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2. A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
3. Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
4. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
5. Putin’s Next, Best Move – The Logic and Limits of Russian Action on Ukraine
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent, new US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. Nonetheless, a full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine is highly unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed below.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
6. And So Now… It’s War?
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
7. Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
- Topic:
- NATO, Weapons, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
8. Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Neither NATO nor US policy caused the Ukraine war. The invasion was Moscow’s unforced choice. But that doesn’t settle the issue of provocation. Although neither provocation nor “facilitation” amount to “cause,” such dynamics might have played a role in moving us toward this war. And knowing what role US or NATO policy may have played in bringing the world to this juncture can help illuminate ways to end the conflict (short of prosecuting it to its bitter end – however long that might take and at whatever cost it might entail).
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
9. The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
10. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea
- Author:
- Charles Knight
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America