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41. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Tackling conflict and providing security in Afghanistan requires a greater effort to deal with local disputes that frequently flare into violence and lead to wider problems. Although these attract less attention than the threat from the resurgent Taliban, they are important as they produce an environment of insecurity which destroys all quality of life for ordinary civilians and undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan Transitional Administration in Kabul. Local commanders often exploit these disputes to consolidate their positions, further weakening the authority of the central government.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Development, Government, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Kabul

42. Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

Author:
Barnett Rubin, Abby Stoddard, and Humayan Hamidzada
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
A year and a half after the defeat of the Taliban, anger is rising in Afghanistan at the slow pace of reconstruction. Success in reconstruction means meeting goals, not fulfilling pledges or being generous. The overriding goal is enabling Afghans to build a country that contributes to, rather than threatens, their own and global security. As the government of Afghanistan becomes better organized and articulates both this goal and what is needed to reach it more clearly, it has become evident that donors underestimated the amount of assistance required. Initial pledges fell short even of underestimates of the needs and were far less than in other comparable cases. Initial disbursements, which in past cases have always exceeded subsequent ones, came relatively quickly and nearly met pledges, as donors have highlighted (see figure 1). But most of these disbursements went for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction. Implementation of those reconstruction projects that have been funded has been exceedingly slow, leaving little to show on the ground. As of May 2003, donors reported that in 17 months they had completed reconstruction projects with a total expenditure of only $191 million, out of $2.1 billion pledged to reconstruction for the first twelve months. Furthermore, according to Afghan government figures, only 16 percent of the total disbursements (including for humanitarian purposes) had passed through channels controlled by the struggling Afghan government and had thus failed to build that government's capacity or legitimacy. The pervasive insecurity outside of Kabul prevented implementation of major projects and sapped the public's confidence in the new authorities. Failure to strengthen the government and provide security will doom the reconstruction effort even if contributions increase. The government has articulated an ambitious policy framework for reconstruction and asked for both reconstruction and security assistance. Success is possible, and at a modest cost. Failure by the US and other major states to respond will doom Afghanistan, the region, and the world to a repetition of anarchy that gave birth to the Taliban and refuge to al-Qaida.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban

43. Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations. On paper it resembles earlier assistance missions that provided governance and development support to post-conflict societies. In practice, however, the UN mission remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place. This disjunction between formal authority and practical influence poses a challenge not only for the specific operation in Afghanistan but also to accepted models of UN peace operations more generally. Most analyses of UN peace operations suggest that the more complex the political environment, the larger the amount of resources required to complete the mandate. On any such measure, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) faces an uphill battle. UNAMA is instead pursuing a high-risk strategy that requires two conceptual leaps from the normal mould of peace operations. The first is that it is possible to blur the normal distinction between negotiating a peace agreement and implementing it. The second is that the UN can make up for its small mandate and limited resources through exercising greater than normal political influence. There is widespread agreement among UNAMA and most of its Afghan partners that expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul would be an important stabilizing factor in this process. If it is to be done, it should be done urgently, while all parties are still buying into the Loya Jirga process. Given the reaction of the United States and potential troop-contributing nations, however, expansion now appears highly unlikely. Every UN mission and development programme now stresses the importance of local 'ownership'. This may be the first mission where some of the local population themselves are truly taking charge. Development, however, is notoriously supply- rather than demand-driven; donor countries are infamous for pledging one thing and delivering another. Agencies must therefore take this into account when constructing fictional budgetary targets that they know will not be met, making responsible financial planning still more difficult. Compounding these problems is confusion in Afghanistan as to what projects are actually going to be funded and when. This is partly caused by the refusal of some of the largest donors to have their money pooled into a trust fund for the whole of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga was intended to encourage Afghans from all parts of the country to 'buy into the peace process'. This phrase was used metaphorically, but should also be understood literally. Encouraging Afghans to see the solutions to their problems as lying in the embryonic institutions of the state is good politics internationally. It is also Afghanistan's best chance for stability and relative prosperity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Peace Studies, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

44. Post-Conflict Peace Operations and Governance in Afghanistan

Author:
Jeff Fischer
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, post-conflict military and civilian interventions have occurred with increasing frequency and scope. By illustration, the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was mandated to supervise the truce of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and initially deployed 93 military observers. By contrast, the current international interventions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTEAT) are de facto governments, employing thousands of international and local staff with police and military services included in the portfolio.
Topic:
Government, International Cooperation, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Israel, Arabia, and Kosovo