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41. Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?

Author:
Robert Egnell
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
This article analyses the conduct of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010 and discusses the implications for the legacy and future of British counterinsurgency. A number of lessons stand out: first, competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand—despite the opportunity to allow the Basra experience to be a leading example of the need for serious changes in training and mindset—is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the task assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for dealing with large-scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over-arching comprehensive approach, and especially the civilian lines of operations that underpinned Britain's historical successes with counterinsurgency, are today missing.
Topic:
Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Britain, Afghanistan, and Iraq

42. Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

Author:
Stuart Griffin
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
Topic:
Security and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and United Kingdom

43. Afghanistan Win or Lose: Transition and the Coming Resource Crisis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US confronts a wide range of challenges if it is to win the Afghan conflict in any meaningful sense, and leave a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan: Decide on US strategic objectives in conducting and terminating the war. These objectives not only include the defeat of Al Qaeda, but deciding on what kind of transition the US wishes to make in Afghanistan, what goals the US can achieve in creating a stable Afghanistan, US goals in Pakistan, and the broader strategic goals the US will seek in Central and South Asia. Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population and ability exploit sanctuaries in Pakistan and win a war of political transition. Create a more effective and integrated, operational civil and civil-military transition effort by NATO/ISAF, UN, member countries, NGO, and international community efforts through 2014 and for 5-10 years after the withdrawal of combat forces. Build up a much larger, and more effective, mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels by 2014. Dealing with Pakistan in reducing the Taliban-Haqqani network in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and dealing with the broader risk Pakistan will become a failed nuclear weapons state. Shape a balance of post-transition relations with India, Iran, "Stans," Russia, and China that will help sustain posttransition stability. Make effective trade-offs in terms of resources relative to the priorities set by other US domestic and security interests.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

44. Invading Afghanistan, Then and Now

Author:
Jonah Blank
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Every invasion of Afghanistan has eventually come to naught, either because the invaders paid insufficient attention to local culture or because they sought to impose centralized control. If the United States is interested in leaving behind a better Afghanistan than the one it found, it needs to take those experiences to heart.
Topic:
Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

45. Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

Author:
John K. Naland
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department- led units inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level. During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful-but harder to quantify-work in mentoring local officials. Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals. Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance. Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia

46. How Terrorist Leaders End: Implications for the Future of the Struggle with al-Qaeda

Author:
Kacper Rękawek
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 2 May 2011, U.S. special forces killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, during a raid in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad. From 1988 onwards he led the first truly transnational, if not global, terrorist organisation aimed at establishing and leading a worldwide coalition of likeminded radicals in their quest for an Islamic Caliphate. The elimination of bin Laden is bound to seriously weaken this atomised terrorist outfit, which relies on the ingenuity of its senior operatives to plan and prepare sporadic, but designed to prove spectacular, terrorist attacks in different parts of the globe.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Arabia

47. Women in Afghanistan: A Human Rights Tragedy Ten Years after 9/11

Author:
Hayat Alvi
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights Human Welfare (University of Denver)
Abstract:
Ten years after the September 11th attacks in the United States and the military campaign in Afghanistan, there is some good news, but unfortunately still much bad news pertaining to women in Afghanistan. The patterns of politics, security/military operations, religious fanaticism, heavily patriarchal structures and practices, and ongoing insurgent violence continue to threaten girls and women in the most insidious ways. Although women's rights and freedoms in Afghanistan have finally entered the radar screen of the international community's consciousness, they still linger in the margins in many respects.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Human Rights, Human Welfare, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

48. Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency

Author:
Shuja Nawaz
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Despite having entered the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in force to support the coalition invasion of Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, the Pakistan Army did not undertake real counterinsurgency operations till much after 2001. Most of its early operations centered on the conventional use of dominating force against irregular opponents in this rugged region. It was hampered as much by lack of training and equipment as it was by its outmoded approaches to fighting in the frontier region. Gradually, its officers began learning by doing, and the Swat operation in 2008 probably marked the turning point in the doctrinal shift to serious counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, regardless of the fact that the army called it Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

49. CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Year End Report 2010

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna Gunaratna
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Transnational terrorism is likely to remain the most profound threat in 2011. Politically motivated groups that seek to legitimize their thinking and actions by using, misusing and misinterpreting the religious text , will continue to dominate the global threat landscape. While homegrown and group terrorism are likely to remain at the forefront, homegrown terrorism in particular will continue to be a formidable challenge for security. There will also be more pressure for Western military troops in Afghanistan, both in combat and support roles, to return home due to the decreasing public support for the war and domestic political considerations.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Terrorism, International Security, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

50. Improving Afghan War Strategy

Author:
Michael E. O'Hanlon
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
The year 2010 in Afghanistan had some encouraging signs but on balance it was less positive than had been hoped. In 2011, therefore, it is important to do two things: first, look for further improvements in our strategy; and second, develop a backup plan, should the current approach not yield the kind of progress that is necessary and expected.
Topic:
NATO, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia