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11. A Temporary Marriage of Convenience: Transnational Jihadists in Proxy Warfare

Author:
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Cecily G. Brewer of the U.S. Department of State defines proxy wars as “inter-state conflicts fought via intra-state means.” She notes that traditionally in such conflicts, “the intra-state symptoms of the conflict draw attention,” while the inter-state driver — the support an actor receives from outside the country — “is ignored.” A prototypical example, albeit one where outside support given to the non-state actors at the heart of the conflict has received copious attention, is the Afghan-Soviet war. Not only did the Afghan mujahedin force the powerful Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan following a costly and humiliating defeat, but the conflict also gave birth to the preeminent transnational jihadist group, al-Qaeda. This article examines how proxy warfare functions in the context of jihadist groups that share al-Qaeda’s transnational outlook, arguing that they create more difficulties for the state attempting to exploit them than do traditional proxies. Pakistan’s policies, and the resulting costs inflicted upon the Pakistani state, provide a powerful case study in the dangers involved in relying on jihadist proxies. The Afghan-Soviet war was a key event in shaping Pakistan’s self-destructive use of proxies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 quickly became notorious throughout the Muslim world. The invasion triggered stiff resistance from Afghan mujahedin, and encouraged both state and non-state actors to support the various mujahedin factions. In the Cold War context, the United States perceived the Soviet invasion as an opportunity to give the U.S.S.R. its own Vietnam War, according to President Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.[2] The mujahedin thus became a proxy of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, each with their own somewhat divergent interests in supporting these factions. The largest U.S. covert aid program since Vietnam, with American support (totaling around $3 billion) matched dollar for dollar by Saudi Arabia, flowed to the anti-Soviet fighters. American and Saudi aid was routed through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI).
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Conflict, Transnational Actors, Jihad, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Soviet Union, and United States of America

12. The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida

Author:
Don Rassler and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report explores how the Haqqani network has historically functioned as a nexus organization and as a strategic enabler of local, regional and global forms of Islamist militancy. Specific attention is placed on examining the Haqqani network’s support for al-Qa`ida and its global jihad, and more recently the Pakistani Taliban. The report is based on a review of three jihadist magazines released in Pashto, Urdu and Arabic by the Haqqani network from 1989-1993; a series of digital videos produced by the group since 2001; and various memoirs written by al-Qa’ida linked fighters present in Afghanistan during the period under study (1973-2010). The authors also reviewed several thousand pages of letters written to and from Haqqani commanders during the 1980s and 1990s, which were captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion and have since been stored in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database. The report’s key findings provide insight into the Haqqani network’s identity and role; the nature of its relationships and the history and development of al-Qa’ida.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, History, Jihad, and Haqqani Network
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

13. Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements

Author:
David Cook
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2005, veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Musa`b al-Suri released a study of the jihadi movement entitled The Call for Global Islamic Resistance. In order to better appreciate the jihadi movement’s strategic objectives and mindset, the Combating Terrorism Center invited David Cook, an expert on Islamic history and jihad, to provide deeper background on four of Suri’s identified paradigmatic jihads: The Harakat al-Shabiba in Morocco; The Harakat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya in Algeria; The Afghani Arabs in Lebanon under Abu `A’isha al Lubnani; The Islamic Army of Aden Abyan in Yemen. Here are some of the most significant findings from Cook’s survey: Yemen is a critical step in the jihadi march towards a global caliphate. Suri and others believe that Yemen is ripe for a jihadi revolution because of the country’s proximity to the apostate regimes, and high levels of anti-American sentiment, population growth, and weapons proliferation. The Sunni jihadi movement has gained little traction in Lebanon. Suri is embarrassed by the fact that few Lebanese jihadis have been involved in the global movement, and by the fact that jihadi groups have found little historical success in waging jihad in Lebanon. Jihadi organizations should be global in their thinking but careful to build a broad constituency in their homeland. Suri seems to favor those movements that, even if they found little success in reality, had the proper motives and methodology. Jihadis should not excommunicate other Muslims. Suri argues that the slaughter of civilians by the GIA in Algeria, which was legitimated by excommunicating them, was a colossal strategic error that should never be repeated.
Topic:
Terrorism, Ideology, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco