Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,

11. Does Party Politicization of Corruption Affect Voter Turnout

Author:
Andreas Bagenholm, Stephan Dahlberg, and Maria Solevid
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be negative. We argue that voters’ willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties politicize the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter concerns. We test this claim by using individual-level data from CSES coupled with unique context data on party politicization of corruption in campaigns. Our findings show that higher perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower voter turnout but that the negative effect of perceiving high corruption on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals’ corruption perceptions exert a significant negative impact on turnout. By politicizing anti-corruption measures, political parties are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting voters’ decision whether to vote or not.
Topic:
Politics, Political Theory, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

12. How corruption shapes the relationship between democracy and electrification

Author:
Frida Boräng, Sverker Jagers, and Marina Povitkina
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
One of the central questions in research on the drivers behind public good provision is how political regimes and institutions impact the provision of public goods. Previous research within this field has shown that democratic history is positively related to public good provision, including the universal provision of reliable electricity. In this paper, we elaborate on these findings by investigat ing how corruption interacts with democratic history in shaping electricity provision. It is argued that since corruption can shape the implementation process of public policies as well as the policy choices, high levels of corruption are likely to limit the positive effect of democratic experience. Following Min (2015), we measure electricity provision by the share of population living in unlit areas. We find that democratic history leads to higher electrification rates only when corruption is relatively low. In high-corrupt contexts, however, the positive effect of democratic history is absent.
Topic:
Corruption, Democracy, and Political and institutional effectiveness
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Making Sense of Corruption Perceptions: Who to Ask (and About What?) - Evidence from Iceland

Author:
Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
The extent of corruption in Iceland is highly contested. International corruption measures indicate a relatively small amount of corruption, while domestic public opinion suggest a serious corruption problem. Thus, uncertainty prevails about the actual extent of corruption and whose perceptions to rely on. This problem is relevant for corruption research in general. Perceptions are increasingly used as proxies for the actual levels of corruption in comparative research. But we still do not know enough about the accuracy of these proxies or the criteria they must meet in order to give depend- able results. In fact, radical differences exist concerning evaluations of perceptions between those who believe in unbiased learning and those believing perceptual bias to be widespread. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to attempt to gauge which factors may influence how perceptions of corruption are shaped and why differences in corruption perceptions between different groups may be so pronounced. We present findings from original survey data from three parallel surveys – among the ‘public’, experts, and ‘municipal practitioners’ – conducted in Iceland in 2014. Expecta- tions based on the perceptual bias approach are tested, indicating that perceptions may be affected by (1) information factors, (2) direct experience of corruption and (3) emotive and/or ideological fac- tors. The validity of perception measures should be considered with this in mind. Domestic experts are likely to be well informed and avoid perceptual bias to a greater extent than other groups. Our examination of the Icelandic case suggests that the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) tends to underestimate corruption problems in ‘mature welfare states’, such as Iceland, whilst the general public tends to overestimate it.
Topic:
Corruption and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Iceland

14. The Abandoned Trustees. Explaining Corruption in Local Government

Author:
Salvador Parrado, Victor Lapuente, and Carl Dahlström
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
This paper engages in the debate about how different ways of organizing relations between politicians and bureaucrats affect corruption. Research has established robust correlations between the political autonomy of bureaucracy and low corruption, on both national and regional levels, but there are few studies that explore the causal mechanisms linking these two phenomena. We do so by comparing public procurement processes in two similar Spanish cities, interviewing all important actors. We show that relatively independent bureaucrats—so-called trustees—can act as checks to prevent political moral hazard. Yet, in order for this to occur, other institutions must support the trustee, such as a merit-based human resources policy, rules, and standard operating procedures, transparency and independent watchdogs. There is thus no silver bullet to defend us against corruption, but having these mechanisms in place makes it much more costly for politicians to oppor- tunistically bend public procurement processes to favour bribe-paying contractors.
Topic:
Corruption and Political Power Sharing
Political Geography:
Spain

15. Corruption, Gender Equality and Feminist Strategies

Author:
Bo Rothstein
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
The following arguments are presented. 1) Corruption in its various forms is a serious social ill. 2) Democracy is not a safe cure against corruption. 3) Increased gender equality seems to be one important factor behind getting corruption under control. 4) Impartiality in the exercise of public power, not least, when it “translates” into meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the public administration, has a powerful effect on lowering corruption. 5) While some aspects of impartiality are central for gender equality, research results are mixed. Some show that impartial principles promotes gender equality, others show that gender bias exists also in many processes designed to be impartial. Going from these results to policy recommendation is thus fraught with many difficulties. One is how to handle problems of legitimacy in the implementation process for various forms of preferential treatment of discriminated groups. Since these problems are impossible to handle, we may be in for a “Churchillian” argument. Like representative democracy, meritocracy may be a far from ideal solution for lowering corruption and thereby promoting human well-being, but it may be the least bad of existing alternatives.
Topic:
Corruption, Gender Issues, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Cooperation or Punishment. The Effects of Trust on Government Regulation and Taxation.

Author:
Niklas Harring and Victor Lapuente
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
For many economists government intervention is linked to low levels of interpersonal trust and corruption, while, on the contrary, for many political scientists, government intervention is associ- ated to high trust and low corruption. The goal of this paper is to reconcile these contrasting find ings by distinguishing the differing effects of trust over two alternative types of government intervention: regulation and taxation. Low-trust individuals demand more governmental regulation but less government taxation. We test the hypotheses by focusing on a particular policy – i.e. environmental policy – where governments use different mixes of regulatory and tax mechanisms, and for which we have data on both trust in others (interpersonal trust) and trust in public institutions (in- stitutional trust). The main finding is that those individuals with low trust (both interpersonal and institutional trust) tend to demand, ceteris paribus, more governmental regulation of the environ- ment and, but are less inclined to pay higher taxes to protect the environment. We also find that the effect of institutional trust is stronger than the effect of interpersonal trust, which puts previous studies in a perspective.
Topic:
Corruption, Government, Regional Cooperation, Regulation, and Political structure
Political Geography:
Global Focus