Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Global Focus Publishing Institution The Fletcher School, Tufts University

1. Cybersecurity: State Attack and Response Strategies

Author:
Josephine Wolff and Ta-Chun Su
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
. One of the questions that has always been very interesting to me is “Who do we hold responsible when something goes wrong with cybersecurity?” While that is a technical question—because often when something goes wrong, there is a technical component since you are dealing with a computer and the Internet—it also very much has to do with what our liability regimes say, what our policies say, what our social norms and expectations say about who we hold accountable and who is expected to pay for the damage. So for me, I think cybersecurity is about trying to understand what we mean when we talk about the "secure Internet,” what it looks like to have a secure Internet, and who we hold responsible for all the different components of how you get there. To whom do we say “It’s your job not to answer the phishing emails,” or “It’s your job to look for bug traffic on the network.” How do we piece together that entirely complicated ecosystem of different stakeholders, and how do we identify what their different roles and responsibilities should be? ...
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Interview
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Synthetic Biology and the Risks of Misuse

Author:
Gigi Gronvall
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Synthetic biology is a relatively new scientific field that aims to make biology easier to engineer and, thus, more useful. It is already delivering on its enormous promise, yielding FDA-approved chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell cancer therapeutics, as well as non-medical products such as laboratory-produced fabrics, flavorings, adhesives, and detergents.[1][2] Despite such progress, however, the rapid growth and democratization of synthetic biology — almost all of which is taking place in the private sector — brings security challenges. Like all areas of the life sciences, it is “dual-use” and able to be exploited. To make misuse more limited and difficult to en‐ force, the United States will need to partner with other nations, international organizations, and international businesses to govern areas of the synthetic biology field...
Topic:
Science and Technology, Biology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

3. Secure Communities A Conversation with Carrie Conway

Author:
Alexandra Heffern
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
I have worked in development for almost twenty years, but when I declared my focus, I had not originally thought “I definitely want to do conflict-related programming and work in conflict zones.” Given my trajectory though, I organically started to do that. I received my undergraduate degree from the University of Vermont, and at that point the only way to study international development was through their Agricultural Economics program. After finishing school, my first real introduction to the field was when I started working with Oxfam in Boston. At first it was a very administrative position, but then I was lucky and had the opportunity to go overseas as the program officer in Cambodia, which is where I would say I began my career. At that point, I really wanted to work with an NGO — I had not even thought about working with USAID or a contractor — but in Cambodia I had the opportunity to work as a local American hire with USAID. After that I went to Clark University for graduate school, and after Clark I had a number of program management roles for USAID, all of which were in conflict zones. For example, I spent time working in Timor-Leste with Tetra Tech ARD, I spent time in Afghanistan, and I served as Chief of Party in Sudan for a conflict transition program. After being overseas I decided to return to the United States and began working with Chemonics, specifically supporting their Libya and Lebanon programs in the Office of Transition Initiatives...
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Interview, and USAID
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

4. 1st Fully Remote & Virtual (FRV) SIMULEX experience keeps 47-year streak alive at Fletcher!

Author:
Brandon Daigle, Paul Pawluk, and David Kaczmarek
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Each year, The International Security Studies Program (ISSP) at the Fletcher School, Tufts University conducts SIMULEX, a major crisis management exercise where participants assume the roles of national policy makers in an international scenario. Throughout this three-day event, the exercise focuses on a highly realistic, near-future scenario involving key players on the world stage. SIMULEX exposes participants to the constraints and opportunities facing policy makers in the quest of making the best possible decisions and enacting associated actions. As representatives of various national and international teams, participants are charged with developing strategy and the necessary tasks required to achieve their country specific goals while driving efforts to bring the global crisis to a preferred end state. In an atmosphere of conflict escalation, SIMULEX stresses leadership in uncertainty, crisis management, team building, adaptability, and policy negotiation skills.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Leadership, Crisis Management, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

5. Re-thinking Biological Arms Control for the 21st Century

Author:
Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
International treaties prohibit the development and use of biological weapons. Yet concerns about these weapons have endured and are now escalating. It is high time to take a hard look at technical and political developments and consider how the international security policy community should respond. ​ A major source of the growing concern about future bioweapons threats stem from scientific and technical advances. Innovations in biotechnology are expanding the toolbox to modify genes and organisms at a staggering pace, making it easier to produce increasingly dangerous pathogens. Disease-causing organisms can now be modified to increase their virulence, expand their host range, increase their transmissibility, or enhance their resistance to therapeutic interventions.[1] Scientific advances are also making it theoretically possible to create entirely novel biological weapons,[2] by synthetically creating known or extinct pathogens or entirely new pathogens.[3] Scientists could potentially enlarge the target of bioweapons from the immune system to the nervous system,[4] genome, or microbiome,[5] or they could weaponize ‘gene drives’ that would rapidly and cheaply spread harmful genes through animal and plant populations.[6] ​ Concurrent developments in other emerging technologies are also impacting potential future biological weapons threats. Developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning could speed up identification of harmful genes or DNA sequences. Artificial intelligence and machine learning could also potentially enable much more targeted biological weapons that would harm specific individuals or groups of individuals based on their genes, prior exposure to vaccines, or known vulnerabilities in their immune system.[7] Big Data and ‘cloud labs’ (completely robotized laboratories for hire) facilitate this process by enabling massively scaled-up experimentation and testing, significantly shortening ‘design-test-build’ timeframes and improving the likelihood of obtaining specificity or producing desired biological functionality.[8] Other developments provide new or easier ways to deliver pathogens or biological systems. Nanotechnology could potentially create aerosolized nanobots dispersing lethal synthetic microbes or chem-bio hybrids through the air,[9] or in vivo nanobots releasing damaging payloads inside human bodies.[10] Aerosol or spraying devices attached to swarms of small unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, could be another potential means to disperse biological agents. Additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, could circumvent barriers imposed by national export control systems on controlled laboratory equipment or dispersal devices. ​
Topic:
Security, Health, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, Biosecurity, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Technology and Tensions in the Global Commons

Author:
Kristi Govella
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
For most of history, the domains of the global commons were unclaimed, largely because the technology to access and utilize them did not exist.[1] In areas such as the high seas and outer space, it was impossible for states to establish and maintain sovereign control. Even as the relevant technologies developed, costliness and controls kept them initially concentrated largely in the hands of just a few major powers such as the Unit- ed States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, “command of the commons” became the military foundation of its hegemony, granting it the ability to access much of the planet and to credibly threaten to deny the use of such spaces to others.[2] Bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union strongly influenced developments in the maritime and outer space domains. In the case of cyberspace, a more recent addition to the traditional global commons, the United States was also initially dominant due to its role in pioneering associated technologies. However, over time and particularly since the end of the Cold War, continuing technological innovation and diffusion have made these domains accessible to a growing number of countries. ​ This technological progress was born of both cooperation and competition between states. While some states chose to develop certain technologies indigenously, many acquired knowledge and equipment from abroad. Globalization of industry has made it easier for states to obtain a variety of foreign technologies, even lowering the threshold for them to procure disruptive military capabilities. In addition, over the last two decades, American primacy has been increasingly challenged by the rise of China, which has impacted the dynamics of technological development and diffusion across multiple domains. As China has acquired the technology to become more active in the commons, it has prompted major regional powers, such as Japan and India, to accelerate their own technological advancement, and other mid-sized and smaller countries have also become increasingly engaged.[3] ​ The consequence of this multiplication of technologically sophisticated actors has been the erosion of American primacy in the global commons. Although the United States still remains the most dominant player, it is faced with a more densely populated field, and management of these spaces has become more difficult. This article examines this trend in the high seas, outer space, and cyberspace since the end of the Cold War, with attention to the ways in which the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have catalyzed greater engagement with the commons, particularly among the countries in Asia that find themselves most affected by this power transition. I argue that advances in and diffusion of technology have transformed the global commons into increasingly crowded domains characterized by interstate competition and heightened tensions. Whether these tensions prevail depends on the creation and strengthening of regimes to manage interactions and promote shared rules and norms...
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Globalization, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

7. How Much Does a “Privacy” Weigh?

Author:
Paul Rosenzweig
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Benjamin Franklin is famous, in part, for having said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” Though historical evidence suggests Franklin’s quote has been misinterpreted,[1] the aphorism has come to stand for the proposition that privacy and security stand in opposition to each other, where every increase in security likely results in a commensurate decrease in privacy, and vice versa. ​ Couched in those terms, the privacy/security trade-off is a grim prospect. We naturally want both privacy and security to the greatest extent possible. But Franklin tells us this is impossible — that privacy and security are locked in a zero-sum game where the gain of one comes only at the loss of the other. ​ Of course, this characterization is assuredly flawed; it is certainly possible to adopt systems that maximize both privacy and security in a Pareto optimal way. That is one of the reasons why so many privacy and security experts simply revile the “balancing” metaphor — it obscures more than it illuminates... ​
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Privacy
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

8. A Healthier Way for the Security Community to Partner with Tech Companies

Author:
Douglas Yeung
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Digital data captured from social media, cell phones, and other online activity has become an invaluable asset for security purposes. Online mapping or cell-phone location information can be used to collect intelligence on population movement, or to provide situational awareness in disasters or violent incidents. Social-media postings may be used to vet potential immigrants and job applicants, or to identify potential recruits who may be likely to join the military. ​ However, breakdowns in relationships between the tech industry and would-be consumers of technology’s handiwork could imperil the ability of security stakeholders to use this data. Ongoing issues have already begun to shape some technologists’ views on the ethical use of artificial intelligence and other technologies in war and conflict and their impact on human rights and civil liberties. It isn’t difficult to imagine a series of future incidents further souring collaboration between technologists and security stakeholders. ​ In contrast to its reluctance over security matters, the tech industry has been a willing partner for government agencies and communities that promote health and wellbeing—topics that present less of an ethical challenge. Although it may not be immediately apparent, wellbeing and security have much in common. Could the security community take a page from wellbeing efforts to improve their collaboration with the tech industry?...
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Business, Surveillance, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

9. Nuclear Weapons with 21st Century Technology: A Conversation with John Borrie

Author:
John Borrie and Fletcher Security Review Staff
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
John Borrie is the research coordinate and program lead at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. He’s currently working on continuing and expanding dialogues about disarmament and the impact of nuclear weapons on humanitarian affairs. He previously worked on weapons control for both the International Committee of the Red Cross and as a New Zealand diplomat. Borrie holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Bradford.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Interview
Political Geography:
United Nations and Global Focus

10. Digitization and the Future of Trade A Conversation with Martin Labbé

Author:
Martin Labbé
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Martin Labbé is the Tech-Sector Development Coordinator at the International Trade Centre and the Program Manager for Netherlands Trust Fund IV (NTF IV), a USD 10 million Export Sector Competitiveness Program. He manages NTF IV Uganda and NT IV Senegal tech-sector development projects, working closely with IT sector associations & tech hubs, SMEs and tech startups to support the internationalization of the local digital economy. He has been actively involved in designing and managing several online and offline B2B business-development and marketing activities in developing countries and transition economies as well as training small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) on technology and trade, with a focus on e-commerce.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Nations and Global Focus