A key objective of the new administration will be to "rebalance" America's foreign and security policy "tool kit", giving greater prominence to diplomacy and other elements of "soft power". And it is easy to see why. The surge in US defense spending and military activity that began ten years ago, and then sharply accelerated after the 11 September 2001 attacks, has had disconcerting results-to say the least. But setting an effective alternative course for US policy will not be as easy to accomplish as some assume.
The United States is entering a critical period of policy transition. Beginning with the advent of the Obama administration, and continuing through the end of 2010, all of America's national security and defense planning guidance will be revised. Certainly the need for change is broadly felt by the public. And it is not difficult to understand why.
On 1-4 February 2007, the Gallup polling organization asked a representative sample of US citizens if they thought the United States was spending too little, too much, or just the right amount on defense and the military.{1} For the first time since the mid-1990s, a plurality of Americans said that the country was spending too much. The surprising result of the survey shows current public attitudes to approximate those that prevailed in March 1993, shortly after former President Bill Clinton took office. Today, 43 percent of Americans say that the country is spending “too much” on the military, while 20 percent say “too little”. In 1993, the balance of opinion was 42 percent saying “too much” and 17 percent saying too little.
Few outside the administration would contest that the mission's “measurables” are miserable. The progress in Iraq reconstruction has been glacial and the security situation has steadily deteriorated, despite a great expenditure of time, money, and lives. But why? Critics have variously targeted the administration's strategy, planning, priorities, and level of effort – which suggest that there might be a better way. And, indeed, the administration now claims to have discovered one.
The Bush administration's misadventure in Iraq constitutes a splendid catastrophe – “splendid” in the sense of being manifest, multifaceted, and profound. It is the strategic equivalent of Katrina, but man-made. Born of disinformation, it has – at great cost in lives, money, and prestige – spawned anti-Americanism, civil war, and a surge in terrorism.{1} Failing to see this is dangerous. Even more dangerous is mistaking the malady for the cure – which is precisely what President Bush has done with his “troop surge” proposal.
President Bush's request to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 personnel follows on the heels of similar proposals by Congress members of both parties. Despite the bipartisan appeal of this idea, it is not at all clear what problem it is intended to solve or how it is supposed to solve it. Advocates may believe that America's troubles in Iraq provide reason enough to “grow” the Army and Marine Corps. But this view misconstrues both the lessons of that war and America's true security needs.
America's unique position of power in the post-Cold War era has often inspired comparisons to that of Rome during the rule of Augustus. But the security policy adopted by the United States, especially since the 9/11 attacks, calls to mind a different ancient place and personage: Pyrrhus (318 - 272 B.C.E.), king of Epirus, a Hellenistic realm that comprised what is now northwestern Greece and southern Albania. Plutarch memorializes Pyrrhus as a “great man of war” – but also a fool. Although he waged successful campaigns against Macedonia, the Romans, and others, Pyrrhus was unable to preserve his gains, which came at great cost. In the end, his martial ambitions won him and his kingdom nothing but ruin and disapprobation. He is remembered today in the phrase “Pyrrhic victory”– meaning any victory not worth its cost.
Considerable controversy surrounds the effects of America's post-9/11 wars on its armed forces – more specifically, their effects on military readiness. And there are grounds enough for concern in the August 2006 admission by General Peter Pace, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, that two-thirds of the US Army's active and reserve combat brigades registered in the two lowest readiness categories.
The sympathy and support for the United States that surged worldwide in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks began to ebb as soon as US bombs began falling on Afghanistan. Supportive sentiments continued to recede through 2004, driven increasingly by the Iraq war and eventually settling at levels unseen since the early 1980s. The trend has temporarily reversed in some places at some times, either in response to hopeful news from Iraq (such as the December 2004 elections) or in reaction to local events (the November 2005 terrorist bombing in Jordan). Also, there are national exceptions to the trend (Israel) and partial exceptions (India). On balance, however, the United States today finds world opinion substantially at odds with its foreign policy and its leadership on most particulars.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan
Since the onset of the US “global war on terrorism”, the operational capacity of the original “Al Qaeda” centered around Osama bin-Laden has been significantly degraded. Hundreds of cadre formerly commanded by bin-Laden have been killed (mostly during the Afghan war). Several top leaders of the organization have been killed or captured – most notably Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – as have several leading regional associates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dozens of third tier operatives have been killed or captured. Nonetheless, the organization continues to function in a more decentralized form.