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112. Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints
- Author:
- Christina R. Sevilla
- Publication Date:
- 01-1998
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Multilateral trade complaints are significant for politics because they serve as a stimulus for the targeted state to alter its status quo trade policy. This paper seeks to explain and predict patterns of multilateral trade complaints filed by states under the dispute settlement mechanism of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor as of 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO). A two-level model of complaint-raising is proposed, which argues that variation in the design of GATT and WTO institutions affects the costs to governments of filing complaints -- such as bureaucratic costs, information costs, and opportunity costs -- and these costs in turn affect state strategies for domestic oversight of treaty compliance by one's trading partners. Specific hypotheses drawn from the model are tested against a data set of over 300 multilateral trade complaints, from 1948-1994 under the GATT and 1995-96 under the WTO.
- Topic:
- International Relations, International Organization, and International Trade and Finance
113. A Treaty on Global Climate Change: Problems and Prospects
- Author:
- Richard N. Cooper
- Publication Date:
- 12-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- International treaties in pursuit of common endeavors can be classified into two categories: those that set mutually agreed national objectives and leave each signatory to pursue them in their own way; and those that define mutually agreed actions. The proposed treaty on global climate change falls into the first category with respect to greenhouse gas emissions by the rich countries. Stabilization of atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases requires eventual engagement of developing countries. The proposed treaty, based on historical emission levels, does not provide a foundation acceptable to them. Indeed, there is unlikely to be any generally acceptable principle for allocating emission rights, potentially worth trillions of dollars, among rich and poor countries. This probable impossibility suggests a successful attack on greenhouse gas emissions, necessarily international in scope, must be through mutually agreed actions, such as a nationally-collected emissions tax, rather than through national emission targets.
- Topic:
- Environment and International Cooperation
114. Conflict in Time and Space
- Author:
- Richard. Tucker and Nathaniel. Beck
- Publication Date:
- 11-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Scholars in international relations (IR) are increasingly using time-series cross-section data to analyze models with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS models). IR scholars generally employ a simple logit/probit to analyze such data. This procedure is inappropriate if the data exhibit temporal or spatial dependence. First, we discuss two estimation methods for modelling temporal dependence in BTSCS data: one promising based on exact modelling of the underlying temporal process which determines the latent, continuous, dependent variable; The second, and easier to implement, depends on the formal equivalence of BTSCS and discrete duration data. Because the logit estimates a discrete hazard in a duration context, this method adds a smoothed time term to the logit estimation. Second, we discuss spatial or cross-sectional issues, including robust standard errors and the modelling of effects. While it is not possible to use fixed effects in binary dependent variable panel models, such a strategy is feasible for IR BTSCS models. While not providing a model of spatial dependence, Huber's robust standard errors may well provide more accurate indications of parameter variability if the unit observations are intra-related. We apply these recommended techniques to reanalyses of the relationship between (1) democracy, interdependence and peace (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett); and (2) security and the termination of interstate rivalry (Bennett). The techniques appear to perform well statistically. Substantively, while democratic dyads do appear to be more peaceful, trade relations, as measured by Oneal, et al., do not decrease the likelihood of particpation in militarized disputes, Bennett's principal finding regarding security and rivalry termination is confirmed; his finding on common external threats, however, is not; his results on the influence of issue salience are even more robust.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution and International Relations
115. The Origins of Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law
- Author:
- John W. Schiemann and Kenneth Benoit
- Publication Date:
- 05-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Theories which explain the origins of institutions as the product of struggles for distributive advantage provide only a general framework with no conceptualization of the bargaining process and few applications to empirical cases. We address both problems and extend the distributive theory of institutional origins by drawing on a unique set of data to examine the creation of the Hungarian electoral law of 1989. Arguing that outcomes are shaped by four mechanisms arising from bargaining - time preferences, the credibility of threats and promises, mimicked fairness, and symmetrical division - we develop observable implications of these mechanisms and test them empirically by analyzing the bargaining which produced the multiple rules of Hungary's complex electoral system. Not only does the Hungarian case confirm the bargaining mechanism theory of institutional origins, but the theory also explains many curious features of the Hungarian electoral institutions, including its surprising combination of extraordinary complexity and unusual stability.
- Topic:
- Democratization and Government
- Political Geography:
- Eastern Europe