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101. Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Gretchen Peters
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight—with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

102. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

Author:
Eric T. Olson
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
If the U.S. Army's current experience in ongoing overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms of the effect that such efforts have had on the course of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army's understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it will likely play in all future operations, especially in counterinsurgencies (COIN).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

103. Defying Expectations: Polio Vaccination Programs Amid Political and Armed Conflict

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Defying expectations, successful polio vaccination campaigns have taken place in well over two dozen armed conflicts, and continue today. Polio vaccination campaigns amid war have often succeeded in gaining the cooperation of anti-government forces such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, multiple rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Diplomatic means have also been employed to overcome severe political obstacles to such campaigns, even when the campaigns have become a flashpoint in places of political turmoil. Such campaigns face many challenges because vaccinators need to reach all villages without threats to their own lives or the programs' implementation. They require security for safe passage for immunizations and sometimes temporary cease-fires. The many successes of vaccination campaigns can be attributed to the programs' exclusive focus on the immunization needs of children; the use of interlocutors who are credible because they demonstrate neutrality; transparent discussions with opposition groups about the reasons for the campaigns; a role for opposition groups in facilitating the campaigns; limits on the number of days vaccinations take place; and the absence of any strategic or political goals for the effort beyond polio eradication.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Armed Struggle, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Taliban, and Peru

104. Humanitarian Space Shrinking for Health Program Delivery in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, humanitarian space has shrunk as the Taliban and other insurgent groups have stepped up attacks on civilians, especially international aid workers, contractors and local leaders. Health programs continue to operate, but the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to recruit and retain staff and to travel outside Kabul has suffered. The United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other groups have sought to persuade the Taliban and other armed groups not to impede or interfere with humanitarian aid activities. These efforts have had some success where the aid is administered by Afghans, but they have not limited attacks on international staff, who along with all foreigners, remain at high risk of attack. Many NGOs act as implementing partners in the government's strategy to implement a comprehensive primary care system in Afghanistan under the direction of the Ministry of Public Health. They have managed to maintain those services with local staff despite their association with the government of Afghanistan, so long as they operate with impartiality and community engagement. The vulnerability of their staff to attack appears to be a product of generalized insecurity or the presence of foreign aid workers, rather than a result of collaboration with the Ministry.NGOs report that military activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and military involvement in the medical sector, have contributed to the shrinkage of humanitarian space. The military's provision of health services through Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other mechanisms, though well-intended, sometimes sows confusion about the allegiances of U.S. and other Western aid workers and creates tensions with humanitarian principles the agencies rely on to operate in conflict environments. The conduct of the Afghanistan National Army and Police and the Pakistan military in entering facilities to gain access to arrest insurgents or gather information also leads to greater insecurity for NGO personnel.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Aid, Islam, Non-Governmental Organization, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan

105. Can You Help Me Now? Mobile Phones and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Author:
Sheldon Himelfarb
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A decade ago, mobile phone usage in Afghanistan was almost nonexistent; now there are 13 million subscriptions for a total of 29 million citizens, and the annual growth rate of subscription is estimated at 53 percent. A number of factors have fueled this dramatic increase, including the sheer popular demand for communication, an absence of viable landline substitutes, government deregulation, and a competitive market that flourishes despite the conflict. Each of the major telecommunications companies in Afghanistan identifies the same five challenges to future expansion: poverty, high illiteracy rates, corruption, an untrained workforce, and lack of security. Despite these challenges, Afghanistan has proved an exceptional case study in the use of mobile phones for social change in support of peacebuilding, as it has been the focus of numerous pilot application programs conducted by the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. Mobile money transfer (MMT) applications have proved to be powerful mechanisms for helping to reduce corruption, foster security sector reform, and promote economic development. Yet neither the international community nor the Afghan government has shown the will or the capacity to move MMT programs forward at a pace commensurate with their demonstrated potential. At least two other high-value mobile applications were cited during the June summit as having improved conditions for stability and reconstruction in early deployments: the provision of market information through mobile phones, especially in the agricultural sector, and the use of mobile phones to strengthen local governance and civil society. Both applications have sufficient promise to warrant large-scale rollouts and merit careful consideration by international donors, whose support is vital during the transition to sustainability. Other applications on the horizon that hold tangible if still aspirational promise for peacebuilding are those that use mobile phones for land dispute resolution, election monitoring, and gender empowerment and education.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, Science and Technology, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

106. Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement

Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan are now entering their tenth year and policymakers in Washington are looking for a way out. A policy review is due in December but the outline is already clear: U.S. forces will try to pummel the Taliban to bring them to the table, responsibility for security will increasingly be transferred to Afghan forces and more money will be provided for economic development. NATO partners agreed at the Lisbon summit to a gradual withdrawal of combat troops with the goal of transitioning to full Afghan control of security by the end of 2014. The aim will be a dignified drawdown of troops as public support wanes while at the same time ensuring that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan, at the very least, does not become the epicentre of transnational terrorism. While success is being measured in numbers of insurgents killed or captured, there is little proof that the operations have disrupted the insurgency's momentum or increased stability. The storyline does not match facts on the ground.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Washington, Taliban, and Lisbon

107. Seeking Solutions for Afghanistan: A Report on the Abu Dhabi Process

Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have accepted a generous proposal from the government of Abu Dhabi to host a series of meetings facilitated by the East West Institute (EWI) to complement existing channels of communication between the two countries. Participants in the series, known as the Abu Dhabi Process, discuss areas of their relationship they believe will help build confidence, ensure greater stability, and enhance sustainable development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The meetings are off-the-record, consultative in nature, and governed by the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arabia, and Abu Dhabi

108. Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation

Author:
Daniel Markey
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
India faces the real prospect of another major terrorist attack by Pakistan-based terrorist organizations in the near future. Unlike the aftermath of the November 2008 attack on Mumbai, in which 166 people died, Indian military restraint cannot be taken for granted if terrorists strike again. An Indian retaliatory strike against terrorist targets on Pakistani soil would raise Indo-Pakistani tensions and could even set off a spiral of violent escalation between the nuclear-armed rivals. Given Washington's effort to intensify pressure on al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated militants operating from Pakistani territory, increased tensions between India and Pakistan would harm U.S. interests even if New Delhi and Islamabad stop well short of the nuclear threshold because it would distract Pakistan from counterterror and counterinsurgency operations, jeopardize the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and place new, extreme stresses on Islamabad.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, Washington, India, New Delhi, and Mumbai

109. Build-up of Afghan security forces ill advised

Author:
Helge Lurås
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
A well-functioning government is a prerequisite for any successful counter-insurgency strategy and good governance is unlikely to be established in Afghanistan any time soon. As a consequence, the plans for the build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) must be adjusted. This build-up is not only an exit strategy; it is a cover for a “graceful exit”, serving a perceptual function in western publics. But in counter-insurgency theory a disconnect between governance and security is anathema. The end-state projection of 400,000 soldiers and police is unsustainable and ill-adapted to Afghanistan's socio-economic and political foundations. Furthermore, the continued growth of centralized and corrupt security forces could very well lead to increased resistance. The ANSF – like any armed force – is in dire need of a credible and motivating cause, simply to avoid disintegration.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

110. The Afghan Peace Jirga: Ensuring That Women Are at the Peace Table

Author:
Palwasha Hassan
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In late May 2010, the Afghan government will convene a Peace Jirga in Kabul to determine a national reintegration and reconciliation strategy. Afghan women have played a variety of social and political roles during the last three decades of conflict, including as peacebuilders, but now risk being excluded from current peacebuilding processes. In alliance with international agreements—most notably United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325—the Afghan government must make sure that women are actively engaged in the upcoming jirga and are included in other reintegration and reconciliation policies. The inclusion of women is central to sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Gender Issues, and Islam
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United Nations