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41. Leaders and laggards, on the way down and up

Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
With the economies of most countries having passed their troughs, it is a good time to take stock of some of the main features of the crisis so far and to assess what the upturn may look like. In this article, we look back at how the different countries have fared in this crisis and how monetary and fiscal authorities have responded to the crisis. We then turn to the nascent recovery to compare and contrast the upturn across countries. Finally, we highlight some of the main legacies of this crisis. Exposure to financial services, housing booms, consumer debt and trade with the US were seen as factors that would make some countries suffer deeper downturns than others. In the event, the downturn has surprised by how quickly it has spread across countries. So the most affected countries turned out to be the most exposed to the world economy such as Germany, Italy, Japan and Eastern Europe. All major central banks have responded with aggressive cuts in interest rates and adopted wide-ranging unconventional measures. This has helped stabilise financial markets, but the goal of getting credit flowing to the non-financial economy has not yet been achieved. Governments have also responded to the crisis with large fiscal stimulus packages. These packages have helped contain the collapse in activity and contributed to some countries exiting the recession in 2009Q2. Whether these packages will be enough to get the world economy back on a sustainable growth path is still uncertain though. Beyond the short term, where fiscal stimulus and the stock cycle will boost growth, the recovery is expected to be sluggish and bumpy in most places. History suggests that recoveries from financial crises tend to be slower than others, and the repair of household and corporate balance sheets will be a drawn out process. In addition, with large amounts of spare capacity around the world, demand for investment will be weak for some time to come. Furthermore, the nascent upturn has already put pressure on oil and commodity prices. If this continues, it will hamper growth in net importer economies. These factors will combine with country-specific features that determine their potential growth. We forecast the recovery to be most drawn out in Italy, Japan and Germany as these countries are hit by weak demand for investment goods and are characterised by relatively low potential growth. One main legacy of this crisis is the likelihoo d of years of fiscal austerity, to bring public deficits back under control. Another legacy may be in changes to the regulation of financial services, although do date little progress has been made in this area. In addition, EMU has so far proved a resilient entity during the crisis, so that the euro could gain a more prominent role on the world stage, depending on how it fares in the upturn.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, and Markets
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Germany, and Italy

42. Can India catch up with China?

Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Although it is only since 2000 that the growing economic power of the Chinese 'dragon' has emerged fully into the media spotlight, its GDP has in fact been growing at an average rate of close to 10% pa for the last 30 years. On a PPP basis, China is already the second largest economy in the world. The Indian 'elephant', on the other hand, has grown at a more sedate pace, but following a burst in the 2000s it now has the fourth largest GDP in the world on a PPP basis and has been close to emulating Chinese growth rates. With the global economy perhaps now starting to recover slowly from the deep recession, it is possible that India is better placed than China to benefit from what may prove to be a fairly slow period of growth in the developed economies in the years ahead, with the latter's huge exports of manufactured goods struggling to recapture the momentum of the last ten years. For China, net trade will probably be a significant drag on growth in the year ahead, while the stimulus from state-led investment may begin to peter out. In order to maintain earlier rapid growth, the Chinese economy will need to rely much more heavily on domestic demand than before, especially if global over-capacity appears in certain key industries. Despite the apparent resilience of the economy to the global recession, there are a number of question marks over whether this shift can be made quickly. India's fundamentals have become more favourable given the rise in its service sector and climbing FDI inflows (albeit both of these remain well below Chinese levels), and its lower reliance on trade will also mean that it is less exposed to what may be a lengthy period of sluggish world demand. But it also faces problems, including an inefficient agricultural sector, a still-burdensome bureaucracy and a cautious stance towards privatisation. Its fiscal position is also much weaker than China, which may be a long-term threat to greater foreign investment. India also has the benefit of being a democracy – although to date this has probably hampered rather than helped growth performance, it should facilitate faster growth in the longer term. China's authoritarian regime has enabled policies to be implemented more quickly and with little regard to public popularity, but this may be storing up socio-political problems for the longer term, especially if growth were to slow sharply. Demographic factors should also favour India, but again over the long term rather than the next decade. China's decision to start to reverse its one-child policy indicates mounting concern about its ageing population and labour shortages in the future. India on the other hand may be able to turn population growth trends to its advantage, as long as it can improve the skills base. In conclusion, although India's growth trend is forecast to pick-up to 7-8% over the next decade, this is not likely to be enough to overtake China's pace of expansion. But India's recent surge in growth was achieved with few reforms – if it can manage to implement further liberalisation measures, attract increasing FDI inflows and turn its more favourable demographics to its advantage, then the 'elephant' may begin to catch up with the 'dragon' after 2020, although by that time the gap will be even wider than it is now.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

43. Valuing the effects of Great Barrier Reef bleaching

Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Australia, along with the entire world, faces the tremendous challenge of climate change over the coming decades. Along with its impacts on a wide variety of global ecosystems, climate change has the potential to have long-term impacts on Australia's Great Barrier Reef (GBR). Among the most serious of these are the phenomenon of coral bleaching (or, more properly, bleaching mortality) and its attendant effects on the reef's biodiversity.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, and Environment
Political Geography:
Australia

44. Why are US home foreclosures so high?

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
US mortgage foreclosures have risen to extraordinary heights in recent months, with the scale of the distress in the US mortgage market much greater than in the UK. Key factors behind this divergent performance include laxer underwriting standards in the US and the widespread existence of 'non-recourse' loans. The latter allow borrowers in negative equity to walk away from their mortgage debt and sap the incentive to remain current on 'underwater' loans. As a result, steep house price falls can generate a sharp rise in foreclosures even without high interest rates or unemployment. In the UK, by contrast, there are strong incentives for home owners to remain in their properties, even when in negative equity.As a result, the escalation from arrears to foreclosure in the UK is much more limited. This may head off very abrupt prices falls but could also mean a more drawn out process of adjustment in the housing market.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States

45. Could swine flu tip the world into deflation?

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Health experts agree that, while the current flu epidemic that started in Mexico in April 2009 may weaken during the summer, it could re-appear in the autumn, possibly in a stronger form. Using historical benchmarks of previous flu pandemics and of the SARS episode, we estimate the economic impact of a global flu pandemic.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, Health, and Infectious Diseases
Political Geography:
Mexico

46. Slump in wealth to hinder global recovery prospects?

Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Since the credit crunch began in Q3 2007, there has been a dramatic slump in the prices of many financial assets. Global equity prices have dropped some 40-50% from their peaks in the major economies and by as much as 70% in some emerging markets. Many classes of other private sector securities have also seen sharp falls in value. Corporate bond spreads have exploded as defaults have soared, as have mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Currently, many classes of MBSs are trading at less than 10% of their par value, and even AAA-rated tranches are trading at as little of 25% of par.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States

47. Assessing the slowdown in China

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Growth in China has slowed dramatically over the past year from a blistering pace of over 13% in 2007 to just 6.1% in 2009 Q1. A turning in the domestic investment cycle has been coupled with a dramatic slowdown in external demand. Despite an unprecedented fiscal package, in the near term we expect growth to dip below 6% but it should begin to recover strongly towards the end of this year as the fiscal stimulus comes on stream, rising to 10% by end-2010. Indeed, some green shoots of recovery are already emerging with a pickup in manufacturing new orders and strong growth in credit. Domestic demand may be recovering but the impact of the external crisis on China’s growth prospects is uncertain. Nevertheless, more fundamental downside risks remain if rising unemployment leads to social instability or if an increase in loss-making investments uncovers weakness in the banking sector. By looking at what has driven the recent slowdown and how this compares with previous downturns, we can shed light on China’s prospects going forward and the major risks.
Topic:
Economics and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
China and Asia

48. How far away is a global recovery?

Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Steep drops in output have been recorded across the industrialised world and much of the emerging market world in recent months. Such has been the scale of these declines that there is now little doubt that the global economy is set for its worst year since the end of WWII, with world GDP forecast to fall almost 1½% (and more than 2% at 2000US$). Significant uncertainties nevertheless remain about the economic outlook, in particular about how deep and protracted the recession will prove to be and how rapid an eventual recovery can be expected. A key factor generating uncertainty is that the current recession has been sparked by and accompanied by a major financial crisis. Recessions of this sort are often more severe than 'standard' recessions, featuring deeper and more sustained drops in asset prices, and a weaker impact from policy interventions due to malfunctioning banking systems. Equity and house prices have continued to drop in the early part of 2009, and there looks to be a significant risk that this weakness will drag on for some time – the average duration of stock price declines in previous financial crises is more than three years and for house prices around six years. The financial sector also remains in a highly dysfunctional state. Although the credit tightening process is showing some signs of coming to an end, stress levels remain extremely elevated and risk appetite is low with banks stuck in 'balance sheet repair mode'. This process is unlikely to be complete for some time. Retrenchment has also become a priority for the corporate and household sectors. In the face of a plunge in final demand, firms have slashed investment and begun destocking. Worryingly, the destocking process could continue f or several quarters as the ratio of inventory to sales remains high. US households were net re payers of debt in the final quarter of 2008, and it seems unlikely that the appetite to take on more debt will recover quickly there or elsewhere in the face of steep increases in unemployment and large falls in household wealth. Taylor rule analysis suggests that the 'appropriate' short-term interest rate for the major economies has now turned negative, supporting the big shift to quantitative easing now under way. Eventually, this and other stimuli in the pipeline should produce a strong recovery. But the outlook for 2010 has weakened significantly in recent weeks and the risks remain skewed toward a more deflationary outcome than that envisaged by our baseline forecast.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Foreign Direct Investment, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States

49. Eurozone Unity Under Threat?

Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Ten years after the introduction of the euro, the onset of deep recession in the Eurozone has triggered concern that the single currency might impose intolerable strains upon some members. With some countries hit hard by the impact of the credit crunch, there are mounting concerns about a possible debt default by one or more member states, which in turn might threaten the euro and even the existence of the Eurozone. With the Eurozone economy forecast to contract by 3.1% this year, unemployment is starting to climb steeply and fiscal deficits are soaring. This has raised concerns about deteriorating public finances in a number of countries, leading to sharply wider spreads on government bonds and credit rating downgrades for Greece, Spain and Portugal, with Ireland maybe facing a similar fate soon. And repercussions from the growing economic crisis in Central and Eastern Europe are adding to the problem, with Austria particularly exposed. Rising bond spreads were always intended to be the mechanism that would restrain public spending by more profligate Eurozone countries. But the question now is whether the weaker economies can withstand the strains that a lengthy period of recession will impose and, at the same time, adopt credible medium-term spending plans to ward off the worst of the downturn and retain market confidence. With fiscal deficits already rising as a result of bank bailouts, fiscal packages and recession will push budget deficits far above the 3% of GDP target – Ireland, facing a deficit of 12% of GDP, and Spain will be worst hit. And with rising deficits and higher bond spreads pushing up the cost of debt, countries face a sharp rise in their level of indebtedness, with Greece and Italy seeing debt/GDP ratios around 100%. This deterioration could lead to a further downward spiral if the recession is prolonged and will be a test of countries' euro commitment, which has remained strong thus far despite rising social tensions in some countries. At this stage, the problems remain manageable and the risk of default or of countries leaving the euro is still very low. Bond spreads are still much lower than during much of the 1990s, when countries were striving to qualify for euro membership, and the currency risks attached to leaving the euro would be substantial. Moreover, EU countries that have been exposed to considerable currency strain over the past year are anxious to join the Eurozone as soon as possible, to take advantage of the benefits of a stable currency. While some smaller countries may experience financial difficulties, it seems inevitable that the larger Eurozone members would step in to stabilise the situation – failure to do so would risk contagion spreading to other countries, which in turn would cause even deeper problems for the euro. More policy action also seems likely to counter this threat – although the German government will probably remain reluctant to countenance the scale of expansionary fiscal policy really needed at this time. Current policies inevitably mean a long hard slog back towards fiscal rectitude in the years ahead, with monetary policy also tightening and growth slower than previously expected. Fiscal federalism may also have to be on the agenda. All this will undoubtedly lead to ongoing strains within the Eurozone. And any measures by governments that appear to be protectionist – such as the support for the French car industry – will only fuel these tensions.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

50. The economic contribution of ports to the UK economy

Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
Ports are vital for the health of the UK economy and the movement of its population. They are gateways into the UK for trade and travel. Over 95% of UK imports and exports by volume and 75% by value pass through the country's ports. In terms of tonnage handled, the UK ports sector is the largest in Europe. In 2007, UK ports handled 580 million tonnes of freight. In 2007, 24.8 million international sea passengers went through UK ports. Nearly three quarters of journeys were to France. Another 14 per cent were to the Republic of Ireland. In 2007, 24.2 million domestic sea passengers traveled between ports in the UK. Sea crossings comprised 4.0 million of these journeys. Inter island journeys the remaining 20.2 million. Of which 10.7 million trips were between Hampshire and Isle of Wight and 8.0 million between the Scottish islands.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe