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21. Abu al-Layth al-Libi

Author:
Kevin Jackson
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report on Abu al-Layth al-Libi, authored by Kévin Jackson, was released as part of the CTC’s Jihadi Bios Project, a series edited by Dr. Nelly Lahoud. The Jihadi Bios Project The CTC is pleased to launch the publication of papers as part of a series devoted to the study of jihadist biographies. The purpose of this project is to contribute to the knowledge of the evolution of the jihadist landscape by exploring it through the lens of the worldviews and experiences of actors who have shaped it. While some states and organizations, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the growth of the jihadist enterprise, it may be argued that modern jihadism, as it continues to unfold, is also the product of individuals, who made it into the global phenomenon that it is. As we study the biographies of jihadis, we are faced with a world crowded with different and differing worldviews. Beneath the banner of jihad that seemingly unites jihadis worldwide is a world marked not just by cooperation between groups and individuals, but also by competition and divisions. Some of the jihadis who occupy that world are characterized by a commitment to idealistic goals, by acumen, skills, and agility; others are driven by sectarianism, criminal disposition, and opportunism; while others manifest an odd combination of all. That is why the actions emanating from the jihadist landscape are the results of an amalgam of strategy, sophisticated planning and targeting, randomness, and juvenile enthusiasm. It is for these reasons and more that the complexity of the jihadist landscape requires different layers of analyses and a rigorous and patient approach to the subject. In short, the study of jihadism is about both the “forest” and the “trees;” and this series of biographies is a study of the “trees” as they are situated in the broader “forest.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa, South Asia, and Libya

22. 2014 Global Terrorism Index

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the second edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 14 years beginning in 2000 and ending in 2013. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has codified over 125,000 terrorist incidents. The report summarises trends in terrorism over time and analyses its changing patterns in terms of geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The index has also been compared to a range of socio-economic indicators to determine the key factors most closely associated with terrorism. In 2013 terrorist activity increased substantially with the total number of deaths rising from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013, a 61 per cent increase. Over the same period, the number of countries that experienced more than 50 deaths rose from 15 to 24. This highlights that not only is the intensity of terrorism increasing, its breadth is increasing as well. Terrorism is both highly concentrated as well as a globally distributed phenomenon. Over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However, another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity.
Topic:
Economics, Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Conflict, Risk, Boko Haram, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Global Focus

23. Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”: Yunus Khalis and the Return of al-Qa`ida’s Leadership to Afghanistan

Author:
Kevin Bell
Publication Date:
05-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to shed light on the poorly understood role that Yunus Khalis played in modern Afghan political history. This research is based on an analysis of several under‐studied primary sources in Pashto and Persian that offer unique insight into Khalis’s life and work. Although he was an author, teacher, and the leader of the Hizb‐e Islami (Khalis) mujahidin political party during the Soviet Afghan War, today Yunus Khalis is most often discussed in the context of his personal relationships with Jalaluddin Haqqani and Usama bin Ladin. There is little doubt that Khalis was on friendly terms with these two men. However, Haqqani had a far more visible effect on the growth of al‐Qa`ida than Khalis, and the latter apparently had major political disagreements with Bin Ladin. This report argues that Yunus Khalis’s historical impact is better found in his work as an activist intellectual and his refusal to take sides in the Afghan Civil War than in his relatively peripheral contact with Usama bin Ladin.
Topic:
Politics, Al Qaeda, History, and Osama bin Laden
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

24. Homegrown Jihadists and the Evolution of al-Qaeda

Author:
Barry Cooper
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Accurate assessments of the threat posed by al-Qaeda to Western interests and government have been hampered by imprecise language and an absence of historical memory. Arguably the organization is over thirty years old. Unquestionably the franchises and self-described affiliates of al-Qaeda bear little resemblance to the elite terrorist organization that attacked the United States on 11 September, 2001. This paper describes the evolution of al-Qaeda from being a source of assistance to mujahedeen fighting the Red Army in Afghanistan to the armed insurgents operating today in Africa and the Greater Middle East, on the one hand, and the homegrown, often self-recruited and largely incompetent “jihadists” who are more a nuisance to western police forces than they are a serious military threat. This change in the effectiveness and operational capability of al-Qaeda does not mean that it will disappear, not least of all because the members of that organization think of themselves as fighting an endless war. It does mean that we ought to have a realistic understanding of the reduced nature of the threat that al-Qaeda can make to our interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Eurasia

25. Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?

Author:
Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and Muhammad Al-'Ubaydi
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is a study of 17 de-classified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. These internal al-Qa`ida communications were authored by several leaders, most prominently Usama bin Ladin. In contrast to his public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of Bin Ladin’s private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers”. He is at pain advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 de-classified documents. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.
Topic:
Communications, Al Qaeda, Media, and Osama bin Laden
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia

26. Beware of Imitators: al-Qa`ida through the lens of its Confi dential Secretary

Author:
Nelly Lahoud
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“I should write a history of the jihadis in my time as I witnessed it and not as it is perceived by the West or those who disagree with us,” explains Fadil Harun regarding his motivation to publish his two-volume manuscript al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War against Islam: the Story of Fadil Harun). The spirit driving Harun’s manuscript is to produce a corrective history of al-Qa`ida distinguishing it from jihadi groups acting in its name. He believed that unlike al-Qa`ida, many jihadi groups have deviated from the true path of jihad: they lack a sound ideological worldview and many of their operations, particularly those which involved resorting to “tatarrus” (i.e., the use of non-combatants as human shields), are in breach of what he deems to be “lawful jihad.” This report is a study of al-Qa`ida’s ideology, organizational structure, strengths and weaknesses through Harun’s lens and in light of captured battlefield documents.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Kenya, Africa, Tanzania, and Somalia

27. The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida

Author:
Don Rassler and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report explores how the Haqqani network has historically functioned as a nexus organization and as a strategic enabler of local, regional and global forms of Islamist militancy. Specific attention is placed on examining the Haqqani network’s support for al-Qa`ida and its global jihad, and more recently the Pakistani Taliban. The report is based on a review of three jihadist magazines released in Pashto, Urdu and Arabic by the Haqqani network from 1989-1993; a series of digital videos produced by the group since 2001; and various memoirs written by al-Qa’ida linked fighters present in Afghanistan during the period under study (1973-2010). The authors also reviewed several thousand pages of letters written to and from Haqqani commanders during the 1980s and 1990s, which were captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion and have since been stored in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database. The report’s key findings provide insight into the Haqqani network’s identity and role; the nature of its relationships and the history and development of al-Qa’ida.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, History, Jihad, and Haqqani Network
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

28. Self Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery

Author:
Anne Stenersen, Bernard Haykel, Brynjar Lia, Marc Lynch, Mohammed Hafez, Reuven Paz, Steven Brooke, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Self‐Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al‐Qa’ida and its Periphery examines the internal, or endogenous, reasons that have hastened the decline of the jihadi movement. In doing so, it exposes the jihadi movement, with al‐Qa’ida at its helm, as one that lacks coherence and unity, despite its claims to the contrary. The report divides the jihadis’ endogenous problems into two categories: internal divisions plaguing al‐Qa’ida and the jihadi movement proper; and fault lines dividing the jihadi movement from other Muslim and Islamist actors.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Al Qaeda, Ideology, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Palestine, Egypt, and Arabian Peninsula

29. New York City's Preparedness for Terrorism (and Catastrophic Natural Disasters)

Author:
Clark Kent Ervin
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Sooner or later, somewhere or other, another natural disaster will strike America, be it a hurricane, a tornado, an earthquake, or a flood. Sooner or later, somewhere or other, terrorists will attempt to strike America again. Indeed, many experts believe that the threat of another attack is rising. 1 Al Qaeda is resurgent, having reconstituted itself along the Afghan-Pakistan border. 2 And, recent history shows that terrorists are especially prone to strike during the transition from one administration to another or early in the term of a new government. Adding to our vulnerability, the nation is now bogged down in two wars and groaning under mounting debt, while our economy is sinking from the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Topic:
Security, Natural Disasters, Financial Crisis, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States of America

30. Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa`ida From 1989-2006

Author:
Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Though it has long been known that al-Qa’ida has suffered from disunity at the leadership level, analysis of documents declassified from the Harmony Database allow us to gain a fresh insight into the engine driving those conflicts and illuminate the vulnerabilities that these conflicts have created for the organization. Al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. Al-Qa’ida’s preference for branding, the military incompetence of its autocratic leaders, and the unanticipated ferocity of the United States’ response to the attacks of 9/11, have together left the brand managers the only ones standing. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida has not been able to threaten American interests; it has. But its real strength has never been as a fighting force, but rather its ability to transform what have traditionally been the local or national concerns of Islamist activism into a vision of apocalyptic inter-civilizational conflict. This report, grounded in the data from the Harmony documents, charts the history of this transformation and of the internal divisions that surrounded it. The Harmony documents shed light on cohesion problems that have been bedeviling Salafi Jihadi organizations going back more than thirty years. While the branding-versus-bureaucracy crux outlined above has consistently been the driving force, at different points in the development of al-Qa’ida the scope and consequences of this leadership struggle have changed. During the first phase, from the founding of the organization at the close of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the return of the leadership to South Asia after its misadventures in Africa, al-Qa’ida had failed in both areas, creating neither an effective guerrilla organization nor a consistent jihadi message. In the second phase, from al-Qa’ida’s re-establishment in Afghanistan to its dispersal from that refuge by American-led attacks, al-Qa’ida was able to exploit the relative security provided by its uneasy alliance with the Taliban to develop and begin to “market” its anti-American message. Though it was during this period that it was able to carry out the large-scale acts of terror for which it is famous – the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in Africa and the attacks of September 11, 2001 – internal divisions over the decision to target the United States severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacity. During the third and current phase, which began with the United States’ response to 9/11, al-Qa’ida as a centrally-controlled bureaucracy all but disappeared, with most of its key military and strategic leaders dispersed, captured or killed. In this period al- Qa’ida Central has been largely reduced to a media organization, while the Iraq war has created a market for its message, a field in which jihadis with little or no connection to the remnants of al-Qa’ida’s central bureaucracy can take up (and thus alter) the al-Qa’ida banner.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia