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611. Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan

Author:
Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
For much of the international community, relations between the Taliban and al-Qaeda – as well as the Taliban's ties to the wider universe of jihadist groups – pose the core obstacle to including the Islamist movement in a possible political settlement in Afghanistan. Can the Taliban become part of a political process without offering refuge to al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other groups posing an international threat? Today the Afghan Taliban collaborate in some ways with al- Qaeda and other jihadist groups. Whether such relations result from the context – the need for assistance against a powerful enemy – or are based on principles or ideology affects how possible it is to change this collaboration. Such an assessment requires examining empirical evidence in context. This report represents a summary of our efforts to date.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

612. How al Qaeda Works

Author:
Leah Farrall
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Accounts that contend that it is on the decline treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

613. Plan A-Minus for Afghanistan

Author:
Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The strategy in Afghanistan, as outlined by President Obama in his December 2009 West Point speech and earlier March 2009 policy review, still has a good chance to succeed. Described here as ''Plan A,'' it is a relatively comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, albeit one with a geographic focus on about one-third of Afghanistan's districts. Directed at defeating the insurgency or at least substantially weakening it, while building up Afghan institutions, it has reasonable prospects of achieving these goals well enough to hold together the Afghan state and prevent the establishment of major al Qaeda or other extremist sanctuaries on Afghan soil. Nevertheless, the strategy is not guaranteed to succeed, for reasons having little to do with its own flaws and more to do with the inherent challenge of the problem. Critics of the current strategy are right to begin a discussion of what a backup strategy, or a ''Plan B,'' might be. The most popular alternative to date emphasizes targeted counterterrorism operations, rather than comprehensive counterinsurgency—especially in the country's Pashtun south and east where the insurgencies are strongest. The United States should have a debate over Plan B, but the above version is highly problematic. Its proponents are serious people motivated by serious considerations—they worry that the current war is not winnable, or at least that it is not winnable at costs commensurate with the strategic stakes they perceive in Afghanistan. Yet, it would be troubling if the U.S. debate in 2011 was forced to choose effectively between this kind of backup plan and the current robust counterinsurgency approach. There is a better way if a fallback option is needed. Rather than conceding at least one-third of the country to extremists and reducing NATO forces quickly, the United States should tie its force drawdown to the growth and maturation of Afghan security forces. Under this plan, described here as ''Plan A-,'' U.S. and other foreign forces would have to keep fighting hard in Afghanistan for 2-4 more years, even as they gradually passed the baton to Afghan forces, but the United States would not need to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, and would not tie its downsizing to the stabilization of all key terrain.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

614. Caught in the Muddle: America's Pakistan Strategy

Author:
Paul Stanilan
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Obama has placed Pakistan at the center of his administration's foreign policy agenda. Islamabad is a pivotal player in Afghanistan and its decisions will have much to do with whether and how U.S. forces can leave that country. Al Qaeda and linked militant groups have used Pakistan as a sanctuary and recruiting ground, with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas becoming, in President Obama's words, ''the most dangerous place in the world.'' Recurrent tensions between India and Pakistan frustrate and complicate U.S. initiatives in the region, where nuclear proliferation, insurgency, terrorism, and grand strategic goals in Asia intersect.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, America, and Asia

615. Girls' Education in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Female education has faced significant obstacles in Afghanistan, yet there have been enormous gains since 2001. Under the Taliban, the majority of girls‟ schools were closed and gross enrollment fell from 32% to just 6.4%.In the early years after the fall of the Taliban, education was a top priority for the Afghan government and donors. Much of this donor focus was on getting children back into school, with a particular emphasis on primary level. The Back to School campaign, launched in 2002, significantly ex-panded enrollment, which has increased nearly seven-fold, from approxi-mately 900,000 in 2000 to 6.7 million in 2009.For girls, the increase has been even more dramatic: official enrollment figures have increased from an estimated 5,000 under the Taliban to 2.4 million girls currently enrolled.
Topic:
Education, Gender Issues, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

616. Whose Aid Is It Anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises

Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Effective aid helps save lives, protect rights and build livelihoods. Yet in conflicts and politically unstable settings from Afghanistan to Yemen, lifesaving humanitarian assistance and longer-term efforts to reduce poverty are being damaged where aid is used primarily to pursue donors' own narrow political and security objectives. This is not only undermining humanitarian principles and donors' development commitments; it impacts on the lives of some of the most vulnerable people affected by conflicts and natural disasters.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Poverty, Natural Disasters, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Yemen

617. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History

Author:
Malou Innocent
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the Western mind, Afghanistan conjures up a rugged land of fractious, tribal people. From Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan, to Tamerlane and Mughal emperor Babur, virtually no conqueror has escaped “the graveyard of empires” unscathed. Even modern, industrial empires—the British and the Russian— suffered heavy losses. Why have foreign attempts to conquer Afghanistan proved so ineffective? Why did the U.S. invasion fail to bring stability?
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

618. Why America No Longer Gets Asia

Author:
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In the fall of 2006, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, I wandered through a bazaar in Kara-suu on the Kyrgyz—Uzbek border. The bazaar is one of Central Asia's largest and a crossroads for traders from across the volatile Ferghana Valley Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and many others. But most remarkably, it has become home to nearly a thousand Chinese traders from Fujian, a coastal province some 3,000 miles away, lapped by the waters of the Taiwan Strait.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Taiwan, and Asia

619. A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew C. Kuchins
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Two events in the past year have shifted the focus of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as President Obama's July 2011 deadline for beginning a drawdown of U.S. forces approaches. The first was the Kabul Conference, held July 20, 2010, where Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that Afghanistan would take full responsibility for its sovereignty and security by the end of 2014. The November 2010 NATO conference in Lisbonthe second eventconfirmed this benchmark for full transition to Afghan sovereignty as well as a longer-term commitment to a ''strong partnership'' beyond 2014. While there are certain caveats about ''conditions-based'' decisions regarding these benchmarks, this timeframe should guide the strategic planning of the Afghan government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and regional partners.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

620. Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan?

Author:
C. Christine Fair
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On December 24, 1998, five Pakistani terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) a Pakistani jihadist organization hijacked an Indian Airlines flight in Kathmandu with the goal of exchanging three Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails for the surviving passengers. Pakistan's external intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitated the hijacking in Nepal. After a harrowing journey through Amritsar (India), Lahore (Pakistan), and Dubai (United Arab Emirates), the plane landed at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, then under Taliban control. Under public pressure, the Indian government ultimately agreed to the terrorists' demands to deliver the three prisoners jailed in India. Both the hijackers and the terrorists who were released from prison transited to Pakistan with the assistance of the ISI. Masood Azhar, one of the freed militants, appeared in Karachi within weeks of the exchange to announce the formation of a new militant group which he would lead, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM).
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, India, Nepal, Dubai, Lahore, and Amritsar