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21. Losing Hearts and Minds: World public opinion and post-9/11 US security policy

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The sympathy and support for the United States that surged worldwide in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks began to ebb as soon as US bombs began falling on Afghanistan. Supportive sentiments continued to recede through 2004, driven increasingly by the Iraq war and eventually settling at levels unseen since the early 1980s. The trend has temporarily reversed in some places at some times, either in response to hopeful news from Iraq (such as the December 2004 elections) or in reaction to local events (the November 2005 terrorist bombing in Jordan). Also, there are national exceptions to the trend (Israel) and partial exceptions (India). On balance, however, the United States today finds world opinion substantially at odds with its foreign policy and its leadership on most particulars.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan

22. War and Consequences: Global terrorism has increased since 9/11 attacks

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Since the onset of the US “global war on terrorism”, the operational capacity of the original “Al Qaeda” centered around Osama bin-Laden has been significantly degraded. Hundreds of cadre formerly commanded by bin-Laden have been killed (mostly during the Afghan war). Several top leaders of the organization have been killed or captured – most notably Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – as have several leading regional associates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dozens of third tier operatives have been killed or captured. Nonetheless, the organization continues to function in a more decentralized form.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States

23. QDR 2006: Do the forces match the mission? DOD gives little reason to believe

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
As originally conceived the Quadrennial Defense Review was meant to help ensure the internal consistency of mid-and longer-term US defense planning. By “internal consistency” I here mean a concordance of strategy, assets, and budgets. As critics often put it in the past: the point is to show how the force fits the strategy and the budget fits the force. The exercise is supposed to “connect” our military strategy with our force development plans and, in turn, connect these with current and future budgets. In this regard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification – “short” as in utterly lacking.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and War
Political Geography:
United States

24. Arms Control in an Age of Strategic and Military Revolution

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
11-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
We have come a long way since autumn 1989 and the few optimistic years that followed. During that dawn of the post-Cold War era, security policy discourse focused briefly on notions of common security and a peace dividend. Since then, these ideas have been displaced by other, more bellicose ones: the clash of civilizations, the war on terrorism, and their constant companion: the Revolution in Military Affairs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Development
Political Geography:
United States

25. The Iraqi election "bait and switch": Faulty poll will not bring peace or US withdrawal

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
President Bush was correct when he asserted on 2 December 2004 that it was "time for the Iraqi citizens to go to the polls." Indeed, it is long past time. Elections should have occurred a year or so after the fall of the Hussein regime. But the fact that they are overdue does not mean that an adequate foundation for meaningfully democratic elections has been laid. It has not. Unfortunately, the balloting due to take place on 30 January will not fulfill the promise of democracy nor satisfy the Iraqi passion for selfdetermination. For these reasons, it cannot bring peace. It is more likely to exacerbate civil strife.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

26. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

27. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

28. Trends in the Incidence of International Terror Attacks on Americans After the Cold War

Author:
Charles Knight and Melissa Murphy
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
This briefing memo addresses trends in the incidence of terror in the post-Cold War period by comparing the number of international terror attacks on American interests with the overall number of terror attacks worldwide. We present the data year by year and as three year moving averages. We use data from the U.S. Department of State which is frequently cited as authoritative and usefully summarizes annual statistics.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States

29. First Strike Guidelines: the Case of Iraq

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
In the first Clinton administration Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the United States would seek the capability to undertake offensive counterproliferation strikes against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To this end Les Aspin's 1993 Bottom Up Review calls for "Improvements in the ability of both our general purpose and special operations forces to seize, disable, or destroy arsenals of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems."
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East