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91. The Privatisation of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment

Author:
Željko Branović
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Failing and collapsed states are a common marketplace for the private military industry, which has grown significantly in size and scope over the last decade. Today the private sector supplies a broad spectrum of military and security services to governments facing a lack of territorial control and law enforcement capacities. These services range from combat support to training for military and policing units, logistics and the protection of individuals and property. Yet a quantifiable picture of the extent to which these private security services are being used by failing or weak governments and the implications this use might have for the security environment has not been properly painted.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and United Nations

92. Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011

Author:
Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub-national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war-weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring 'victory'. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational- strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Governance
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

93. Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

Author:
Stuart Griffin
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
Topic:
Security and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and United Kingdom

94. Humanitarian soldiers, colonialised Others and invisible enemies: Visual strategic communication narratives of the Afghan war

Author:
Noora Kotilainen
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This paper examines the current visual strategic communications endeavour of the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, which is designed to influence public opinion within the participant coalition nations. The aim is to track down what kind of means, messages and narratives the Western strategic communications machinery topically uses, in order to more effectively convince and address the domestic publics of the desirability of the operation. I concentrate on analysing the communication and image building endeavour taking place in Internet and new media surroundings, and namely bite into visual images constructed for the communication. For material, I use the ISAF media Flickr photostream, which is a large and frequently updated set of online photographs presented by ISAF.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Communications, and Mass Media
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

95. Defining Success in Afghanistan

Author:
Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Success in Afghanistan is the establishment of a political order, security situation, and indigenous security force that is stable, viable, enduring, and able—with greatly reduced international support—to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists. The current American and Coalition strategy is making progress and should be continued. Since President Obama, NATO allies, and the Afghans have agreed that troops will be present in Afghanistan through 2014, the policy does not require substantial modifications at this point. This paper is thus primarily a report on the current situation in Afghanistan and a consideration of some of the prospects and challenges ahead. Our principal recommendation is that the U.S. and its allies should continue to resource and sustain the strategy now being executed, which is the only approach that can secure their vital national security interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and America

96. Afghanistan in Transition: The Security Context Post-Bin Laden

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2011 NATO initiated the Inteqal process, i.e. the "transition" of security responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghan state and its security forces. The main pillars of this process are the build up of the Afghan Army and Police and the improvement of Afghanistan's governance system at both national and local level. Progress has been made in this respect, although challenges remain. NATO aims to complete the transition by 2014, while reducing its military presence in the country, but a substantial Allied footprint is likely to remain in Afghanistan beyond that date. The death of Bin Laden has brought about little changes to the situation on the ground, while it may have a significant impact on the US's attitude towards peace talks with the Taliban and thus influence the transition timeline and nature.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Terrorism, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

97. Afghanistan Win or Lose: Transition and the Coming Resource Crisis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US confronts a wide range of challenges if it is to win the Afghan conflict in any meaningful sense, and leave a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan: Decide on US strategic objectives in conducting and terminating the war. These objectives not only include the defeat of Al Qaeda, but deciding on what kind of transition the US wishes to make in Afghanistan, what goals the US can achieve in creating a stable Afghanistan, US goals in Pakistan, and the broader strategic goals the US will seek in Central and South Asia. Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population and ability exploit sanctuaries in Pakistan and win a war of political transition. Create a more effective and integrated, operational civil and civil-military transition effort by NATO/ISAF, UN, member countries, NGO, and international community efforts through 2014 and for 5-10 years after the withdrawal of combat forces. Build up a much larger, and more effective, mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels by 2014. Dealing with Pakistan in reducing the Taliban-Haqqani network in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and dealing with the broader risk Pakistan will become a failed nuclear weapons state. Shape a balance of post-transition relations with India, Iran, "Stans," Russia, and China that will help sustain posttransition stability. Make effective trade-offs in terms of resources relative to the priorities set by other US domestic and security interests.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

98. u.s. and iranian strategic competition: Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan

Author:
Erin Fitzgerald and Varun Vira
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policies toward Central and South Asia – driven primarily by the war in Afghanistan, the growing instability in Pakistan, and whether the US should actively pursue strategic interest in Central Asia in the face of Russian and Chinese pressures and advantages, than by strategic competition with Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

99. Leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans

Author:
David M. Rodriguez
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In the summer of 2011, I visited the Afghan army's Regional Military Training Center in Helmand Province. The recruits had been there for two weeks, and they looked as strong as any group of U.S. soldiers in basic training. The Afghan drill instructors were as competent, and had the same cocky swagger, as American ones. "Sir, look at all of our volunteers," one drill sergeant proudly said to me. "They're great. We have already won. . . . We just don't know it yet." To comprehend the United States' progress in Afghanistan, it is important to understand how and where we have focused our resources and what work lies ahead. To be sure, the United States and its coalition partners still have plenty of challenges left to tackle in Afghanistan. However, there are indisputable gains everywhere we have focused our efforts. In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, then the commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, with the help of David Petraeus, then the commander of the U.S. Central Command, worked hard to design a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign for Afghanistan that would "get the inputs right," as Petraues often said. The upshot was more resources, troops, and civilian support and better command coherence. There are now more Afghan and coalition soldiers in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces alone than there were in all of Regional Command East, the formation responsible for security in Afghanistan's 14 eastern provinces, when I commanded the latter from 2007 to 2008. As 33,000 U.S. troops begin the drawdown, returning to the United States by next summer, 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police will be in place to continue their work. There are clear signs of progress in Afghanistan, and coalition forces have regained the initiative. The strategy has worked because it sought to match the coalition's goals with available resources. It involved four major concepts. First, use a bottom-up approach founded on good governance, capable security forces, and engagement with local communities. If towns had good leaders and security providers, populations would find local solutions to their local problems, with just a little help from Kabul. Insurgents could no longer exploit popular grievances about security, justice, and a lack of basic services.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and America

100. Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Insecure Environments: Learning from Afghanistan

Author:
Mark Sedra, Major Gen (ret.) Andrew Mackay, and Geoff Burt
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Security Sector Management
Institution:
Centre for Security Sector Management
Abstract:
The uneven impact of security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan, despite nearly a decade-long commitment and billions of dollars invested, demonstrates the immense and perhaps insurmountable challenge of effectively implementing the process amidst an active conflict. The SSR model was largely developed for post-conflict and post-authoritarian environments featuring favorable political conditions for reform. In Afghanistan, the SSR project and the Bonn political dispensation has faced progressively greater levels of violence with each passing year, reaching the level of a full-blown war covering large parts of the country by 2008. In the absence of a genuine political settlement with the Taliban and other stakeholders, the SSR process has been conceived of and applied as a means to confront the growing insurgency, rather than as part of a larger state building and democratization project, as it was intended. It is difficult to imagine a more inhospitable environment for SSR than the one that confronted Afghan and international state builders in the wake of the Taliban's ouster in late 2001. Over two decades of intense civil war left little institutional infrastructure and human capacity to build upon; public attitudes toward the state and security sector were marked by mistrust and suspicion; and insecurity, whether caused by insurgent activity, crime or inter-communal violence was widespread.
Topic:
Security and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban