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31. NATO is doing fine, but the Atlantic Alliance is in trouble

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Twenty years ago, as the Atlantic Alliance was get- ting ready to celebrate its 50th anniversary, this au- thor published a piece entitled “Will NATO still exist in 2009?”.1 It argued that NATO’s lost sense of mission after the disappearance of the Sovi- et threat, disagreements over peacekeeping, and a growing US disinterest for Europe legitimately raised the question of the Alliance’s ability to sur- vive ten years from then. Today NATO’s Article 5 missions are once again taking center stage and the relevance of the Alli- ance is hardly questioned. But questions are still being raised about its political solidity. Is it more le- gitimate today to wonder about NATO’s existence ten years from now than it was in 1999? To a point, no. There is no longer a significant debate about NATO’s relevance. However, there are severe ten- sions in the transatlantic relation, which Russia’s aggressiveness is unlikely to dampen. NATO has remarkably adapted and has even been rejuvenated: but the Atlantic Alliance remains in trouble. And this, in turn, could have consequences on NATO’s ability to deter and act.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

32. NATO at 70: enter the technological age

Author:
Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary, it has re- turned nearly all the way to its original deterrence and defence roots. While it remains in the busi- ness of collective security and crisis management, for the past five years – since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – Article 5 tasks have come to dominate the agenda of the commanders, plan- ners and policy makers. As for the years ahead, the challenges come in three forms. The first is to finish the transition to common defence. 2019 is not 1949; the nature of the technologies that determine winners and los- ers has changed. And while NATO has adapted admirably in many ways, it has work left to do, par- ticularly in addressing cyber vulnerabilities. The second challenge is also related to technolo- gies, and it is to start preparing for the next gener- ation of partly or fully automated warfare, which will make use of artificial intelligence (AI). The re- search and development is well under way, on the part of the Allies as well as potential adversaries. A lot less thinking is taking place with regard to how defence politics – the way Allies agree on plans and guide operations – will be affected. That is a mistake. The changes which automation will bring to NATO deliberations will be no less dramatic than those which will happen on the battlefield. The third challenge is more immediate and po- litical in nature: it is to keep the Alliance unified inthe face of unprecedented soul-searching on the part of the biggest Ally, the United States. And while by virtue of its size and dominance Wash- ington tends to be self-referential, reactions from the rest of NATO member states do make a dif- ference, both positive and negative. Their track re- cord over the past two years has been mixed.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

33. Building the airplane while flying: adapting NATO’s force structure in an era of uncertainty

Author:
Sara B. Moller
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO has made a series of reforms (“Adaptation Measures”) to the NATO Force Structure (NFS), the pool of conventional national and multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance’s disposal on either a permanent or temporary basis.1 Designed to strengthen NATO’s long-term military posture and enable quick response to emergencies wherever they arise, the post-2014 initiatives constitute the most ambitious attempt at modernizing the NFS in a generation. While NATO deserves praise for the speed with which it reacted to security developments on its Eastern flank in recent years, the importance Brussels placed on responding quickly has come at the expense of a comprehensive theater-wide strategy for the new force structure. Because the new Adaptation Measures were adopted largely on an ad hoc basis, with different framework nations often taking the lead, the question of their relationship with existing NATO initiatives and structures received insufficient attention early on. Indeed, within the Alliance, many officials continue to liken the post-Wales force structure adaptation process to the act of building an airplane while flying. The political expediency which initially gave rise to the Adaptation Measures has since given way to intra-Alliance debates about burden-sharing and the appropriate number of resources to commit to one flank. At the core of these disagreements lie members’ differing threat perceptions. To succeed, however, the new NFS will require the support of all members. For this reason, it is imperative that NATO officials and member states redouble existing efforts to forge consensus on an Alliance-wide threat assessment.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

34. What NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy?

Author:
Kris Quanten
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Until 2001, NATO considered the terrorist threat as a secondary phenomenon with a limited impact on the Alliance. The 9/11 attacks marked a radical turnaround: suddenly terrorism became a top secu- rity priority. This was also the first and only time in NATO’s history that Article 5 was invoked, further- more for a terrorist attack. Initially, the reaction to 9/11 was purely military. However, it soon became clear that there was lit- tle strategic vision underlying the initiatives to fight terrorism at the operational level. Hence, the hasty approval, at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, of a Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.1 This Concept foresaw a number of new initiatives, such as intelligence sharing, CBRN measures, the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, and Civil Emergency planning, as a priority. Yet all these separate initiatives lacked coordination and an overarching vision.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

35. Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO’s North-Eastern border

Author:
Sven Sakkov
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of Europe went on a “strategic holiday”. The West had won and the future was bright. Even the fact that at its weakest the Russian Federation was still able to create frozen conflicts at its borders did not dent this optimism. Defence spending in Eu- rope was plummeting throughout the 1990s, and all the way to 2014. NATO’s prevailing paradigm changed from being a collective defence organi- sation more to something of a collective security actor, with many main missions and a plethora of partnerships. After the shock of 9/11, the Alliance focused on counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Military capabilities required to fight a modern near-peer adversary atrophied even further. In this context, some Allies did not take their eyes off Russia – primarily Poland and the Baltic States. Yet they were perceived by major Western Allies as nuisances requiring psychological counselling, as countries who had been traumatised by their harsh history and hence had become incapable of embracing this new reality of partnership with Rus- sia. Even the Russian military aggression against Georgia in 2008 did not change that Zeitgeist. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her “reset” button to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov just seven months after Russian tanks rolled into Georgia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Northern Europe

36. A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy of Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 1949-2019

Author:
Diego A. Ruiz Palmer
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In this Research Paper, Diego Ruiz Palmer argues, that in spite of the many crises over seven decades, NATO has been a forum in which Allies were able to stand together, build a common purpose, most notably through a process of strategy- making. What is strategy-making and why is it important? Strategy-making is mainly about building a shared sense of strategic thinking and doing within the Alliance; it is about making the Alliance a cohesive and credible defence actor that draws on a solid and Alliance-wide political and military posture. This is achieved through a process of constant consultation, planning, policy-making, shared threat assessment and buy-in by all member states. Strategy-making is important because it determines the long-term success of the project. This was true in the past, but still holds today, at a time when the Alliance is re-embracing a deterrence and defence agenda. If, as Diego Ruiz Palmer puts it, strategy-making has been the “key ingredient in sustaining a constancy of purpose in often turbulent times”, then it must continue to be so, as external and internal challenges – in the post-Cold War era more than ever – question the relevance of the Alliance. Diego Ruiz Palmer recounts the strategic odyssey in systematic and meticulous detail: from the very first steps of the Alliance’s establishment, to the post-Cold War adaptation, through the doctrinal evolutions of the 1960s, to NATO’s strategic and operational renaissance in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Throughout, Diego draws on a rich mix of NATO’s archives and declassified documents, secondary sources, and his own expertise of the institution’s life. The result is inspiring, and will no doubt become a reference document on NATO’s nature and ability to navigate through turbulent strategic waters. One may simply hope that the fate of the Alliance does not resemble that of the Odyssey’s hero.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

37. The necessary adaptation of NATO’s military instrument of power

Author:
Jan Broeks
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of a series of actions taken by Russia: Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; Russia’s military posture and provocative military activities, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violations of NATO Allied air- space, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nu- clear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nucle- ar dimension. In parallel, growing instability in our southern re- gion, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are chal- lenging our security. These factors can all have long- term consequences for peace and security in the Eu- ro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe. Yet it is mainly Russian military actions that have brought deterrence and collective defence back to the fore- front of NATO’s agenda.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

38. Deterring hybrid threats: the need for a more rational debate

Author:
Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine in 2014, the Western strategic community is trying to come to grips with the concept of hybridity.1 Some ob- servers were quick to point out that the idea of combining military and non-military tools was far from new, and they warned against exaggerating hy- brid warfare.2 However, Russia’s apparently seam- less and effective blending of political, diplomatic, economic, electronic and military tools in order to annex Crimea and support separatists in the Don- bas seemed to herald a new era of hybrid warfare: a revisionist power was using both old and new means to undermine and, eventually, tear down a post-Cold War order it considered unfair and un- favourable.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

39. Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a “Low Tension” Environment

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s military posture in the Arctic is informed by the changing geopolitical environment, and can no longer be considered in isolation from the country’s growing tensions with the West. In this sense, the period of “Arctic exceptionalism” – in which, by convention, the region has been treated as a zone of depoliticized cooperation – is coming to an end. Certainly, the Russian Arctic is not exceptional for Moscow in military-operational terms. Russia’s leadership has accorded the same threat perception to the Arctic as it has to other theatres of operation. It seeks consistent control over foreign military activity in the Russian Arctic, and ensured access for Russian armed forces, particularly the Northern Fleet. Russia’s military build-up in the Russian Arctic and the Kremlin’s intentions are, at least for now, defensive in nature. Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) primarily aims to ensure perimeter defence of the Kola Peninsula for the survivability of second-strike nuclear assets. Russia’s “Bastion” defence concept consists of the projection of multi-layered sea denial and interdiction capabilities. Another Russian priority is to ensure the Northern Fleet’s access to, and passage along, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. This has hitherto been achieved through military infrastructure along the NSR. However, due to the receding ice, Moscow will seek to enforce “border control” over a larger portion of its Arctic area in the future. The revamping of dual-use border control infrastructure and facilities is deemed a priority for safeguarding Russia’s vision of national security in the AZRF. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has deployed substantive force and capabilities along its northern border in the AZRF. Parts of the armed forces, such as the Arctic Brigade, are now Arctic-capable and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. The Northern Fleet has been repurposed with the Arctic environment in mind, and has been provided with Arctic-specific military technology and training. Russia acts as a status quo power and a reluctant rule-follower in the Arctic, partly because international law there plays in its favour, and partly because it is in Russia’s interest to do so. Despite growing tension, cooperation between Russia and other Arctic nations is likely to endure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Arctic

40. Russia and China: “axis of convenience” or “stable strategic partnership”?

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
s the growing relationship between Russia and China a short term “axis of convenience” as some have suggest- ed or rather a “stable strategic partnership” described by China’s former vice Foreign Minister, Fu Ying”.1 Based on current events, it is still too early to tell how substan- tive this relationship will develop. On the one hand, there are impressive achievements in cooperation with clear sig- nals from Moscow and Beijing of their future aspirations, which are serious and long-term. On the other hand, there are indications that things could fall apart quickly consid- ering a contentious history that is still in living memory, lingering distrust and socio-cultural obstacles. Although both countries have finally agreed on a mutually recog- nized border, growing Chinese influence and the sheer disparity of populations in the border region raise con- cerns that even Russian leadership privately acknowledge. For the time being, however, the forces bringing both countries together are enough to overcome these obsta- cles. Although the current direction of bilateral relations is towards cooperation, it is still a fragile sort. Because co- operation requires the participation of Russian and Chi- nese leadership, it could recede without their active pro- motion. In the long term much will depend on how the leadership navigates through the phases of cooperation, both military and economic. For NATO, this underscores the need to incorporate Far East developments into its strategic awareness of the Eastern Flank, particularly with respect to the convergence of political, military and eco- nomic forces.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America