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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)

61. Governance by Labels

Author:
Henri Bergeron, Patrick Castel, and Dubuisson-Quellier
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Many of today’s public policies aimed directly or indirectly at regulating the behaviors of individuals and organizations provide for the implementation of a certain type of instrument which can be qualified as a label. They share some features with what the literature tends to identify as proper standards (e.g., they aim at defining the best practices, they may represent – at least – a symbolic resource for those who adopt them), but they also have some peculiarities, which we will present here. In this paper, we propose to analyze the characteristics and dynamics underpinning this mode of governance as part of a study of two particular public policy domains chosen for their complementarity as well as their contrasts: the fight against obesity, and sustainable consumption. In both of these fields, labels have become a preferred mode of governance – and even, we might say, a kind of standard. Based on Foucault (2004), we emphasize the fact that the logics of distinction, which regulate utilities and sanctions in a particular social field, are instrumentalized by public policy as an incentive to the actors to deliberately take action whose value is endorsed by a label. Hence, the aim and outcome of this mode of governance are not the uniformity of a field, but the ongoing creation of increasingly demanding labels that only some of the participants can hope to obtain.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Public Policy, Public Health, and Consumption
Political Geography:
Europe and France

62. The Superiority of Economists

Author:
Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In this essay, we investigate the dominant position of economics within the network of the social sciences in the United States. We begin by documenting the relative insularity of economics, using bibliometric data. Next we analyze the tight management of the field from the top down, which gives economics its characteristic hierarchical structure. Economists also distinguish themselves from other social scientists through their much better material situation (many teach in business schools, have external consulting activities), their more individualist worldviews, and in the confidence they have in their discipline’s ability to fix the world’s problems. Taken together, these traits constitute what we call the superiority of economists, where economists’ objective supremacy is intimately linked with their subjective sense of authority and entitlement. While this superiority has certainly fueled economists’ practical involvement and their considerable influence over the economy, it has also exposed them more to conflicts of interests, political critique, even derision.
Topic:
Economics, Academia, Social Science, and Hierarchy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

63. Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis

Author:
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner, Wolfgang Streeck, and Cornelia Woll
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or masquerade as such. The reverse may be true as well: deep moral-political conflicts may be waged through the manipulation of economic resources. Using the recent financial and Eurozone crises as empirical backgrounds, the four papers gathered here propose four different perspectives on the play of moral judgments in the economy, and call for broader and more systematic scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on executive compensation, bank bailouts, and the sovereign debt crisis, the symposium builds on a roundtable discussion held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.
Topic:
Economics, Financial Crisis, Banking, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Europe

64. Transnational Civil Society and the Consumer-friendly Turn in Financial Regulation

Author:
Lisa Kastner
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The literature on financial regulation has typically emphasized the role of the powerful financial industry in shaping regulatory outcomes. However, capture theories cannot explain the prominence of financial consumer protection in post-crisis reform agendas. By contrast, this paper argues that, despite their collective action disadvantage, a polymorphous network of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after the financial crisis and to influence the financial reform process. In this policy window, where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of expertise, a transnationally connected civil society network successfully raised the issue of consumer protection on reform agendas in tandem with public entrepreneurs and on the back of a popular backlash against big finance. This argument will be explored through a comparative study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe and the US in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In the conclusion, the paper discusses the substance of the financial reforms that have been undertaken.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Regulation, and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

65. Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage and Bad Working Conditions on the Exit–Voice Trade-off

Author:
Olivier Godechot and Zinaida Salibekyan
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Although Hirschman’s exit–voice theoretical model has been applied to labor markets, research up to now has not tested one of its most important features: the impact of job quality on exit–voice strategies. Hirschman’s model of consumer behavior explains that those individuals unsatisfied with a product’s quality are more likely to “voice,” whereas those more concerned with its price are more likely to “exit.” A rationale for this tradeoff is based on information: first, information on the price of alternative options is much more accessible than information on quality; second, voice produces more information than exit and favors opportunities for specific improvements. We transpose Hirschman’s assumptions to labor markets and use the French SalSa survey and DADS, declaration by employers on social data, to examine the conditions under which French employees are more likely to exit, and the conditions under which they are more likely to voice. Our results support the Hirschmanian hypothesis. A deterioration by one unit in our working-conditions index increases the probability of participation in collective action by 5 percentage points. An increase in log hourly wage by one unit decreases the probability of quitting by 5 percentage points.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Labor Market, and Workforce
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Le salaire dépend-il du sexe du supérieur ?

Author:
Olivier Godechot
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Do female supervisors promote greater wage equality between men and women? Although female supervisors might want to promote greater equality, might they also lack power, not only to implement this policy, but also to improve the wages of both male and female subordinates? Based on the SalSa and COI surveys, we show that female supervisors do seem to reduce the wage gap between men and women. However, the subordinates of female supervisors also receive lower wages. This phenomenon could be related to selection bias : women become supervisors more easily in sectors, jobs, and departments that are less valued and where wages are lower. Even when adding controls for measurable selection effects, employees with a female supervisor earn 2.5% to 4% less than those with a male supervisor. Although the phenomenon still needs additional confirmation, the wage gap between women and men does seem wider when employees are men (–5% to –10%) than when they are women (0% to –3%). When the supervisor is a woman, the gender gap significantly reduces: from 30% to 85%. Interpreting this phenomenon is still in its infancy. We put forward four lines of interpretation: the unobserved differences between male and female managerial positions; the effect of individual characteristics correlated with the supervisor’s gender; differences between male and female dispositions to negotiation and competition; and, finally, discriminatory corporate behavior towards female demands.
Topic:
Women, Discrimination, Equality, Workforce, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus