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11. China's Credit Boom: New Risks Require New Reforms

Author:
Nicholas Borst
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Chinese financial system has undergone almost continuous reform since the dismantling in the 1980s of the Soviet- style system where only one state-controlled bank existed. Government efforts to create a financial system that adheres to international best practices of commercial lending accelerated in the 1990s (box 1). Reforms progressed quickly during this period, but they were accompanied by excessive credit growth and a massive increase in nonperforming loans, threatening the solvency of some banks and the financial stability of the entire economy. The risk of these weaknesses was dramatized by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in which several nearby countries were crippled by plunging currency values, rising interest rates and difficulties servicing their foreign-held debts.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
China

12. Lehman Died, Bagehot Lives: Why Did the Fed and Treasury Let a Major Wall Street Bank Fail?

Author:
William R. Cline and Joseph E. Gagnon
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Five years after the Federal Reserve and the Treasury allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail, their actions (or inaction) remain a focus of debate. Some argue that it was an inconsistent policy to have let Lehman fail while making emergency loans to save other large financial institutions in the same time frame. In this Policy Brief we present evidence that the Fed and Treasury had a sound reason to have bailed out other institutions while letting Lehman fail. Simply put, Lehman was insolvent—probably deeply so—whereas the other institutions arguably were solvent. In addition, the other institutions had abundant collateral to pledge, whereas what little collateral Lehman had to pledge was of questionable quality and scattered across many affiliated entities. Thus, federal officials, at least in hindsight, appear to have followed the dictum of Walter Bagehot (cited above), which has guided central banks for almost 150 years.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States

13. Sovereign Debt Sustainability in Italy and Spain: A Probabilistic Approach

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This paper introduces a new probabilistic approach to sovereign debt projections and presents new estimates of debt ratios through 2020 for Italy and Spain. The new approach takes account of likely correlations across 243 alternative scenarios with three states (good, baseline, bad) for five key variables (growth, interest rate, primary surplus, bank recapitalization, and privatization). The 25th and 75th percentile scenarios are reported, as are the baseline and probability-weighted outcomes. The results suggest sovereign debt is sustainable in both Italy (where debt ratios are likely to decline because of a high primary surplus) and Spain (where the ratios rise but at a decelerating pace and from relatively low levels).
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Spain and Italy

14. Lessons from Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis

Author:
Anders Åslund
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The response of the ten new eastern members of the European Union to the global financial crisis has valuable lessons of crisis resolution for the euro area. These countries were severely hit by the crisis in the fall of 2008 and responded with extensive reforms. Crisis made the unthinkable possible. This paper outlines the main reform measures that the ten Central and East European (CEE) countries carried out. It then quantifies to what extent the CEE countries resolved the macroeconomic crisis and explores the effects of the reforms on future growth prospects. The fourth and major section discusses how the political economy of the crisis resolution actually worked. Finally, the author examines what lessons euro area countries can learn from the crisis resolution of the newest members of the European Union.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

15. Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union

Author:
C. Randall Henning and Martin Kessler
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
European debates over reform of the fiscal governance of the euro area frequently reference fiscal federalism in the United States. The “fiscal compact” agreed by the European Council during 2011 provided for the introduction of, among other things, constitutional rules or framework laws known as “debt brakes” in the member states of the euro area. In light of the compact and proposals for deeper fiscal union, we review US fiscal federalism from Alexander Hamilton to the present. We note that within the US system the states are “sovereign”: The federal government does not mandate balanced budgets nor, since the 1840s, does it bail out states in fiscal trouble. States adopted balanced budget rules of varying strength during the nineteenth century and these rules limit debt accumulation. Before introducing debt brakes for euro area member states, however, Europeans should consider three important caveats. First, debt brakes are likely to be more durable and effective when “owned” locally rather than mandated centrally. Second, maintaining a capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilization is essential. Balanced budget rules have been viable in the US states because the federal government has a broad set of fiscal powers, including countercyclical fiscal action. Finally, because debt brakes threaten to collide with bank rescues, the euro area should unify bank regulation and create a common fiscal pool for restructuring the banking system.
Topic:
Debt, Financial Crisis, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

16. Interest Rate Shock and Sustainability of Italy's Sovereign Debt

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Contagion from Greece, together with domestic political uncertainty in Italy, caused interest rates on Italian sovereign debt to spike in the second half of 2011. As shown in figure 1, the risk spread above German bunds for 10-year Italian government bonds rose from 200 basis points in early July 2011, to a range of 300 to 400 basis points after the July 21 Greek package with its new emphasis on private sector involvement. There was a second surge to the 400 to 500 basis point range in November through January, following the October 27 Greek package that insisted on a 50 percent reduction in private sector claims.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Italy

17. The Liquidation of Government Debt

Author:
Carmen M. Reinhart
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Historically, periods of high indebtedness have been associated with a rising incidence of default or restructuring of public and private debts. A subtle type of debt restructuring takes the form of "financial repression." Financial repression includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government and banks. In this paper, the authors describe some of the regulatory measures and policy actions that characterized the heyday of the financial repression era. In the heavily regulated financial markets of the Bretton Woods system, several restrictions facilitated a sharp and rapid reduction in public debt/GDP ratios from the late 1940s to the 1970s. Low nominal interest rates help reduce debt servicing costs while a high incidence of negative real interest rates liquidates or erodes the real value of government debt. Thus, financial repression is most successful in liquidating debts when accompanied by a steady dose of inflation. Inflation need not take market participants entirely by surprise and, in effect, it need not be very high (by historical standards). For the advanced economies in Reinhart and Sbrancia's sample, real interest rates were negative roughly half of the time during 1945–80. For the United States and the United Kingdom, their estimates of the annual liquidation of debt via negative real interest rates amounted on average to 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year. For Australia and Italy, which recorded higher inflation rates, the liquidation effect was larger (around 5 percent per annum).
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
United States and United Kingdom

18. Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Recent crises and the expansion of international financial arrangements have dramatically elevated the importance of cooperation between regional institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the case for coordination between regional and multilateral institutions is generally accepted, however, the need to organize it on an ex ante basis is not fully appreciated. The relatively successful cooperation among the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF on the European debt crisis is not likely to be easily replicated in joint programs for countries in other regions, moreover, and the costs of coordination failure could be very large. Recent innovations at the IMF, on the other hand, present opportunities for cooperation with regional facilities. Henning reviews (1) the case for organizing cooperation on an ex ante basis, (2) the policy and institutional matters that should be coordinated, (3) how East Asian arrangements in particular and the IMF might cooperate, and (4) an Interinstitutional Agenda of general principles, modalities, and institutional recommendations. The G-20, member states, and institutions themselves should address this agenda proactively.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, International Monetary Fund, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and East Asia

19. Europe on the Brink

Author:
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Attempts to resolve the problems in Europe are failing, and the crisis is spreading from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal to larger nations. Europe's financial system relies on moral hazard, i.e., a “no defaults” policy, to attract the funding needed to roll over large amounts of short–term bank and sovereign debt. Now that politicians in creditor nations are calling for private sector burden sharing, investors are demanding higher interest rates to hold these debts. But higher rates may tip banks and nations toward bankruptcy. Europe's banks and financial system are highly integrated across countries. Rising expectations of default in some countries could lead to large-scale capital flight into “safe” countries. This shift will raise concerns regarding solvency and liquidity of many financial institutions. The payments system of the euro area is serving as an opaque bailout mechanism that is currently preventing the euro area from falling apart at this time. If the number of nations in trouble spreads beyond Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, this bailout system will be stressed because of the potential size of accumulated funding. The European Central Bank (ECB) could soon see a vocal debate between inflationist and hawkish (anti–inflation) members. Inflationists will call for large–scale interventions, including bond buybacks and emergency loans, while the hawks will attempt to close loopholes in the payments system that effectively permit each troubled nation to create money needed to finance capital flight and budget deficits. At this stage in the debate, we see little chance that Europe can avoid ending the “moral hazard” regime, in which case it needs to plan for widespread sovereign and bank debt restructurings.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Ireland

20. Sustainability of Greek Public Debt

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
On July 21, 2011, the heads of government of the euro area announced a new plan to address the Greek debt crisis. This policy brief presents a simulation exercise that examines whether the new arrangements are likely to provide a sustainable solution. The analysis focuses on four key measures: gross debt relative to GDP; net debt relative to GDP; net interest payments relative to GDP; and amortization of medium-and long-term debt coming due during the year in question, relative to GDP. The new Greek package shows prospective future progress on all four measures, and Greek debt looks much more sustainable after the package than before. Debt also appears considerably more manageable if the criterion is net debt or interest burden rather than gross debt ratio, although even for gross debt the ratio is down substantially by 2020. It also becomes clear that the major contribution of the private-sector involvement (PSI) part of the package is in the form of sharply cutting amortization due, although by avoiding large new borrowing at crisis-level interest rates it also alleviates the interest burden that would otherwise occur.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece