Among those endeavors that a state or a people may undertake, none is more terrible than war. None has repercussions more far-reaching or profound. Thus, a grave responsibility to one's own nation and to the global community attends any decision to go to war. And part of this responsibility is to estimate and gauge the effects of war, including the collateral damage and civilian casualties that it incurs.
The motivating premise of this study is that nations cannot wage war responsibly or intelligently without careful attention to its costs. The broader context in which "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was conducted -- that is, the campaign against terrorism -- makes attention to the repercussions of war even more urgent. Effective action against terrorism depends in fair part on an effort to win hearts and minds. Success in this effort turns significantly on issues of legitimacy and responsible action, especially with regard to the use of force. And the first principle of responsible action is to take account of its effects.
This report analyzes an important aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): the interdiction of Iraqi ground units by coalition air forces. Based on air campaign statistics, observations from the field, and the experience of past air campaigns, the report assesses the likely impact (in terms of combatant casualties) of coalition air attacks on the Iraqi army in the field. Our approach is a comparative one that views the OIF air interdiction campaign in light of the experience of the 1991 Gulf War. Among the issues we explore is the contribution of coalition air power to the catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi Republican Guard and regular army.
This briefing memo addresses trends in the incidence of terror in the post-Cold War period by comparing the number of international terror attacks on American interests with the overall number of terror attacks worldwide. We present the data year by year and as three year moving averages. We use data from the U.S. Department of State which is frequently cited as authoritative and usefully summarizes annual statistics.
In the first Clinton administration Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the United States would seek the capability to undertake offensive counterproliferation strikes against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To this end Les Aspin's 1993 Bottom Up Review calls for "Improvements in the ability of both our general purpose and special operations forces to seize, disable, or destroy arsenals of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems."