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1131. Coalition Dynamics in the War Against Terrorism

Author:
Ian O. Lesser
Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“Coalition” may be an inappropriate term to describe the constellation of state and non state actors cooperating in the global struggle against terrorism. The term coalition implies a certain agreement on strategy and objectives, short of a formal alliance. In fact, to the extent that NATO plays an active role in counter-terrorism, the current pattern of cooperation does have elements of an alliance. But the vast bulk of international cooperation on counter-terrorism, before and after September 11th, has involved the routine, sometimes intensive, coordination of intelligence, police and judicial activity. Contributions to large-scale military operations in Afghanistan, or elsewhere – although important to current objectives – are exceptional. Most counter-terrorism cooperation has been, and will almost certainly continue to be, of a more prosaic nature. The sheer range of activity – from the most intensive cooperation among European allies, to the ad hoc and often arms length relations with states such as Libya, Syria and Iran, not to mention Russia and China, makes it difficult to speak of a single grand coalition against terrorism.. The reality is a highly diverse pattern of cooperation; some limited, some extensive; some sustained, and some on a case-by-case basis.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Libya, and Syria

1132. The Problem with Redundancy Problem: Will more nuclear security forces produce nuclear security?

Author:
Scott D. Sagan
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many scholars, journalists, and public officials expressed fears about the security of nuclear facilities in the United States. Terrorists could attack military bases, weapons in transit, or nuclear weapons production and dismantlement plants in order to steal a weapon or its components. Terrorists might attack nuclear power reactors, nuclear materials storage sites, nuclear waste transportation vehicles, or nuclear research facilities, with two basic motives in mind: to cause a conventional explosion, spreading radioactive materials in the area; or to seize the nuclear materials, which could be used for building either a dirty bomb (a radiological weapon) or, conceivably, a primitive nuclear bomb. These fears were highlighted in President George Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address, in which he reported that diagrams of American nuclear plants were discovered in al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. Senior U.S. intelligence officials also revealed that Osama bin Laden had sent operatives to try to purchase stolen nuclear materials and that there was “pretty convincing evidence” that al-Qaeda operatives had been “casing” nuclear power plants in the U.S. prior to the September 11th attacks. In January 2002, U.S. intelligence agencies issued a warning, based on an interrogation of a captured terrorist, of a possible attack on a nuclear power plant or Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons facility. Then, in June 2002, the Justice Department announced that it had arrested an American citizen who had joined al-Qaeda in Pakistan and was sent back to the United States to develop and execute a plan to seize nuclear materials and use them in a radiological bomb attack.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, America, and Middle East

1133. Filling the Vacuum: Prerequisites to Security in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
As a result of 23 years of war and civil conflict, and despite the recent removal of the Taliban and establishment of an Interim Authority, Afghanistan remains a country in chaos. Unless and until Afghanistan is at least modestly stable and secure, it will continue to represent a risk to the region and the world. The global order is still grappling with the question of failed states, but one lesson is certain: when governments fail, warlords, drug barons, or terrorists fill the vacuum. The only sure way to eliminate terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan is to support its leaders and people in their quest for internal stability and security, according to their own rich traditions and history.
Topic:
Democratization, Government, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and Taliban

1134. Trans-Atlantic Relations: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Wolfgang Ischinger
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute at University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract:
I would like to share some observations about German-American relations, about Afghanistan, about Iraq and the war on terrorism, and about power and the global system. Where does Germany stand today? The recent elections in Germany have brought about a number of significant developments.
Topic:
International Relations and Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, America, Europe, and Germany

1135. Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
In the rare circumstances in which the United Nations administers a post-conflict territory, what law should be enforced? By whom? And, crucially, how should one resolve the potential dilemma between building capacity for sustainable local institutions and maintaining respect for international standards of justice? This report examines these questions through the experiences of United Nations administrations in Kosovo (1999— ) and East Timor (1999-2002) and the assistance mission in Afghanistan (2002— ). Practice in this area has, necessarily, been improvizational rather than principled. But it is possible to draw some broad lessons from these three experiments in judicial reconstruction First, the administration of justice should rank among the higher priorities of a post-conflict peace operation – certainly far higher than it is currently ranked in Afghanistan. There is a tendency on the part of international actors to conflate armed conflict and criminal activity more generally. Drawing a clearer distinction and being firm on violations of the law increases both the credibility of the international presence and the chances of a peace agreement holding. Failure to do this undermined the credibility of the international presence in Kosovo, and led to missed opportunities in East Timor. Secondly, in an immediate post-conflict environment lacking a functioning law enforcement and judicial system, rule of law functions may have to be entrusted to military personnel on a temporary basis. Recourse to the military for such functions is a last resort, but may be the only alternative to a legal vacuum. The law imposed in such circumstances should be simple and consistent. If it is not feasible to enforce the law of the land, martial law should be declared as a temporary measure, with military lawyers – especially if they come from different national contingents – agreeing upon a basic legal framework. Persons detained under such an ad hoc system should be transferred to civilian authorities as quickly as possible. Thirdly, once the security environment allows the process of civil reconstruction to begin, sustainability should generally take precedence over temporary standards in the administration of basic law and order. Whether internationalized processes are appropriate for the most serious crimes should be determined, where possible, through broad consultation with local actors.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, South Asia, Kosovo, and Southeast Asia

1136. Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations. On paper it resembles earlier assistance missions that provided governance and development support to post-conflict societies. In practice, however, the UN mission remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place. This disjunction between formal authority and practical influence poses a challenge not only for the specific operation in Afghanistan but also to accepted models of UN peace operations more generally. Most analyses of UN peace operations suggest that the more complex the political environment, the larger the amount of resources required to complete the mandate. On any such measure, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) faces an uphill battle. UNAMA is instead pursuing a high-risk strategy that requires two conceptual leaps from the normal mould of peace operations. The first is that it is possible to blur the normal distinction between negotiating a peace agreement and implementing it. The second is that the UN can make up for its small mandate and limited resources through exercising greater than normal political influence. There is widespread agreement among UNAMA and most of its Afghan partners that expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul would be an important stabilizing factor in this process. If it is to be done, it should be done urgently, while all parties are still buying into the Loya Jirga process. Given the reaction of the United States and potential troop-contributing nations, however, expansion now appears highly unlikely. Every UN mission and development programme now stresses the importance of local 'ownership'. This may be the first mission where some of the local population themselves are truly taking charge. Development, however, is notoriously supply- rather than demand-driven; donor countries are infamous for pledging one thing and delivering another. Agencies must therefore take this into account when constructing fictional budgetary targets that they know will not be met, making responsible financial planning still more difficult. Compounding these problems is confusion in Afghanistan as to what projects are actually going to be funded and when. This is partly caused by the refusal of some of the largest donors to have their money pooled into a trust fund for the whole of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga was intended to encourage Afghans from all parts of the country to 'buy into the peace process'. This phrase was used metaphorically, but should also be understood literally. Encouraging Afghans to see the solutions to their problems as lying in the embryonic institutions of the state is good politics internationally. It is also Afghanistan's best chance for stability and relative prosperity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Peace Studies, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

1137. Middle East/Afghanistan — Al-Qaida Threat

Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Analytica
Abstract:
Intelligence assessments suggest that the bomb attack on French naval engineers in Karachi on May 8 bore the hallmarks of an al-Qaida operation. There is evidence to suggest that Osama bin Laden and other senior leaders are alive and regrouping, despite significant losses. The campaign against al-Qaida in Afghanistan and elsewhere is entering a new phase.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Europe, Middle East, and Arab Countries

1138. The Defense Monitor: The Afghan Campaign One Year On

Author:
Mark Burgess
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
An Afghan Blitzkrieg? Sept. 11, 2001, transformed Afghanistan even more than it did America. The pariah state which harbored Osama bin Laden, and was the base camp for his al Qaeda network, immediately became the focus of the U.S. war against terrorism. The Afghan campaign began amid dire warnings of the dangers historically faced by foreign interlopers in the country that was center stage of central Asia's “great game” during the 19th and 20th centuries and that would become the first battlefield of an even greater one during the first year of the 21st. The experience of the British and the Soviets was held up as an example of what fate potentially awaited any American intervention in Afghanistan. A year later, such warnings seem overstated. Al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan have been destroyed, the Taliban ousted, and an Afghan Transitional Government rules in their place. Meanwhile, life for the average Afghan is a considerably less nasty and brutish affair than it was a little over a year ago — all in short order and at a relatively low cost in human life. Such successes notwithstanding, the Afghan campaign is not yet over. It has not been without failings, some of which may return to haunt ongoing operations there. Similarly, some of the methods used to achieve this success, while effective in the short term, may yet prove polemical.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

1139. Crime, Terror and the Central Asia Drug Trade

Author:
Tamara Makarenko
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
Over the last decade, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been rising incrementally, culminating in a bumper crop in 1999 that produced approximately 80 percent of the global supply of illicit opium. Despite this predicament, the dynamics of the illicit drugs trade in Afghanistan has received little attention. Most media reports and government statements over-simplify the situation, making it appear as though the Taliban controlled the planting, cultivation, production and trafficking of all opiates. For example, The Times, in an article published in January 2000, reported “The Taliban rulers of Afghanistan have become the world's biggest producers and smugglers of hard drugs, overtaking rings in Colombia and Burma. They are now responsible for 95 per cent of all the heroin entering Britain.” Following the September 11 attacks, this responsibility was shared with Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. British Prime Minister Tony Blair thus stated that the “arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for with the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets”, and subsequently added that the Taliban and Usama bin Laden “jointly exploited the drugs trade.” This view has also been propagated in the United States by leading news agencies. CNN, for example, explicitly reported that the Taliban both taxed and trafficked in narcotics, which were directly used to finance their military operations.
Topic:
Crime, Economics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Britain, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Taliban, Colombia, and Burma

1140. The Federal Option for Afghanistan

Author:
Henry E. Hale
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The future security and stability of Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus–all struggling to deal with the simultaneous forces of terrorism, crime, narcotics, poverty, and disease–require a successful political and economic transformation in Afghanistan. A federal system was rejected in favor of aunitary state structure for Afghanistan, but the government of Hamid Karzai has faced great difficulty extending central authority much beyond Kabul. New questions about state-building there and elsewhere in the region should compel policymakers to reconsider federalism among a range of options for how best to organize this complex and diverse society. Although critics charge that a federal solution to state organization enhances social cleavages and fosters instability, federalism could be aviable and effective option if constructed to minimize the power and influence of the demographically dominant group.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, Asia, and Kabul