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21. The Chance of Influence: A Natural Experiment on the Role of Social Capital in Academic Hiring?

Author:
Olivier Godechot
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The effect of social capital is often overrated because contacts and centrality can be a consequence of success rather than its cause. Randomized or natural experiments are an excellent way to assess the real causal effect of social capital, but these are rare. This paper relies on data from one such experiment: recruitment at the EHESS, a leading social science institution in France, between 1960 and 2005. The EHESS recruitment process uses an electoral commission to produce a first-stage ranking of applicants, which is then provided to the faculty assembly for final voting. The commission is partly composed of faculty members drawn at random, a feature that this article exploits in order to compare the chances for success of applicants whose contacts have been drawn to sit on the commission (treated) versus those whose contacts have not been drawn (control). It shows that a contact such as a PhD advisor has a causal impact, especially for assistant professor hiring exams: it doubles the chance of being ranked and increases the share of votes by 10 percent. This phenomenon may explain part of the classic “academic inbreeding” issue.
Topic:
Academia, Social Capital, and Mentorship
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage and Bad Working Conditions on the Exit–Voice Trade-off

Author:
Olivier Godechot and Zinaida Salibekyan
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Although Hirschman’s exit–voice theoretical model has been applied to labor markets, research up to now has not tested one of its most important features: the impact of job quality on exit–voice strategies. Hirschman’s model of consumer behavior explains that those individuals unsatisfied with a product’s quality are more likely to “voice,” whereas those more concerned with its price are more likely to “exit.” A rationale for this tradeoff is based on information: first, information on the price of alternative options is much more accessible than information on quality; second, voice produces more information than exit and favors opportunities for specific improvements. We transpose Hirschman’s assumptions to labor markets and use the French SalSa survey and DADS, declaration by employers on social data, to examine the conditions under which French employees are more likely to exit, and the conditions under which they are more likely to voice. Our results support the Hirschmanian hypothesis. A deterioration by one unit in our working-conditions index increases the probability of participation in collective action by 5 percentage points. An increase in log hourly wage by one unit decreases the probability of quitting by 5 percentage points.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Labor Market, and Workforce
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Le salaire dépend-il du sexe du supérieur ?

Author:
Olivier Godechot
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Do female supervisors promote greater wage equality between men and women? Although female supervisors might want to promote greater equality, might they also lack power, not only to implement this policy, but also to improve the wages of both male and female subordinates? Based on the SalSa and COI surveys, we show that female supervisors do seem to reduce the wage gap between men and women. However, the subordinates of female supervisors also receive lower wages. This phenomenon could be related to selection bias : women become supervisors more easily in sectors, jobs, and departments that are less valued and where wages are lower. Even when adding controls for measurable selection effects, employees with a female supervisor earn 2.5% to 4% less than those with a male supervisor. Although the phenomenon still needs additional confirmation, the wage gap between women and men does seem wider when employees are men (–5% to –10%) than when they are women (0% to –3%). When the supervisor is a woman, the gender gap significantly reduces: from 30% to 85%. Interpreting this phenomenon is still in its infancy. We put forward four lines of interpretation: the unobserved differences between male and female managerial positions; the effect of individual characteristics correlated with the supervisor’s gender; differences between male and female dispositions to negotiation and competition; and, finally, discriminatory corporate behavior towards female demands.
Topic:
Women, Discrimination, Equality, Workforce, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus