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1. Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent traditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the European Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of “non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Government, Politics, and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Representative versus Responsible Government

Author:
Peter Mair
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The changing circumstances in which parties compete in contemporary democracies, coupled with the changing circumstances in which governments now govern, have led to a widening of the traditional gap between representative and responsible government. Although it is generally seen as desirable that parties in government are both representative and responsible, these two characteristics are now becoming increasingly incompatible. Prudence and consistency in government, as well as accountability, require conformity to external constraints and legacies. This means more than just answering to public opinion. While these external constraints and legacies have become weightier in recent years, public opinion, in its turn, has become harder and harder for governments to read. Hence we see the growing incompatibility. Meanwhile, because of changes in their organizations and in their relationship with civil society, parties are no longer in a position to bridge or “manage” this gap, or even to persuade voters to accept it as a necessary element in political life. This growing incompatibility is one of the principal sources of the democratic malaise that confronts many Western democracies today.
Topic:
Democratization, Government, Politics, and Governance

3. Flexible Markets, Stable Societies?

Author:
Wolfgang Streeck
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The dissolution of the standard employment relationship since the 1970s has been paralleled by a destabilization of family relations. The paper, which is a slightly revised version of a plenary lecture at the 2008 Meeting of the German Sociological Association, discusses possible connections between the rise of more flexible labor market and family structures, and explores how they might tie in with the declining birth rate. The co-evolution of labor markets and family relations can be explained by both the attractions and the constraints of free markets. The current shift toward a new social policy aimed at increasing fertility is presented as an example of how expanding market relations and the uncertainty to which they give rise in personal life cause demands for state intervention. The logic seems remarkably similar to that of the current banking crisis, where the liberation of financial markets from traditional constraints and the progressive commodification of money have ultimately issued in irresistible pressures on the state to step in and restore the social commons of stable expectations and mutual confidence. In both cases, and perhaps generally, capitalism seems to imply a need for a public power capable of creating substitutes for social relations invaded by market relations and as a consequence losing their capacity to perform some of their previous functions.
Topic:
Government, Markets, Political Economy, and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Germany

4. Can We Reform the Welfare State in Times of ”Grey“ Majorities? The Myth of an Electoral Opposition between Younger and Older Voters in Germany

Author:
Achim Goerres
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Is there an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena that could lead to the obstruction of welfare-state reforms? This article argues that this notion is a myth and lacks empirical evidence for the case of Germany. It is true that (a) there are imminent majorities of voters aged 50 and older; (b) older voters benefit from many welfare state programs and (c) life-cycle interests shape some attitudes towards single public policies. However, these facts alone do not represent an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena. Firstly, differences in party preferences between age groups are due to generational effects associated with early political socialization. Secondly, life-cycle interests do not shape the German party competition because age is not a political division line (cleavage). Young age/old age is only a transitional boundary that all of us aspire to cross, meaning that material old-age interests are important to everyone. Finally, grey interests parties are notoriously weak and try to become parties for the interests of all age groups.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

5. Wie viel Erbschaftssteuern?

Author:
Jens Beckert
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Germany introduced a federal inheritance tax in 1906. Historically, the share of its revenues compared to total tax revenues has always been low. Currently, less than one percent of total revenues are generated from inheritance tax. In countries like France, the United States and England, inheritance tax revenues are higher. With its ruling in 2007 the German supreme court has forced parliament to revise regulations on inheritance taxation. Various proposals are currently the subject of intense political debate. I take this discussion as the starting point for an investigation of fundamental arguments for and against estate taxation. Proposing that inheritances be taxed as a further type of income within the context of the income tax, I examine the impact of inheritance taxes on economic performance, family solidarity and the political community as well as the relationship between inheritance taxation and important value principles of individual freedom, social justice and equality of opportunity.
Topic:
Government and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

6. Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and firms, regardless of the ultimate origin – international, European or national – of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European “government of governments” is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance – especially the rules of negative integration defined by politically non-accountable actors – may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply.
Topic:
Government, International Law, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Social Democrats and Education Spending: A Refined Perspective on Supply-Side Strategies

Author:
Marius R. Busemeyer
Publication Date:
06-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper builds on the arguments developed by Carles Boix (1997, 1998) about partisan differences in supply-side oriented strategies. The original Boix model argues that social democrats in government prefer to increase public investment in human capital formation, while conservatives are opposed to this. The model is presented and subjected to a comprehensive empirical test. It is argued that it is necessary to determine the dynamics of spending in each educational sector separately. In addition, economic internationalization is not treated as a background variable as with Boix (1997, 1998), but fully included in the analysis. Finally, instead of relying on a simple dichotomy of leftist and rightist parties, the impact of government participation on the part of social democrats, Christian democrats and conservatives is analysed. The empirical test supports the Boix model only on a very general level. Social democrats are found for the most part to increase spending on higher education, which is at odds with the predictions of the Boix model and partisan theory in general. The paper concludes with a discussion of the consequence of the findings for the development of partisan theory.
Topic:
Economics, Education, Government, and Political Economy

8. Corporate Values in Local Contexts: Work Systems and Workers' Welfare in Western and Eastern Europe

Author:
Marta Kahancová
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Increased international competition poses challenges to companies' organizational practices, including human resource management. For multinational companies operating simultaneously in diverse local conditions this challenge implies a decision between either opting for universal best practices or adapting their employment strategy to differing local standards in host countries. What influences whether work practices are similar or differ when deployed in differing conditions? Why are some companies committed to their workers' welfare while others are not? This paper attempts to answer these questions by studying work practices, namely work systems and fringe benefits, in a Dutch multinational company (MNC) and its manufacturing subsidiaries in Western and Eastern Europe. Evidence suggests that the observed patterns are best explained by the interplay of three factors. Rational economic interest, company values, and local institutions yield subsidiary work practices that are embedded in, but not adapted to, local standards. The MNC's value system accounts for the fact that generous benefits are offered without a direct relation to the company's profit maximization and without external societal and institutional pressures to provide such benefits.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?

Author:
Cornelia Woll
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-á-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business—government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Lobbying Systems in the European Union: A Quantitative Study

Author:
Andreas Broscheid and David Coen
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper presents and tests a micro-theoretical model of EU lobbying across policy domains. In particular, we focus on two questions: first, we want to know why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains and, second, we investigate why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation in some policy domains but not in others. Our argument focuses on the Commission's need for expert information and its costs of managing contacts with a large number of interest representatives. Both factors provide incentives for the Commission to create restricted-access fora as the number of interest representatives increases. Using cross-sectional data on interest representation in a wide range of policy domains, we find some support for our hypotheses.
Topic:
Development, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe