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41. Can We Reform the Welfare State in Times of ”Grey“ Majorities? The Myth of an Electoral Opposition between Younger and Older Voters in Germany

Author:
Achim Goerres
Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Is there an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena that could lead to the obstruction of welfare-state reforms? This article argues that this notion is a myth and lacks empirical evidence for the case of Germany. It is true that (a) there are imminent majorities of voters aged 50 and older; (b) older voters benefit from many welfare state programs and (c) life-cycle interests shape some attitudes towards single public policies. However, these facts alone do not represent an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena. Firstly, differences in party preferences between age groups are due to generational effects associated with early political socialization. Secondly, life-cycle interests do not shape the German party competition because age is not a political division line (cleavage). Young age/old age is only a transitional boundary that all of us aspire to cross, meaning that material old-age interests are important to everyone. Finally, grey interests parties are notoriously weak and try to become parties for the interests of all age groups.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

42. Wie viel Erbschaftssteuern?

Author:
Jens Beckert
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Germany introduced a federal inheritance tax in 1906. Historically, the share of its revenues compared to total tax revenues has always been low. Currently, less than one percent of total revenues are generated from inheritance tax. In countries like France, the United States and England, inheritance tax revenues are higher. With its ruling in 2007 the German supreme court has forced parliament to revise regulations on inheritance taxation. Various proposals are currently the subject of intense political debate. I take this discussion as the starting point for an investigation of fundamental arguments for and against estate taxation. Proposing that inheritances be taxed as a further type of income within the context of the income tax, I examine the impact of inheritance taxes on economic performance, family solidarity and the political community as well as the relationship between inheritance taxation and important value principles of individual freedom, social justice and equality of opportunity.
Topic:
Government and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

43. Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and firms, regardless of the ultimate origin – international, European or national – of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European “government of governments” is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance – especially the rules of negative integration defined by politically non-accountable actors – may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply.
Topic:
Government, International Law, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe

44. Corporate Values in Local Contexts: Work Systems and Workers' Welfare in Western and Eastern Europe

Author:
Marta Kahancová
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Increased international competition poses challenges to companies' organizational practices, including human resource management. For multinational companies operating simultaneously in diverse local conditions this challenge implies a decision between either opting for universal best practices or adapting their employment strategy to differing local standards in host countries. What influences whether work practices are similar or differ when deployed in differing conditions? Why are some companies committed to their workers' welfare while others are not? This paper attempts to answer these questions by studying work practices, namely work systems and fringe benefits, in a Dutch multinational company (MNC) and its manufacturing subsidiaries in Western and Eastern Europe. Evidence suggests that the observed patterns are best explained by the interplay of three factors. Rational economic interest, company values, and local institutions yield subsidiary work practices that are embedded in, but not adapted to, local standards. The MNC's value system accounts for the fact that generous benefits are offered without a direct relation to the company's profit maximization and without external societal and institutional pressures to provide such benefits.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

45. Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?

Author:
Cornelia Woll
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-á-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business—government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

46. Lobbying Systems in the European Union: A Quantitative Study

Author:
Andreas Broscheid and David Coen
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper presents and tests a micro-theoretical model of EU lobbying across policy domains. In particular, we focus on two questions: first, we want to know why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains and, second, we investigate why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation in some policy domains but not in others. Our argument focuses on the Commission's need for expert information and its costs of managing contacts with a large number of interest representatives. Both factors provide incentives for the Commission to create restricted-access fora as the number of interest representatives increases. Using cross-sectional data on interest representation in a wide range of policy domains, we find some support for our hypotheses.
Topic:
Development, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

47. Collective Bargaining Practices in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from Romania

Author:
Aurora Trif
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
There are several studies on recent developments in collective bargaining in Eastern Europe, but there is still a debate about the extent to which collective bargaining practices resemble those in continental Western Europe. This paper aims to contribute to this debate, by examining primary data on collective bargaining practices in Romania using an actor-centred institutionalist approach. It focuses on collective bargaining in four large chemical companies. Comparisons are made to other countries in order to highlight the developments in Romanian cases. Unexpectedly, the study's findings point to an increase in state intervention in establishing the terms and conditions of employment after 1989, due to the state’s new roles during the transformation process that affected job security. The study suggests a considerable increase in the influence of top managers in determining pay and working conditions, while trade unions retained the considerable influence over social benefits in large companies. The findings show continuance of certain pre-1989 practices, such as a persistence of high state intervention and a limited independence of the trade unions from the management. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of institutional changes in the context of a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Romania

48. No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

49. Strategic Unionism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania

Author:
Aurora Trif and Karl Koch
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The shift from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economic models presented trade unions in Eastern European countries with crucial choices in relation to their roles as industrial relations actors. This paper investigates whether (and why) unions have chosen adversarial and/or co-operative relationships with the employers, based on a strategic choice conceptual framework. It focuses on trade union relations with employers at national, sectoral and company levels in Romania. It is argued that adversarial and co-operative relations between unions and employers developed simultaneously after 1989, but co-operation was the prevalent approach. Evidence suggests that ideological legacies, former institutions and the initial decision to participate in the macroeconomic transformation played a key role in shaping unions' choices towards co-operation with employers. Although this paper confirms the widespread view that labour is rather weak in Eastern Europe, it indicates that unions can be proactive and shape their own future if they have the capacity to mobilise their members and union leaders have the skills and willingness to use both conflict and co-operation in their relationships with employers. The comparison of evidence from Romania with other Eastern European countries reflects on the stage of Romanian transformation and also illustrates a wider possible applicability of the theoretical framework employed for the study.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Romania

50. Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State

Author:
Wolfgang Streeck and Christine Trampusch
Publication Date:
02-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The key to economic reform in Germany is a significant reduction in the high costs of labour.The main factor driving up German labour costs is the funding of the extensive German welfare state through social insurance contributions that in effect operate like payroll taxes on employment. The paper discusses the political causes of the rise in non-wage labour costs since the 1970s. It then proceeds to show how a variety of opportunities for political blockade in the German political economy dim the prospect for effective reform in the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany