Search

Begin New Search Topic Economics Publishing Institution Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)

21. Politics in the Interest of Capital: A Not-So-Organized Combat

Author:
Cornelia Woll
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The rise in inequality has been explained with reference to organized groups and the lobbying of the financial sector. This article argues that the image of politics as organized combat is contradicted by empirical evidence on lobbying in the United States, and does not travel well to Europe. The power of finance does not operate through organized political influence. Rather, politics in the interest of capital unfolds as a structural feature of advanced economies over time. Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, one of the most promising strategies of institutions seeking government support was not organizing for combat, but collective inaction. Our challenge, then, is to explain how the power of finance has built up and is playing out in creating inequality. A more structural, less agency-focused perspective highlights how the rise of finance has been supported by actors that few would accuse of being finance-friendly, such as the European center-left parties and consumers. Reconceptualizing the power of finance has important implications for political solutions to rising inequality.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Inequality, Finance, and Capital
Political Geography:
Europe

22. Financialization Is Marketization! A Study on the Respective Impact of Various Dimensions of Financialization on the Increase in Global Inequality

Author:
Olivier Godechot
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In this paper, we study the impact of financialization on the rise in inequality in 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2011 and measure the respective roles of various forms of financialization: the growth of the financial sector; the growth of one of its subcomponents, financial markets; the financialization of non-financial firms; and the financialization of households. We test these impacts using cross-country panel regressions in OECD countries. As dependent measures we use Solt’s (2009) Gini index, the World Top Incomes Database, and OECD inter-decile inequality measures. We show first that the share of the finance sector within the GDP is a substantial driver of world inequality, explaining between 20 and 40 percent of its increase from 1980 to 2007. When we decompose this financial sector effect, we find that this evolution was mainly driven by the increase in the volume of stocks traded in national stock exchanges and by the volume of shares held as assets in banks’ balance sheets. By contrast, the financialization of non-financial firms and of households does not play a substantial role. Based on this inequality test, we therefore interpret financialization as being mainly a phenomenon of marketization, redefined as the growing amount of social energy devoted to the trade of financial instruments on financial markets.
Topic:
Economics, Income Inequality, Financialisation, OECD, and Marketization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. The Superiority of Economists

Author:
Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In this essay, we investigate the dominant position of economics within the network of the social sciences in the United States. We begin by documenting the relative insularity of economics, using bibliometric data. Next we analyze the tight management of the field from the top down, which gives economics its characteristic hierarchical structure. Economists also distinguish themselves from other social scientists through their much better material situation (many teach in business schools, have external consulting activities), their more individualist worldviews, and in the confidence they have in their discipline’s ability to fix the world’s problems. Taken together, these traits constitute what we call the superiority of economists, where economists’ objective supremacy is intimately linked with their subjective sense of authority and entitlement. While this superiority has certainly fueled economists’ practical involvement and their considerable influence over the economy, it has also exposed them more to conflicts of interests, political critique, even derision.
Topic:
Economics, Academia, Social Science, and Hierarchy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

24. Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis

Author:
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner, Wolfgang Streeck, and Cornelia Woll
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or masquerade as such. The reverse may be true as well: deep moral-political conflicts may be waged through the manipulation of economic resources. Using the recent financial and Eurozone crises as empirical backgrounds, the four papers gathered here propose four different perspectives on the play of moral judgments in the economy, and call for broader and more systematic scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on executive compensation, bank bailouts, and the sovereign debt crisis, the symposium builds on a roundtable discussion held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.
Topic:
Economics, Financial Crisis, Banking, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Europe

25. Transnational Civil Society and the Consumer-friendly Turn in Financial Regulation

Author:
Lisa Kastner
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The literature on financial regulation has typically emphasized the role of the powerful financial industry in shaping regulatory outcomes. However, capture theories cannot explain the prominence of financial consumer protection in post-crisis reform agendas. By contrast, this paper argues that, despite their collective action disadvantage, a polymorphous network of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after the financial crisis and to influence the financial reform process. In this policy window, where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of expertise, a transnationally connected civil society network successfully raised the issue of consumer protection on reform agendas in tandem with public entrepreneurs and on the back of a popular backlash against big finance. This argument will be explored through a comparative study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe and the US in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In the conclusion, the paper discusses the substance of the financial reforms that have been undertaken.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Regulation, and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

26. Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage and Bad Working Conditions on the Exit–Voice Trade-off

Author:
Olivier Godechot and Zinaida Salibekyan
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Although Hirschman’s exit–voice theoretical model has been applied to labor markets, research up to now has not tested one of its most important features: the impact of job quality on exit–voice strategies. Hirschman’s model of consumer behavior explains that those individuals unsatisfied with a product’s quality are more likely to “voice,” whereas those more concerned with its price are more likely to “exit.” A rationale for this tradeoff is based on information: first, information on the price of alternative options is much more accessible than information on quality; second, voice produces more information than exit and favors opportunities for specific improvements. We transpose Hirschman’s assumptions to labor markets and use the French SalSa survey and DADS, declaration by employers on social data, to examine the conditions under which French employees are more likely to exit, and the conditions under which they are more likely to voice. Our results support the Hirschmanian hypothesis. A deterioration by one unit in our working-conditions index increases the probability of participation in collective action by 5 percentage points. An increase in log hourly wage by one unit decreases the probability of quitting by 5 percentage points.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Labor Market, and Workforce
Political Geography:
Global Focus