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1. Tangled Web: The Role of Oil, Gas and Mining in Funding Regional Governments in Indonesia

Author:
David Manley, Rani Febrianti, and Hari Subhash
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Indonesia’s system of funding provincial, district and city governments is one of the most complex in the world, and has undergone substantial expansion over the last two decades. While the system allows thousands of authorities to function, it is failing in three respects: inequality of funding between regions persists, funding for some governments is unpredictable and volatile and some oil- and gas-rich regions have not sufficiently prepared for a possible future with much lower revenues. Indonesia’s planning ministry, Bappenas, should investigate these issues further focusing particularly on clarifying policy objectives, ensuring more reliable funding, supporting oil- and gas-rich regions in becoming more resilient to a long-term decline in prices and clarifying the published rules around the funding system.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Oil, Gas, Media, Mining, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

2. A Race to the Bottom and Back to the Top: Taxing Oil and Gas During and After the Pandemic

Author:
David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Colin Fleming
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Earlier this year as people around the world responded to the coronavirus pandemic, their demand for oil tumbled. At the same time, OPEC and Russia initially failed to agree to coordinate supply cuts. Consequently, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil fell from $60 in December 2019 to $20 in April 2020. As of this publication, the price is $43. If the price stays low, and if oil executives expect the price to remain low, companies may lobby governments to reduce taxes and other costly regulations. Payments to governments are often larger than costs for a company, so there is pressure on governments to reduce taxes to keep projects viable. This briefing considers the following key questions: Where will the oil price go next? What is the impact on currently operating projects, undeveloped projects, and those that are yet to be discovered? How should governments respond in changing oil and gas taxes? Will governments try to “race to the bottom,” but then lose a race back to the top? Key messages: There’s no certainty over future prices. Some rise is likely in the next few years, even if an energy transition results in a structural decline in the oil price in the longer-term. Governments must consider this uncertainty and probable rise when taxing oil and gas. Tax breaks on most currently operating projects are likely a waste of public money. Some governments may be pressured into reducing tax on projects awaiting development. But they must identify which projects would become viable with lower taxes, and which do not need a tax break. If in doubt, governments should consider whether a project that needs a tax incentive really will provide value for the country. For most countries, relative to total oil and gas produced, the production from projects that could be delayed or cancelled is small. But not so for the “new producer” countries like Senegal and Guyana. Changing taxes to make a country more attractive has the most impact before companies have invested – e.g., in attracting investment in licensing rounds. But setting low taxes now could force a government to raise taxes later if prices rise again. If a tax break is unavoidable, governments could use a “sunset clause” to limit the duration of the tax break. Ideally, governments should set progressive tax regimes that respond to changes in profit. But as many taxing authorities struggle to measure profit, governments could set simpler tax regimes based on sales revenue or prices – but must prepare to change tax rates in the future, and be prepared for the repercussion for a government’s credibility with investors. Governments should disclose contract terms detailing tax changes, tax exemptions, incentives and estimated break-even prices of projects to help government auditors, local think tanks, and the public check and support tax policy decisions.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Tax Systems, Commodities, Coronavirus, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Beyond Revenues: Measuring and Valuing Environmental and Social Impacts in Extractive Sector Governance

Author:
Nicola Woodroffe and Tim Grice
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Oil, gas and mining projects can generate substantial revenues for host countries. At the same time, extractive activities generate a range of other positive and negative economic, environmental, social, political, institutional and cultural impacts. Host countries must weigh the economic benefits of extractive projects against their environmental and social impacts. However, environmental and social impacts are often assessed in separate processes and by separate institutions from those assessing financial revenues and the modeling, measuring and reporting of these impacts is rarely integrated with financial impacts.
Topic:
Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, Governance, Gas, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime

Author:
Thomas Lassourd and Carole Nakhle
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The authors of this paper examine Tunisia’s upstream petroleum fiscal regime, in consideration of the government’s stated policy priority of reversing a decade-long decline in reserves and production. Although the country’s “Jasmine Revolution” led to improved civic rights and the country is a strong regional performer on the Natural Resource Governance Institute’s (NRGI) Resource Governance Index, foreign investment has dropped since 2011, in part because of regulatory ambiguity and political instability. Tunisia’s proven oil and gas reserves are very small, especially by regional standards. With limited geological prospects, the existing context is not conducive to oil and gas investment, especially for exploration. Tunisia offers different contractual arrangements and fiscal regimes: a concession-based system, which often involves joint ventures between the state-owned company, ETAP, and international oil companies and production sharing contracts. This paper analyses the various arrangements and fiscal instruments, focusing primarily on production sharing contracts, which have become the dominant contractual forms for foreign investors and do not require any public (ETAP) capital investment. The government of Tunisia publicly discloses all contracts and concessions.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

5. Mongolia's Missing Oil, Gas and Mining Contracts

Author:
Robert Pitman
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Many of the most important contracts for publicly owned oil, gas and minerals in Mongolia remain secret, despite government promises to make contracts public. A review of publicly available contracts in Mongolia suggests that contracts are unlikely to contain the kinds of information about a project that are commercially sensitive. Likewise, evidence suggests that there is no reason to think that confidentiality clauses prevent disclosure of contracts. Contracting regimes in Mongolia are complex and therefore in many instances, it will be necessary to publish several contracts and associated documents for each project. There are five steps that the government can take to make contracts public: 1) explain the contracting landscape, 2) define the scope of disclosure, 3) establish a contract disclosure rule, 4) make contracts accessible, and 5) support contract use.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Oil, Gas, Journalism, Tax Systems, Mining, Private Sector, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

6. Managing Expectations About Tanzania’s Uncertain Gas Revenues

Author:
Thomas Scurfield and David Mihalyi
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
With negotiations between the Tanzanian government and a consortium of companies for a game-changing liquefied natural gas (LNG) project continuing, a decision on whether the project will proceed is still some years away. In this brief, the authors update a previous analysis of the possible outcomes for the LNG project and its potential impact on public financial management. This update accounts for new information and changes in company planning.
Topic:
Sovereign Wealth Funds, Gas, Legislation, Commodities, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

7. How Tanzania Can Secure a Good Deal for its Offshore Gas

Author:
Thomas Scurfield and David Manley
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The Tanzanian government and a consortium of companies are negotiating the regulatory terms for a game-changing liquefied natural gas (LNG) project. In this brief, the authors update a previous analysis of some of the key decisions that will be made in the negotiation and their potential impact on whether the LNG project proceeds and the levels of revenues that the project could generate for the government. This update accounts for new information and changes in company planning. There is a reasonable chance that foreign investment in the LNG project will not happen under current conditions. NRGI’s economic model and specific assumptions of the project suggest that a long-term LNG price of USD 11 per mmBtu is needed for investors to earn the return they usually require from LNG projects. Current forecasts by the IMF and World Bank are $7-8 per mmBtu. As the authors discuss in the brief, the chances of investment will shrink further if, during the negotiations, the government increases taxes and requires companies to share a greater portion of the gas with Tanzania’s home market. Government officials could wait and hope that conditions improve, and perhaps then impose stricter terms. However, this would delay the point at which the country would start generating benefits from the project. If officials want to accelerate development, without harming long-term gains for the country, they could: adopt a more progressive tax regime, avoid raising the share of gas to be sold to the home market, and establish a legal framework that both company managers and future generations of Tanzanians will trust.
Topic:
Gas, Regulation, Legislation, Tax Systems, Commodities, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

8. Lessons for Generating Government Revenue for New and Prospective Liquefied Natural Gas Producers

Author:
Thomas Lassourd, Amir Shafaie, and Thomas Scurfield
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) is changing fast, with increasing demand, new sources of supply, and a growing spot market. Over the last decade (2008 to 2018), LNG prices in the three main markets of North America, Western Europe and East Asia have diverged significantly at times, creating arbitrage opportunities for sellers. This briefing presents two case studies of developing countries that have faced challenges in securing public revenue from their natural gas industries. Trinidad and Tobago and Peru offer two examples of developing countries that faced challenges in maximizing government revenue from LNG sales during that time. Although LNG markets are evolving, these examples offer lessons for new and prospective LNG producers, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. A key area (and the focus of this briefing) is the valuation of LNG sales and the corresponding impact on government revenues. Governments should pay close attention to LNG project structure and the long-term LNG sale and purchase agreements between LNG producers and offtakers, especially when they are related companies. Governments should push for these agreements to maximize the price flowing back to the LNG plant and the upstream producer and should favor project structures that facilitate this. In particular, the practice of diverting LNG cargos to more lucrative export markets than the ones initially designated in offtake agreements should be regulated and monitored by governments to balance the financial incentives to LNG sellers with the interests of LNG-exporting countries. This will become increasingly important as the market becomes more liquid and sellers have more options.
Topic:
Government, Gas, Tax Systems, Commodities, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
South America, Caribbean, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago

9. Indonesia’s Oil and Gas Revenues: Using Payments to Governments Data for Accountability

Author:
Alexander Malden and Fikri Zaki Muhammadi
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Under mandatory disclosure laws in the European Union, Canada and Norway, companies listed or incorporated in these countries must disclose the payments they make to government entities for their extractive activities. Under these laws, seventeen international oil and gas companies have reported over $15 billion in payments to Indonesian government entities since 2014. This report explores some of the ways this timely source of payment data can be used as an accountability tool. Civil society organizations, media outlets, government officials, parties to Indonesia’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and oversight actors can use payment data in combination with other data sources to: Verify the size and recipient of oil and gas project signature bonuses Estimate and verify the revenue that local and regional government entities should receive from an oil and gas project that operates in their region Estimate and verify the government’s share of production from a project under the new gross split production-sharing contract (PSC) model
Topic:
Government, Oil, Gas, Accountability, and Data
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia