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Begin New Search Political Geography Germany Publishing Institution Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

31. An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance

Author:
Gregory Jackson and Martin Hopner
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Corporate governance in Germany is often described as a bank-oriented, blockholder or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control have not played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. These changes include the strategic reorientation of German banks from the “house bank” to investment banking, the growing consensus and productivity orientation of employee codetermination and corporate law reform. A significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control. The implications for the German model are examined in light of both claims by agency theory for the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities within Germany's specific “variety” of capitalism. While the efficiency effects are questionable, the growing pressures for German corporations to achieve the higher stock market valuations of their Anglo-American competitors threaten the distributional compromises underlying the German model.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
America and Germany

32. Wage Coordination and the Welfare State: Germany and Japan Compared

Author:
Philip Manow
Publication Date:
12-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Is there a relation between welfare state regimes and national wage setting systems? Peter Swenson in his research on the historical dynamics of the US-American and Swedish welfare state has recently claimed that such a relation does indeed exist. The essay aims to check if this also holds true for the German and Japanese case. In the post-war period both countries have established systems of wage-bargaining that are less centralized than the Swedish system, but in which wages are highly coordinated both within and across sectors, and, subsequently, in which wage compression is relatively high as well. Thus, both countries are confronted with the same problems of wage- and welfare-drift and of firms' exit from the 'solidaristic' or coordinated wage setting that are so typical for Sweden. At the same time the German and Japanese welfare state differ from each other in almost all dimensions. Thus, both cases seem to be ideally suited to provide for a plausibility-check of the Swenson hypothesis. The essay reaches the conclusion that there is indeed ample evidence that both the German and the Japanese welfare state contributed critically to the stability of wage coordination in the era of high growth after World War II. They thus have to be understood as an integral part of the German and Japanese post-war growth model.
Topic:
Economics, Human Welfare, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, America, and Germany