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101. Les madrasas chiites afghanes à l’aune iranienne : anthropologie d’une dépendance religieuse (The Afghan Shiites Madras in the Iranian news: the anthropology of religious dependance)

Author:
Fariba Adelkhah and Keiko Sakurai
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
As a social institution, the madras must be analyzed in terms of their relationship to social, econmomic and political change and to the public educational system whose bureaucratic organization they have copied. In the case of Afghanistan they cannot be disassociated from the war and its consequences, such as emigration and the reconstitution of ethno-religious affiliations. Financed and run by the diaspora, they enable the Shiite minority, notably Hazara, to reestablish itself in the central State and to provide a counterweight to the Pachtoune domination. They also contribute to the education of girls and children from disfavored social classes. The dependeance of Shiite education in Afghanistan on the Iranian clergy has organizational, theological, financial and symbolique benefits. But it is accompanied by a reinvention of, and separation from, the Iranian model which should, in the minds of the religous authorities, lead to a national schism in Afghanistan of which Kaboul hopes to be the spiritual capital. The asymetric Irano-Afghan interaction illustrates the relevance of the notion of « religous dependence ».
Topic:
Education, Religion, War, Ethnicity, and Anthropology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

102. Traditional Dispute Resolution and Stability in Afghanistan

Author:
John Dempsey and Noah Coburn
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Stability in Afghanistan will remain elusive unless disputes between individuals and among communities can be resolved through peaceful and equitable means. However, state justice institutions are barely functioning in much of the country and are incapable of meeting many justice and dispute resolution needs of Afghans. Instead, the majority of Afghans turn to traditional justice mechanisms—including tribal councils and village and religious leaders—to address both civil and criminal disputes. In many parts of the country, including areas recently cleared of insurgents, the best way to make signi_cant, visible, short-term (12 to 18 months) gains in peacefully resolving disputes is to work with community-based structures. USIP has drawn important lessons from its work with Afghan partners to implement pilot programs exploring links between the state and traditional justice systems in four provinces across the country (in Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia and Herat). Programs designed to create or strengthen existing links between traditional justice bodies and state institutions can build mutual trust and harness the strengths of each. Donor-funded traditional justice programs need to involve the Afghan government while also accounting for the practical needs of communities to settle disputes in line with their own traditions and procedures, as well as Afghanistan's laws and human rights norms.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

103. Congress and Parliaments in Security Sector Reform

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Legislative oversight of the security sector is crucial to ensure that security policies and expenditures are undertaken with full transparency, accountability and concern for other national priorities and popular attitudes. This is important in conflict states, particularly during peace or stability operations. Establishing legislative oversight is difficult in conflict countries because of the absence of historical tradition, the complexity of security agencies, the technical nature of the issues, secrecy laws and the lack of expertise among parliamentarians and their staffs. The U.S. Congress provides a model for effective legislative oversight of the security sector for other countries to emulate. Congress has developed the legal authorities and the traditions required to form an effective partnership with the Defense and Justice departments, the U.S. military forces and civilian security services. Due to the importance of legislative oversight of the security sector to the democratic process, the U.S. Congress provides advice and training to foreign parliaments and parliamentarians in security sector reform. Congress has important partnership arrangements with parliaments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Kosovo and other conflict countries.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Georgia

104. The dangers of militarized aid in Afghanistan

Author:
Ashley Jackson
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Every half hour, an average of one Afghan woman dies from pregnancy-related complications, another dies of tuberculosis and 14 children die, largely from preventable causes. Eight years after the fall of the Taliban, the humanitarian and development needs in Afghanistan remain acute.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

105. Out of Order: Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship

Author:
Matthew Moten
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In June, U.S. President Barack Obama acted swiftly and wisely in relieving General Stanley McChrystal of command of the war in Afghanistan. In removing McChrystal for making disparaging comments about civilian leaders in a Rolling Stone article, the president reasserted the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military. He also immediately appointed General David Petraeus as the new commanding general in Afghanistan, with the U.S. mission continuing as before. Republicans did not try to exploit the situation for political advantage. There was no crisis, no rending of the fabric of political-military relations, and no threat to the U.S. Constitution. In fact, the current state of relations between the United States' highest civilian and military leaders is quite good. This is a welcome change, and it began with the tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who changed the climate at the Pentagon from one of suspicion to one of collaboration. Gates has established an atmosphere of trust and respect, combined with an unflinching demand for accountability. Although Donald Rumsfeld had a reputation for leading by fear and intimidation, in his six years as secretary of defense, he fired only one service secretary, Army Secretary Thomas White -- largely over personal differences -- and no flag officers (the hundreds of generals and admirals who compose the country's senior military leadership). In contrast, Gates has dismissed two service secretaries, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the air force chief of staff, the commanding admiral of Central Command, two commanding generals in Afghanistan, and the surgeon general of the army. Yet Gates and Obama have also shown forbearance. Last October, in the midst of the administration's review of the country's Afghanistan policy, McChrystal publicly warned of "mission failure" if a significant infusion of U.S. troops was not made. But instead of removing McChrystal, who had become commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan less than three months earlier, Gates and Obama gave McChrystal a clear message about his place in the political-military partnership. Obama had a private chat with the general on Air Force One, and Gates delivered a highly publicized speech in which he reminded his listeners that "it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations -- civilian and military alike -- provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately."
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

106. Human rights challenges in EU civilian crisis management

Author:
Wanda Troszczynska-van Genderen
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the years, human rights have become an area of programmatic focus in the crisis management operations conducted by the EU. Nevertheless, the geopolitical reality after the launch of the so-called 'war on terror' witnessed the emergence of new practical impediments to human rights implementation in civilian crisis response operations. The militarisation of the humanitarian space and blurred boundaries between military and civilian tasks resulted in the increased vulnerability of civilians working in ground operations. Simultaneously, the scale of human rights violations, coupled with security threats to civilians due to both attacks by insurgents and interventions carried out by international military personnel, created operational challenges going well beyond what previous Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian crisis management operations had to deal with.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

107. The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan

Author:
Lisa Schirch
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The intense challenge of coordinating government civilians with military actors in the International Security Assistance Forces' Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan has inhibited development of military relationships with civil society. The counterinsurgency strategy of “shape, clear, hold, build” invites civil society organizations (CSOs) to play key roles in the final “build” stage at the operational level. Yet many CSOs resist “coordination” in a mission and strategy different from their own. CSOs seek greater policy dialogue and “communication” with high-level ISAF decision makers, particularly during planning stages. An ongoing, high-level forum for civil society-military policy dialogue could help address tensions, provide a mechanism for CSOs to share their conflict assessments, and explore areas for possible collaboration such as in security sector reform.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil Society, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Indonesia

108. Afghanistan: Conditions-Based Redeployment

Author:
William B. Taylor
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
President Barack Obama's policy of a conditions-based redeployment in Afghanistan starting in July 2011 leaves him a lot of flexibility. The administration will likely decide to maintain the troop numbers in Afghanistan near the surge level next year, pending another review.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

109. Many Shuras Do Not a Government Make: International Community Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan

Author:
Noah Coburn and Shahmahmood Miakhel
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The need to engage local Afghan leaders and support community decision making has recently been promoted as a key element of both development and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan. The resulting proliferation of community councils—commonly called shuras or jirgas— sponsored by different actors within the Afghan government and international community has decreased the effectiveness of local governance and rule of law in many places. Traditional Afghan dispute resolution and governance bodies are most effective when they are formed by local residents and genuinely reflect the interests of the community. Their legitimacy decreases if international or government sponsors create shuras or jirgas to promote their own interests. This paradox creates a dilemma for programs designed to foster good governance: how to promote community self-rule that reflects traditional values and mechanisms and that develop locally, while adhering to rigid counterinsurgency and development timelines and strategies. These so-called 'traditional' political structures have an important place in local governance in Afghanistan, but the international community should not assume that such bodies fairly represent their respective communities. Rather, sound understanding of local dynamics and in-depth consultation with local government actors and community leaders are necessary to help ensure that such bodies are represented and thus, legitimate within the community. A more coherent, sustainable vision of long-term local governance and coordinated strategies between the Afghan government and international forces is necessary to bring both stability and development to Afghanistan. In particular, this Peace Brief supports the attempts to create a coherent long-term goal of local governance based on legitimate local actors, most likely selected through elections.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

110. Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact

Author:
T.X. Hammes
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan. These numbers include both armed and unarmed contractors. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term contractor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specified. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in the Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Privatization, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq