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1181. Special Policy Forum Report: Palestinian Attitudes During the Bush/Sharon Era

Author:
Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there are three perspectives as to why violent confrontations began in September: The Camp David II negotiations uncovered underlying differences in Israeli and Palestinian interests that are simply unbridgeable. Recent confrontations are basically the product of these differences. In this scenario, no return to negotiations is going to improve the situation. The current situation reflects domestic political constraints in both societies. Weak leaders, populations that are not prepared for the compromises needed for a final settlement, coalition politics, and questions of legitimacy are working against a solution. In this scenario, a permanent settlement is possible but certainly not easy. The two negotiating teams could have wrapped up the talks if they had had more time; indeed, they came very close to a compromise at Taba in January. According to this scenario, a matter of procedural difficulty — a miscalculation, misperception, or simply a lack of time — probably impeded the finalization of an agreement at Taba, while violence was still flaring in the territories. Most Palestinians are of the second school of thought. They did not believe that a deal was imminent at Camp David II or at Taba. Indeed, the belief that a comprehensive deal is imminent has eroded over time. Yet most Palestinians continue to hope that strong leaders in Israel and among the Palestinians can make essential compromises. Recently, a prominent perception among the Palestinian public was that Israel's weak government initiated the violence after Camp David II because Israel wanted the Palestinians to accept something that they had rejected. This perception, plus the heavy causalities and the collective punishment sustained over the past few months, has helped to radicalize Palestinian society.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Arab Countries

1182. Special Policy Forum Report: The Brink of Peace? And Inside Look from Camp David to Taba

Author:
Gilead Sher
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasir Arafat is responsible for the collapse of the peace process and for the extreme violence of the last seven months. In the year and a half of negotiations with the Palestinians under the leadership of former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, the objective was a permanent peace settlement: Israel would withdraw from a large part of the occupied territories, and, in return, there would be an official end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The intention was to fashion an alternative to occupation, since this situation was not only untenable, but was also a strategic burden to Israel. Arafat, however, would only accept an agreement in which all of his demands were met; failing this, he would and did resort to imposing an arrangement through violent confrontation. Consequently, the peace process collapsed. Arafat was never ready — mentally, personally, or historically, at Camp David or afterwards — to conclude a deal; he is a leader of a national movement and not a statesman.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

1183. Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities During The Barak Government: A Statistical Overview

Author:
Liat Radcliffe
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The following report analyzes political fatalities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that occurred during the government of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak (July 7, 1999-March 7, 2001). This report is an update to The Washington Institute's Research Note #8: Trends in Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987-1999. Like the research note, its primary source for data is the Israeli human rights group Btselem, although other sources (including various media sources) were also used. Consistent with the previous study, no deaths that resulted from inter-Israeli or inter-Palestinian violence are included in this report; for example, the deaths of Israeli Arabs, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and accused Palestinian collaborators with Israel are excluded. A main conclusion from the data is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict increasingly involves official security services, as distinct from civilians.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict and Government
Political Geography:
Washington, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

1184. FORCE-17: The Renewal Of Old Competition Motivates Violence

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During the recent intifada, certain Palestinian security forces have been intensively involved in violent attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets. Most prominently involved have been the personal security guards of Yasir Arafat, popularly known as Force-17 and officially called Amn al-Ri'asah(Presidential Security). On March 30, Israeli forces bombarded from the air two of the headquarters of this force in Ramallah and Gaza, in the first serious Israeli retaliation under the new Sharon government. Then in early April, Israeli forces arrested several members of this force inside Area A, the area that is under full control of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

1185. Punting On PA/PLO Responsibility For Violence: Assessing The PLO Compliance Report

Author:
David Schenker, Robert Satloff, and Rachel Stroumsa
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Last week, President George W. Bush pointedly called upon Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat to "stop the violence" and Assistant Secretary of State Edward Walker testified that Arafat has "made no statements that would indicate that he is opposed to violence or that he even wants to see it stop." Yesterday, however, the State Department issued its semi-annual PLOCCA (PLO Commitments Compliance Act) report that appears to contradict these sentiments by specifically refraining from assigning the PLO, the Palestinian Authority (PA), or any senior Palestinian officials any responsibility for any violence or terrorism that occurred during the first seventy-five days of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Palestine

1186. The Arab League Summit: Opportunities Amid The Vitriol?

Author:
Rovert Satloff
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the Middle East, this week witnessed a series of events occurring at such breakneck speed that it is important not to lose the significance of each: On Thursday, President Bush issued an unprecedented statement calling on Chairman Yasir Arafat to "stop the violence," a statement that could lay down a marker by which the administration judges the efforts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and which could determine the direction of the U.S.–Palestinian relationship under the new administration. On Wednesday, Israel's national unity government launched retaliatory attacks against Arafat's personal guard, Force 17, underscoring Israel's intent to hold the chairman personally responsible for the terrorism emanating from within his close circle. On Monday and Tuesday, bombs went off inside the heart of Israel — responsibility for which was claimed by the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad, suggesting that Tehran is eager to tap pro-Hizballah sympathy and compete with the Tanzim and other Fatah elements for the pacesetter's role in the Palestinian uprising. Also on Tuesday, the PA chose an all-or-nothing option at the United Nations, demanding a Security Council vote on a resolution that the United States had no trouble vetoing — one calling for an international protection force for Palestinians — rather than pursuing diplomacy to bring to a vote a watered-down, but still problematic, resolution on which Washington was prepared to compromise. And on Sunday, Israel's Likud-led government issued a communique affirming its intent to seek the full implementation of signed agreements with the Palestinians, specifically citing its willingness to fulfill the requirement for a third "further redeployment" — territorial withdrawal in the West Bank — in the context of full compliance with the Wye River Memorandum. Each of these items alone has significant ramifications for the direction of Arab–Israeli relations, the Palestinian uprising, and U.S. policy toward the peace process. Taken together, they suggest a situation in great flux with emerging trends that are both ominous (e.g., Iran's deepening role) and positive (e.g., Bush's forthrightness on violence, Israel's balance of diplomacy and force).
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, Palestine, and Arab Countries

1187. From Tehran To Beirut To Jerusalem: Iran And Hizballah In The Palestinian Uprising

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As Arab leaders gather in Amman for the first regular Arab summit in a decade, non-Arab Iran is keenly watching to see whether Arab heads-of-state once again make grandiose promises to support the Palestinians. If Arab leaders fail to deliver on these promises, as has been the case with Arab financial commitments to the Palestinians, it would open the door for Tehran to build on Hizballah's success in Lebanon and to deepen its already worrisome role in the Israeli–Palestinian arena.
Topic:
International Relations, Ethnic Conflict, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, Palestine, Arabia, Jerusalem, Lebanon, and Beirut

1188. Special Policy Forum Report; The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Past, Present, And Future

Author:
Dennis Ross and Jacqueline Kaufman
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Over the past twelve years a revolution has taken place in the landscape of peacemaking in the Middle East. Twelve years ago, direct negotiations were non-existent and there was no peace process. While negotiations themselves do not ensure an agreement, their total absence ensures that there can be no resolution. The United States has borne the burden of trying to create dialogue.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, and Egypt

1189. The Palestinian Authority: En Route To The State Department's Terrorism List?

Author:
David Schenker
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The U.S. Department of State will shortly issue its semi-annual Palestine Liberation Organization Commitments Compliance Act (PLOCCA) report. This report, now several weeks overdue, details PLO and Palestinian Authority (PA) compliance with their "peace process" commitments. And in April, the State Department will release its annual report about global terrorism. The release of these reports comes just weeks after Israeli chief of staff Shaul Mofaz described the PA as a "terrorist entity." The content of these reports will be the subject of close scrutiny. How the United States characterizes the PA with regard to terrorist activities is an important signal — both of how the Bush administration will contribute to the lowering of violence as the first step to the resumption of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, and of what the direction of U.S.–Palestinian relations will be during the George W. Bush/Ariel Sharon era.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

1190. Israel's New Sharon Government

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The formation of a national unity government in Israel today, by a vote 72 to 21, is a triumph for Ariel Sharon. First, he seized the initiative. After his landslide victory a few weeks ago, Sharon did not engage in classic Israeli bargaining tactics in dealing with his Labor Party rivals, but rather caught the defeated and divided party off balance by immediately offering them top cabinet positions in the desire to cement a unity government. Sharon was not intoxicated by the breadth of his victory, but rather followed through on his campaign commitment. Sharon realizes that it is also good politics. According to Gallup's poll taken last week, the Israeli public favors the establishment of such a government by an overwhelming 79 to 14 margin.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel