resisted al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts in the region. After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism forces. We conclude this study by identifying concepts and techniques that may be applicable in other regions based upon al-Qa’ida’s experiences in the Horn. Our primary conclusion is that the U.S. and its coalition partners should prioritize counterterrorism efforts on weak states–not failed ones. Both types of states demand attention but require different policy solutions. Effective and sustainable counterterrorism in failed states requires engaging with sub-state authorities to give them the means and the motivation to resist foreign intrusion. In weak states, successful counterterrorism policies must address core institutional and governance problems that render such states unable or unwilling to fully deal with the threat. Perversely, U.S. support to state and local counterterrorism efforts can create incentives to tolerate low levels of terrorism, a problem best addressed by conditioning aid on counterterrorism effort rather than on the presence of a threat.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, and Somalia