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131. Licensing Afghan Opium for Medicinal Use: Why It Won't Work

Author:
David Mansfield and William A. Byrd
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
With large increases in Afghan opium cultivation and production in 2013 and 2014, there is a risk that resulting frustration may give rise to a search for extreme but unproductive solutions. There are no easy solutions to the illegal narcotics problem. The proposal that Afghanistan could shift to licensed production of opium for pain medications will not work. Due to severe problems with governance, rule of law and security, opium licensing in Afghanistan would be subject to extremely high leakages. Afghanistan's comparative advantage in supplying the illicit market means that it would likely expand cultivation to meet demand in both markets. Afghanistan is a high-cost producer of opium, and prices for licensed opium are much lower than on the illegal market, so profits might well be marginal or even negative. Existing producers of licensed opiates— Australia, Turkey, India, France and others—would strongly oppose any move to let Afghanistan become a competitor on the licensed market. Even if a more liberalized market for opiates is envisioned, technological advances and modern techniques in other countries mean that Afghanistan could not be a competitive producer.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Turkey, India, France, and Australia

132. Using Special Envoys In High-Stakes Conflict Diplomacy

Author:
Princeton N. Lyman and Robert M. Beecroft
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Special envoys or representatives (SE/SRs) have been used by nearly every administration to address high-stakes conflicts. They are most useful when a conflict situation is of major importance to the United States, has strong regional as well as bilateral aspects, and exceeds the State Department's capacity to address it. To be effective, an SE/SR must be recognizably empowered by the president and the secretary of state, have clear mandates, and enjoy a degree of latitude beyond normal bureaucratic restrictions. While the secretary of state needs to be actively engaged in the conflict resolution process, the envoy should be sufficiently empowered to ensure that the secretary's interventions are strategic. Chemistry matters: in minimizing tensions between the SE/SR and the relevant State Department regional bureau and with ambassadors in the field, in overcoming State- White House rivalries over policy control, and in mobilizing support of allies. There are no “cookie cutter” solutions to overlapping responsibilities and the envoy's need for staff and resources; rather, mutual respect and flexibility are key. Senior State Department officials have the required skills for assignments as SE/SRs. Enhancing the department's resources and reinforcing the ranks of senior department posi¬tions would increase such appointments and the department's capacity to support them.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States

133. Pakistan's Resurgent Sectarian War

Author:
Arif Rafiq
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandi and Shia Muslims in Pakistan has escalated in recent years. Most of this violence is perpetrated by local networks, but the sectarian phenomenon also has important ties to regional security dynamics and transnational terrorist networks. Despite sporadic state crackdowns, Pakistan's leading Sunni Deobandi sectarian militant groups have been able to maintain a persistent presence thanks in part to reluctance among mainstream Pakistani military and political leaders to directly confront groups that are sometimes seen as serving utilitarian political interests. Despite this negligence, Sunni Deobandi militants have also established linkages with terrorist groups that target the Pakistani state, such as al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Rising conflict in the greater Middle East over the past five years has strengthened the sectarian political narrative in Pakistan and emboldened sectarian militant networks on both sides of the conflict.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Pakistan

134. How to Spur Afghan Reforms: The Limits and Benefits of Incentives

Author:
Trent Ruder
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Donors have increasingly sought to condition assistance funds for Afghanistan, particularly as a result of inadequate reforms during the Karzai administration. Since its negotiation in 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework has been the basis of most donor incentive decisions on Afghanistan. Donors need to consider who benefits from incentives, how resources and requests align, Afghanistan's capacity to implement reform, and the consequences of success or failure. Donors should both temper their expectations and minimize the linkage between highly politicized issues and incentive programs. Incentive programming is not a magic bullet, but it can help shape dialogue with the new Afghan administration.
Topic:
Corruption, Foreign Aid, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Tokyo

135. Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Without Government Revenues or Development Benefits

Author:
William A. Byrd and Javed Noorani
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Case studies of five ongoing mining operations show that Afghan mining companies are wantonly exploiting easily extractable mineral resources with little or no taxes and royalties going to the government. Revenue losses from just two sources —royalties and land rent —at the five mines are more than US$50 million per year. Total revenue losses from all sources for the hundreds of mines contracted to different companies easily could be hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The tendering processes, awards, and contents of contracts issued, contract implementation, and actual operations at the mines all showed clear signs of political interference, favoring bidders that often had no prior mining experience. Companies usually began extracting resources soon after mining contracts were awarded, without paying any taxes and royalties —even though the contract called for an initial exploration period. Companies did not provide the legally and contractually required documents, such as exploration reports and environmental and social impact assessments. Effective inspections of mines were not conducted, and companies were not held accountable for payments due. Sometimes mining activities precipitated local conflicts, resulting in violence and deaths; weaker local communities called on Taliban elements for support in one such dispute. Serious reforms are needed to ensure that mining activities are developmentally beneficial and that revenues generated are paid to the government.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

136. Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan's 2014 National Elections

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi and Casey Garret Johnson
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan's 2014 national elections than was the case in any of the country's last four elections. Still, there are disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and intimidation. One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least for some time, a more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials to discuss allowing the polls to go forward. Another Group, led by Taliban military commander Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file fighters are either vowing to carry out attacks regardless or, as has happened in the past, may strike local deals with political entities to look the other way and allow voting to take place.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

137. The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign States in the Syrian Conflict

Author:
Thomas Pierret
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Syrian conflict's internal dynamics have reshuffled regional alignments alongside unprecedentedly clear-cut sectarian dividing lines; this has often occurred against the preferences of regional state actors−including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Foreign states have generally adopted expedient policies that followed sectarian patterns for lack of alternatives. Iran bears significant responsibility for exacerbating the conflict's sectarian character at the regional level. There is no such “diplomatic shortcut” to regional appeasement; it is the domestic Syrian deadlock that must be broken in order to alleviate sectarian tensions across the Middle East, not the opposite.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

138. Syria's Sectarian Ripples across the Gulf

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Like the Iraq war and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon's 2006 war, Syria's internecine conflict has enabled the Gulf's ruling families, media commentators, clerics, parliamentarians, and activists to invoke and amplify Sunni-Shia identities, often for goals that are rooted in local power politics. By-products of the mounting sectarian tension include the fraying of reform cooperation among sects and regions, and pressure on the Gulf's formal political institutions. Traditional and social media have served to amplify the most polarizing voices as well as provide reform activists new means for cross-sectarian communication that circumvent governmental efforts to control or block such activities.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

139. Sunni-Shia Relations After the Iraq War

Author:
Fanar Haddad
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the social, political, and technological changes of the 21st century are giving birth to a new sectarian landscape. The three most consequential drivers behind the change in sectarian relations have been the political change in Iraq of 2003; the near simultaneous spread of new media and social networking in the Arab world; and – perhaps as a consequence of the first two – the ongoing search for alternatives to familiar but moribund forms of authoritarianism, as demonstrated most dramatically by the “Arab Spring.” 2003 highlighted the uncomfortable fact that there were multiple, indeed contradictory, visions of what it meant to be an Iraqi and by extension what it meant to be a part of the Arab world. New media, social networking, user-generated websites, and private satellite channels helped to make Iraq's accelerated sectarianization contagious. The mainstreaming of sectarian polemics has increased the relevance of religious, doctrinal, and dogmatic differences in views regarding the sectarian “other,” a particularly dangerous development.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

140. Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over

Author:
Joseph Bahout
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
When the Arab revolutions reached Syria, the Sunni-Shia cleavage in Lebanon was already well in the making. Syria's turmoil only added fuel to an existing fire in Lebanon. Syria's crisis is intensifying Sunni-Shia tensions in Lebanon on two levels, symbolic and identity-based on the one hand, and geopolitical or interest based, on the other hand. The shift toward identity-based or symbolic forms of sectarianism can probably be explained by the existential character the struggle in the Levant is taking, whereby both “communities,” however imagined or over-constructed, are coming to perceive themselves as defending not only their share of resources or power, but their very survival. Lebanon's minority communities – including Christian and Druze – are increasingly anxious about the changing regional environment. Lebanon and Syria must face the difficult equation of sectarian diversity and national unity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria