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31. Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State

Author:
Wolfgang Streeck and Christine Trampusch
Publication Date:
02-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The key to economic reform in Germany is a significant reduction in the high costs of labour.The main factor driving up German labour costs is the funding of the extensive German welfare state through social insurance contributions that in effect operate like payroll taxes on employment. The paper discusses the political causes of the rise in non-wage labour costs since the 1970s. It then proceeds to show how a variety of opportunities for political blockade in the German political economy dim the prospect for effective reform in the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

32. The Dog that Would Never Bite? The Past and Future of the Stability and Growth Pact

Author:
Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper analyses the underlying reasons for the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its subsequent development in recent years. The paper examines the economic and political factors behind it, including the role of economic ideas, experts, politicians, institutional arrangements in the Maastricht Treaty, domestic politics, and the exceptional position of Germany in the realm of monetary integration in the EU. It concludes that a set of commonly held beliefs together with a corresponding power-political constellation explain the creation of the SGP.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

33. The Politics of the German Company Network

Author:
Martin Höpner and Lothar Krempel
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
For over 100 years, the German company network was a major feature of organized corporate governance in Germany. This paper uses network visualization techniques and qualitative-historical analysis to discuss the structure, origins and development of this network and to analyze the reasons for its recent erosion. Network visualization makes it possible to identify crucial entanglement patterns that can be traced back historically. In three phases of network formation – the 1880s, 1920s and the 1950s –, capital entanglement resulted from the interplay of company behavior and government policy. In its heyday, the company network was de facto encompassing and provided its core participants, especially the banks, with a national, macroeconomic perspective. In the 1970s, a process of increased competition among financial companies set in. In the 1980s and 1990s, declining returns from blockholding and increased opportunity costs made network dissolution a thinkable option for companies. Because of the strategic reorientation of the largest banks toward investment banking, ties between banks and industry underwent functional changes. Since the year 2000, the German government's tax policy has sped up network erosion. Vanishing capital ties imply a declining degree of strategic coordination among large German companies.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

34. The Effects of Convergence: Internationalisation and the Changing Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms

Author:
Anke Hassel and Jürgen Beyer
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The paper examines whether and how the increasing internationalisation of firms impacts on the operation of a co-ordinated market economy. Following the tenets of agency theory it assumes that an emerging market for corporate control changes the monitoring mechanisms that oversee management. Since Anglo- American forms of monitoring are usually associated with a higher return for investors compared with Continental European firms, a change in the distribution of the net value added of firms is expected. Using financial data on 59 large German companies, the paper shows that the emerging convergence of German corporate governance practices to Anglo-American standards has had a weak, but significant, impact on the distribution of net value added. This is in contrast to the impact of the internationalisation of firms on product markets, which does not have an effect. Since the market for corporate control is, however, still underdeveloped in Germany, the main effects remain to be seen.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
America, Europe, and Germany

35. Institutional Change and the Uses and Limits of Path Dependency: The Case of German Finance

Author:
Richard Deeg
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
How can we determine when an existing institutional path or trajectory is ending and being replaced with a new one? How does such a process take place? How can we distinguish between institutional innovation within an existing trajectory and a switchover to a new trajectory or path? This paper explores these questions by examining the pattern of institutional change in the German financial system. The paper advances four theoretical claims: First, that endogenous developments can disrupt an institutional path and lead to a new one. Second, that an event sequence involving a move to a new institutional path may not follow from a contingent event yet may nonetheless be marked by increasing returns processes. Third, that increasing returns in politics are not automatic and must be cultivated by actors in order to be realized. Finally, that the concept of path is still in need of a measurable conceptualization before any further advances in path dependent arguments can be made.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Germany

36. Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany

Author:
Martin Hopner
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Within the context of debates over national “varieties” of capitalism, this paper discusses the shareholder value orientation of the 40 largest listed German companies. Three dimensions of shareholder value are distinguished: the communicative dimension, the operative dimension and the dimension of managerial compensation. A shareholder value index compiling data on accounting, investor relations, variable top-management compensation and the implementation of profitability goals makes it possible to compare the shareholder orientations of the companies. The shareholder value phenomenon is explained first by the exposure to markets – the international product market, capital market pressures and the market for corporate control – and, secondly, by internal developments – changing management careers, increasing management compensation and reduced monitoring by banks and corporate networks – which cause external impulses to increase shareholder value to fall on fertile ground. Conflicts over shareholder orientation result in changing coalitions between shareholders, management, and employees. Shareholder value does not make companies opt out of central collective agreements or endanger the existence of employees' codetermination, but it does lead to more market-driven industrial relations.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Germany

37. An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance

Author:
Gregory Jackson and Martin Hopner
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Corporate governance in Germany is often described as a bank-oriented, blockholder or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control have not played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. These changes include the strategic reorientation of German banks from the “house bank” to investment banking, the growing consensus and productivity orientation of employee codetermination and corporate law reform. A significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control. The implications for the German model are examined in light of both claims by agency theory for the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities within Germany's specific “variety” of capitalism. While the efficiency effects are questionable, the growing pressures for German corporations to achieve the higher stock market valuations of their Anglo-American competitors threaten the distributional compromises underlying the German model.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
America and Germany

38. Wage Coordination and the Welfare State: Germany and Japan Compared

Author:
Philip Manow
Publication Date:
12-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Is there a relation between welfare state regimes and national wage setting systems? Peter Swenson in his research on the historical dynamics of the US-American and Swedish welfare state has recently claimed that such a relation does indeed exist. The essay aims to check if this also holds true for the German and Japanese case. In the post-war period both countries have established systems of wage-bargaining that are less centralized than the Swedish system, but in which wages are highly coordinated both within and across sectors, and, subsequently, in which wage compression is relatively high as well. Thus, both countries are confronted with the same problems of wage- and welfare-drift and of firms' exit from the 'solidaristic' or coordinated wage setting that are so typical for Sweden. At the same time the German and Japanese welfare state differ from each other in almost all dimensions. Thus, both cases seem to be ideally suited to provide for a plausibility-check of the Swenson hypothesis. The essay reaches the conclusion that there is indeed ample evidence that both the German and the Japanese welfare state contributed critically to the stability of wage coordination in the era of high growth after World War II. They thus have to be understood as an integral part of the German and Japanese post-war growth model.
Topic:
Economics, Human Welfare, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, America, and Germany